Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BERLIN1470
2009-11-18 14:59:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:  

ON THE EVE OF THE KARZAI INAUGURAL: GERMAN VIEWS

Tags:  PREL MARR NATO ECON EAID GM AF PK 
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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHRL #1470/01 3221459
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181459Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5830
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0544
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0671
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0892
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001470 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO ECON EAID GM AF PK
SUBJECT: ON THE EVE OF THE KARZAI INAUGURAL: GERMAN VIEWS
ON U.S. PRIORITIES, DUAL-HATTING PROPOSAL, AND CONFERENCE

REF: A. STATE 118297

B. BERLIN 1447 (NOTAL)

C. BERLIN 1273

Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR STAN OTTO. REASONS:
1.4 (B) AND (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001470

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO ECON EAID GM AF PK
SUBJECT: ON THE EVE OF THE KARZAI INAUGURAL: GERMAN VIEWS
ON U.S. PRIORITIES, DUAL-HATTING PROPOSAL, AND CONFERENCE

REF: A. STATE 118297

B. BERLIN 1447 (NOTAL)

C. BERLIN 1273

Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR STAN OTTO. REASONS:
1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Germany completely shares U.S. priorities for
the new Afghan government, and FM Westerwelle plans to
reinforce these points in a scheduled bilateral meeting with
Karzai after the November 19 inauguration. The German MFA
remains skeptical about the idea of dual-hatting the U.S.
Ambassador in Kabul as the coordinator of all international
civilian assistance, preferring strongly to achieve the
desired effect through a strengthening of UN efforts. The
Chancellery and MFA have developed a short list of
replacements for German SRAP Muetzelburg, which includes both
politicians and career diplomats, but have still not come to
a decision. The German MFA believes the planned
international conference on Afghanistan needs to be only a
day or two long and should be restricted to updating the
benchmarks in Annex 1 of the 2006 Afghanistan Compact. END
SUMMARY.

TOTAL AGREEMENT ON U.S. PRIORITIES FOR NEW GOVERNMENT


2. (S/NF) Post delivered ref A points on U.S. priorities for
the new Afghan government to MFA Afghanistan-Pakistan Task
Force Director Ruediger Koenig on November 17 and followed up
with him on November 18. Koenig emphasized that Germany
"completely agreed" with the U.S. message. He confirmed that
German FM Westerwelle would attend the November 19
inauguration and would have a bilateral meeting with
President Karzai later that afternoon, where he planned to
make these same points. Koenig said that Karzai, thanks to
the U.S. Embassy's close coordination with the President, was
expected to say the right things in his inaugural speech, so
Westerwelle would focus on emphasizing the need to put these
words into action. Koenig added, however, that the German
Embassy in Kabul had reported there were credible rumors that
President Obama could make a surprise appearance at the
inauguration, which presumably would upset these plans for a
bilateral meeting. (Comment: Koenig reassured us that the
information about a possible POTUS visit had been relayed by
secure means and had been restricted to just a handful of
people at the MFA. End Comment.)

SKEPTICISM ABOUT DUAL-HATTING PROPOSAL


3. (S/NF) Regarding the U.S. proposal to dual-hat the U.S.
Ambassador in Kabul as the overall coordinator of
international civilian assistance in Afghanistan (ref B),
Koenig said bluntly that Germany had "great skepticism" that

this was feasible or even desirable. While emphasizing that
the German objections had nothing to do with Amb. Eikenberry
as a person, Koenig raised a number of questions: On what
basis could the U.S. Ambassador credibly coordinate the
efforts of the UN, EU and other actors? Who would give him
his mandate? What authority would he have to carry out
decisions? Wouldn't this just reinforce the perception of
"Americanization" and undermine the commitment of other
countries to the mission? Koenig said this coordination role
more appropriately resided with the UN. While acknowledging
UNAMA's weakness, Koenig argued in favor of strengthening the
UN effort rather than subordinating it to a U.S. coordinator.



4. (C) Koenig suggested that one way to strengthen the UN
effort was to appoint a high-powered UN Special
Representative, who would stand above UNAMA and the other UN
agencies in Afghanistan and would therefore not be consumed
with day-to-day management issues. He noted that this was
the situation when Lakhdar Brahimi was the first SRSG, with
Francesc Vendrell running UNAMA. He noted that this would be
equivalent to the new intermediate command arrangements for
ISAF, which allows COMISAF GEN McChrystal to focus on larger
strategic and political questions.

DECISION STILL PENDING ON NEW GERMAN SRAP


5. (C) Koenig said that, contrary to what MFA State Minister
Werner Hoyer told SRAP Holbrooke during their November 12
meeting in Berlin, a decision will not be made on the new
German SRAP before FM Westerwelle's trip to Afghanistan.

BERLIN 00001470 002 OF 002


Koenig said that a short list of candidates is under review
by the Chancellery and MFA, but there is still no agreement.
He declined to give any names of those under consideration,
but said they included politicians, both active and retired,
as well as career diplomats. He reiterated his belief that
an active Bundestag member was unlikely to be chosen, given
the travel demands of being the SRAP. Meanwhile, current
German SRAP Muetzelburg remains on the job and will travel
with Westerwelle to Kabul for the inauguration.

PRELIMINARY IDEAS ON CONFERENCE


6. (C) Koenig will also travel with the minister to Kabul and
plans to stay on to have consultations with UNAMA and others
about the planned international conference on Afghanistan.
Koenig said it appeared that the January 28 date was firming
up, with London as the venue. He thought the conference
could be done on a single day, and should not be more than
two days maximum. Koenig reiterated his view (ref C) that it
was not necessary -- or desirable -- to re-negotiate the
whole 2006 Afghanistan Compact. The only part that required
updating were the benchmarks in Annex 1 of the Compact. The
goal of the conference was to get commitments from the Afghan
government on how it planned to carry out reforms and begin
taking over responsibility from the international community;
in return, the international community would indicate how it
would assist in this effort. It should not be a pledging
conference per se. He assumed that the conference would be
conducted at the level of foreign ministers, although he
acknowledged that the Chancellery might have other ideas
since the conference had been a joint proposal of Chancellor
Merkel, French President Sarkozy and UK PM Brown.
MURPHY

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