GERMAN VIEWS ON RUSSIA AND UKRAINE IN ADVANCE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001442

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2019
TAGS: GM EU NATO PREL RU UNSC PGOV IR UP GG
SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON RUSSIA AND UKRAINE IN ADVANCE OF
THE NOVEMBER 16-17 EU GAERC

REF: STATE DEPARTMENT POINTS ON NOVEMBER 16-17 2009
GAERC TOPICS

Classified By: Deputy Political Minister Counselor Stan Otto for reason
s 1.4 (B) and (C).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Germany largely supports the U.S. position
laid out in reftel: continued engagement with Russia on
difficult issues such as Iran and Georgia remains necessary,
and the negative developments in Ukraine reinforce the need
for Ukrainian leaders to work together. Despite a negative
outlook on recent developments in Ukraine, Germany together
with France and Poland plans to present a joint letter in
Kyiv early next week, pleading with the leaders to cooperate.
However, German MFA sees little chance that the domestic
situation in Ukraine will improve before the scheduled
January presidential elections. On Russia, the MFA appears
more upbeat, hoping that Russia will support stronger
sanctions against Iran in the new year, and respond more
proactively to U.S. efforts to push the "reset button." The
MFA itself is waiting with bated breath to see what tone FM
Westerwelle will set with Russia during his first trip as
foreign minister to Moscow on November 20. END SUMMARY.

ADJUSTING TO A NEW FOREIGN MINISTER


2. (C) The coalition agreement between the Christian
Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the
Free Democratic Party (FDP) emphasizes the important role
Russia plays "when dealing with regional and global
challenges," but some within the MFA expect the new foreign
minister to focus more on democracy, rule of law, and civil
society, according to MFA Deputy Head of Division for Russia,
Ukraine, and Belarus Henning Simon. Although no major policy
change vis-a-vis Russia is anticipated, the MFA is preparing
itself for a minister more openly critical of Russia. The
MFA hopes that Westerwelle's short trip to Moscow on November
20 will provide clarification on what the new minister
intends to emphasize during his tenure. Westerwelle has a
confirmed meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and is
still pursuing an appointment with President Medvedev.

GETTING RUSSIA TO MEET THE U.S. HALF WAY


3. (C) In preparing Westerwelle for his trip, the MFA
division responsible for Russia is encouraging the foreign
minister to convey German hopes that Russia engage the U.S
more actively in improving bilateral relations. Germany thus
far has been "disappointed" by the Russian response following
"significant U.S. policy changes." The MFA hopes that
Westerwelle will agree to press Lavrov and possibly Medvedev
to "not waste the opportunity the U.S. has offered." Germany
frets that if Russia does not prove to be a more tractable
partner for the U.S., the "U.S. will give up on or sideline
Russia when possible." If Russia wants to maintain a
significant role in world politics, they need to seize this
opportunity.

ENGAGING RUSSIA ON IRAN, GEORGIA


4. (C) More specifically, the MFA judges it likely that
Russia will support stronger sanctions against Iran in the
new year, assuming that Iran stays its current course.
Indeed, the MFA appears ready to pressure Russia on this
matter. On Georgia, the MFA views EUR A/S Gordon's
participation in the Geneva Talks on November 11 as assuaging
Russian and European concerns that AMERICA no longer viewed
the Geneva Talks as significant. Although the MFA found the
November 11 round to be "less than satisfying," the MFA
supports the process as it presents the only forum where "we
can engage Russia on these issues."

JOINT APPEAL TO UKRAINE


5. (C) Regarding Ukraine, the MFA agrees that the recent
decision to increase wages and pensions was irresponsible,
and fears that Kyiv's fiscal posture will soon reach a
critical state. However, Germany sees "no chance that
Ukraine's leaders finally work together." While expressing
some skepticism that Kyiv would hold elections in January as
planned, MFA contacts hope that Ukraine may prove to be a
more responsible partner after the election. Despite this
pessimistic outlook, Paris, Warsaw, and Berlin have prepared
a joint letter to be delivered in Kyiv, in which they once
again plead for Ukrainian leaders to cooperate.

COMMENT


6. (C) Those responsible for Russia policy in the MFA appear

genuinely uncertain of what approach Westerwelle will take
vis-a-vis Moscow, although they acknowledge it is unlikely to
deviate greatly from the post-Cold War norm. While the
pro-business FDP puts a strong emphasis on foreign economic
interests -- and therefore good relations with Moscow -- it
also prides itself on strong civil libertarian values, which
may lead it to be more openly critical of internal Russian
political and economic developments.
MURPHY