ACTING MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR HABER ON BOSNIA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001435 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EUN PHUM GM TU BK SUBJECT: ACTING MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR HABER ON BOSNIA AND TURKEY Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Acting MFA Political Director Emily Haber, who is the MFA's Special Envoy for Southeast Europe and Turkey, discussed follow-up to the Butmir Talks and the future of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia with EUR A/S Gordon during a November 10 meeting in Berlin. Haber warned against moving too fast to blame one party for the lack of progress in the talks because doing so would take the pressure off the other two parties to make necessary concessions. Haber confirmed that Germany was no longer pushing to close the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia, given the need for additional progress on fulfilling the 5-plus-2 agenda, but argued that something had to be done to make the OHR more effective. Haber also expressed concern that EU negotiations with Turkey could soon collapse, given the lack of substance to negotiate, thereby significantly weakening what has been an important lever of reform in Turkey. END SUMMARY. FOLLOW-UP ON BUTMIR TALKS ¶2. (C) Haber agreed that while the first two rounds of Butmir talks were disappointing, it was positive that the process is still alive. Haber thought it was important not to be too quick to single out one particular party to blame for the impasse. While Republika Srpska (RS) PM Dodic may prove to be the main stumbling block to agreement on a reform package, fingering him now would take pressure off the Croats and the Bosniaks, who also had not been helpful. Haber suggested a division of labor in pressuring the parties back to the table -- the Europeans should focus on Dodic, while the U.S. and Turkey should concentrate on the Bosniaks. Haber said the best lever against Dodic is to threaten to limit his travel to the EU. He now travels regularly to Germany (Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hessen) for business. ¶3. (C) Gordon said he was skeptical about whether the Turks would help out in pressuring the Bosniaks. Haber agreed that the Turks had not been very active on Bosnia and were usually represented at Peace Implementation Council (PIC) meetings only at ambassadorial level. By contrast, Haber claimed that the Russians have played a surprisingly helpful role recently in pressuring Dodic and other RS politicians to accept federal authority. For example, when RS politicians complained about Bosnia pursuing NATO membership, Moscow supposedly declined to get involved and replied that this was something that should be decided at the federal level of the Bosnian state. STRENGTHENING THE OHR ¶4. (C) Haber confirmed that Germany now agrees that Bosnia is not ready for closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and transition to an EU Special Representative. While Germany had been pushing for that before, it will not support that step at the November 19-20 Peace Implementation Council (PIC) meeting. At the same time, Haber argued that the current OHR was ineffective and needed to be strengthened. She asked what we had in mind in proposing a reinforced OHR. She thought that simply changing or adding personnel would not be enough. Unfortunately, the Butmir Talks had further weakened the OHR because Inzko turned out to be such a marginal player in the presence of Deputy Secretary Steinberg and Swedish FM Bildt. ¶5. (C) Gordon said part of the problem was that closure of the OHR had been anticipated for so long, the position was now viewed as a lame duck. To change that perception, it would be necessary to make a clear commitment to maintain the OHR and perhaps to name a new High Rep and deputy to provide a fresh start. KEEPING TURKEY ON THE PATH OF REFORM ¶6. (C) Haber said that there are only subtle differences in how Turkey is addressed in the coalition agreement of the new German government compared to that from 2005. As before, the coalition agreement stresses that the EU negotiations are open-ended, with no guarantee of admission at the end of the process. In the event that the EU is not able to accept Turkey as a member or Turkey is not able to meet the requirements for membership, the coalition agreement calls for integrating Turkey as closely as possible in the EU in a "privileged relationship." ¶7. (C) Haber expressed concern that current EU membership negotiations with Turkey could "deflate." The two sides are running out of substance to negotiate, given that talks on so BERLIN 00001435 002 OF 002 many chapters of the EU acquis communautaire have been formally or informally frozen. She said that the EU negotiations and the potential prospect of EU membership had been a powerful tool in encouraging reform in Turkey. To allow this process to collapse is "not in our own interests." MURPHY