GERMAN VIEWS ON NOVEMBER 16-17 EU GAERC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001441

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2019
TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV MARR MOPS BO RU UP SO BK
SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON NOVEMBER 16-17 EU GAERC

REF: 11/9 EUR/ERA E-MAIL

Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR STAN OTTO. REASONS:
1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. On Belarus, Germany concedes that the GAERC
is likely to extend both the sanctions regime and the
suspension of those sanctions until October 2010, but
continues to believe that it would be better to extend them
only to May 2010. Germany is eager to increase cooperation
with Russia under ESDP, but acknowledges that Moscow's strong
reluctance to subordinate its forces to EU command remains a
major stumbling block. Germany remains dismissive of
Ukrainian entreaties on visa liberalization given Kyiv's lack
of commitment on economic reforms. Germany agrees that the
international community has an interest in supporting the
Somalian government in the training of its security forces,
but still has misgivings about the proposed ESDP training
mission. Given the lack of progress in the recent Butmir
Talks, Germany acknowledges that the OHR in Bosnia will have
to remain open at least another year, which, in turn, means
maintaining EUFOR Althea at its current strength. END
SUMMARY.


2. (U) Post discussed ref points with MFA European
Corespondent Michael Fluegger on November 13.

B TEAM ON SECOND DAY OF THE GAERC


3. (SBU) Fluegger reported that Germany will be represented
at ministerial level only during the first day of the jumbo
GAERC. On November 17, FM Westerwelle and Defense Minister
zu Guttenberg will join the rest of the German cabinet in a
day-long, off-site meeting at Meseberg Castle in Brandenburg,
70 km. north of Berlin. New MFA State Secretary Wolf-Ruthart
Born and MOD State Ruediger Wolf will sit in for their
principals at the GAERC.

BELARUS


4. (C) Fluegger confirmed that both the sanctions regime and
the suspension of the sanctions would be extended until
October 2010. Fluegger said the German preference had been
to extend both only until May 2010, thereby giving Belarus a
stronger incentive to have free and fair elections in April.
The ministers are likely to agree to a Polish-proposed
"review clause," which will allow the sanctions to be
re-visited at any time. Fluegger said Germany supported this
idea, but conceded that it would have limited impact because
consensus will be necessary to activate the review.

RUSSIA


5. (C) Fluegger noted that one of the issues under discussion
was the idea of negotiating a framework agreement with Moscow
that would facilitate Russian participation in ESDP missions,
like the Atalanta counterpiracy operation. The EU wanted to
build on recent successful Russian-EU cooperation, in which
Russia had provided helicopters in support of the EU mission
in Chad. But while other non-EU countries, like Norway, had
no problem subordinating their forces to the EU, this
remained a major stumbling block to greater operational
cooperation between Russia and the EU.

UKRAINE


6. (C) Fluegger said Germany completely shared the U.S. view
that Ukraine had to get its political act together and meet
its commitments. He complained that the Ukrainians were
seeking EU visa liberalization, but were unwilling to make
the economic reforms necessary to ensure that this did not
result in masses of "economic refugees" flowing into Western
Europe.

SOMALIA


7. (C) Fluegger said Germany agreed that the EU should do
everything possible to support the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) of Somalia in building up its security
forces. However, Germany had "many questions" about the
proposed ESDP mission to train TFG troops. Fluegger noted
that notional planning envisioned deploying about 100 EU
personnel to Djibouti, Uganda or Kenya to train some 2,000
TFG soldiers. Fluegger said it was still not clear to
Germany how the TFG soldiers would be recruited, paid or
armed. Germany was also concerned that there were not
sufficient safeguards in place to keep track of trained
soldiers and to ensure that they did not desert their units
and sell their weapons and uniforms upon returning to
Somalia. Fluegger said that while France was the most
enthusiastic about the proposed ESDP mission, the UK was the
most skeptical. He claimed that Germany was somewhere in the
middle.

BOSNIA


8. (C) Fluegger confirmed that Germany had reluctantly come
to the conclusion that the Office of High Representative
(OHR) would have to remain open. Given the limited progress
in the Butmir Talks, the planned transition to the EU Special
Representative would have to be delayed for at least another
year, until after next year's elections in Bosnia. Fluegger
said that as long as the OHR remained open, the EU Althea
Force would have to stay in place. Notwithstanding Spanish
plans to withdraw its contingent, Germany was hopeful that
the EUFOR numbers would remain relatively stable. Since
EUFOR Althea was only about 2,000 troops strong, the
withdrawal of even relatively small units would have a
significant impact. Fluegger said that Germany planned to
maintain its current contribution of 140.
MURPHY