SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 001403 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREF MNUC AF RS IR KPAL KWBG GM SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S VISIT TO BERLIN, NOVEMBER 8-10 Classified By: Ambassador Phillip Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Berlin warmly welcomes you to Germany for the historic 20th Anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Berlin is hosting all four-powers and EU leaders at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate to mark this occasion. Your visit includes meetings with Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Westerwelle. Chancellor Merkel will likely raise concern about General Motors' November 3 decision to keep its German subsidiary, Opel, and Westerwelle may likely raise his interest in removal of nuclear weapons from Germany. You may wish to encourage from them: -- Assurances that the proposed Afghanistan conference will not slip past January and that Germany will go immediately to the Bundestag if increases in contributions are warranted; -- Support for including banking and insurance relations with Iran in calculations for possible new sanctions, and no backsliding on export controls; -- Assurances that Germany and the EU will work with the U.S. at Copenhagen and not seek to isolate; -- Agreement to tone down the public rhetoric on Opel; -- German prodding of Russia to engage constructively on security issues and human rights. Recognizing Germany's prominent and international role on this occasion is important to Merkel. She is still trying to get a sense of working with the new Washington Administration and seems uncertain at times. Of course, Westerwelle is learning the ropes and being watched by Merkel to see if he can be an effective FM for her. Alternatively, Merkel may look to new Defense Minister zu Guttenberg (CSU) to play an alternative role on foreign policy. End summary. Political Climate -------------- ¶2. (C) The political divisions that marked the recent election campaign, culminating in the October 28 swearing-in of a center-right coalition led by Chancellor Merkel, will be swept aside for your celebratory visit. Merkel just returned from what she considers an exceptional visit to Washington, which front-paged her address to Congress in every publication. Merkel will be focused on setting her priorities for the next legislative term -- she gives a major state of the union-like address on November 10 on all issues -- and will seek U.S. cooperation in promoting economic recovery and growth (Opel, regulation),progress in addressing climate change (Copenhagen),and strengthening Germany's international profile (Afghanistan). Westerwelle will have spent a total of some two days work in the foreign ministry by the time your arrive. His ministry is not sure what he wants yet. Economic Climate -------------- ¶3. (C) Germany's export-driven economy is showing initial signs of recovery from its deepest recession since WW II. For the full year 2009, GDP will shrink around 5%, but should show modest growth of 1% next year. Unemployment has remained relatively low thanks to government-subsidized programs, but is expected to rise next year. Given the government's record budget deficit, there is heated debate over the wisdom of the new coalition's proposed tax cuts, intended to boost growth. Germany was pleased with the outcome of the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, but is keener on the G-20's regulatory agenda than addressing global imbalances. ¶4. (C) GM's sudden decision on November 3 to cancel the sale of its European subsidiary Opel in a deal underwritten by the German government shocked and angered Germans. Merkel's chief economic advisor told the Ambassador November 4 that Merkel was so furious at GM's about-face that she refused to take a call from GM CEO Fritz Henderson. Merkel subsequently called the President. Federal and state governments are demanding that GM immediately pay back 1.2 billion Euros in bridge loans they had extended to the car maker. What particularly irked the Germans was that GM had failed to forewarn them of their latest flip-flop after months of laborious negotiations and a total of 4.5 billion Euros in loans/guarantees in exchange for promises to retain most Opel jobs and plants in Germany. (Merkel found out about the GM decision just hours after delivering her address before Congress.) The Opel story has dominated the news November 4-5. Opel workers are likely to strike in the next few days, and politicians and others are citing the GM action as another example of American "turbo-capitalism." Berlin 00001403 002 of 003 Iran/Export Controls -------------- ¶5. (C) You should express appreciation for Merkel's strong statement during her speech to Congress that there should be "zero tolerance" for Iranian acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. You should stress the importance of German support for EU measures or measures taken by "like-minded" countries should a UNSCR be unattainable due to a possible Iranian rejection of the engagement track. With Westerwelle, it remains imperative that you raise the importance of P5 1 unity again. In addition, you should stress the particular importance of continued German leadership on export control, particularly in light of recent interdictions of Iranian arms shipments. The new German coalition seeks to expand exports by normalizing German export control policy (of arms and dual-use items) with the EU. Germany contends that its intention is to raise the EU to the German standard, but the danger is that German standards could be watered down to an EU lowest common denominator. Arms Control/Disarmament -------------- ¶6. (C) Westerwelle is on a bit of a tangent by publicly calling for removal of nuclear weapons from Germany, although he insists that Berlin will not act unilaterally. This gets him attention and he then offers assurances that everything must be done in the NATO context, but it distracts from other issues. This is one of the few foreign policy positions that distinguishes his FDP from Chancellor Merkel's CDU, and Westerwelle may feel pressed to mention this. The MFA emphasizes that Westerwelle's position does not necessarily mean that Germany intends to cease participation in the NATO nuclear share. Germany may be willing to maintain its fleet of dual-capable aircraft, but have the applicable nuclear weapons stored in the U.S. or elsewhere. Westerwelle also understands that some Allies may want to maintain their current stock of NATO nuclear weapons. Your meeting with Westerwelle is a good opportunity to emphasize any red lines or concerns we have before this effort gets too far down the road. For its part, the Chancellery, MFA and MOD are uncomfortable with Westerwelle's push and sees no reason to tackle this issue right now. Afghanistan: Small Window for More Troops -------------- ¶7. (C) FM Westerwelle has strongly defended German engagement in Afghanistan, both military and civilian, as vital to German national security interests. However, he supports the Chancellor's recent decision to put off any consideration of deploying additional German soldiers until after the proposed international conference on Afghanistan early next year, notwithstanding the significantly deteriorated security situation in the north. The new government sees the conference as critical for setting a new framework and benchmarks for the international engagement in Afghanistan, as well as for prescribing what is expected of the Afghan government in return. It is in our interest to capitalize on the Germans' sense of "ownership" of the north in getting a commitment from Westerwelle to seriously re-consider a troop increase after the Afghanistan conference early next year, if, in fact, he and Merkel rule out any increase before then. Within this context, it would be important to acknowledge that Germany is the fourth largest provider of civilian development assistance in Afghanistan and is an enthusiastic supporter of the U.S. Focused District Development (FDD) civilian police training program, which it joined in January of this year. Middle East -------------- ¶8. (C) You should thank Merkel for her strong statements before Congress where she stressed the overarching importance of Israel's security and a two-state solution. In general, Merkel has been very supportive of U.S. efforts in the Middle East. She is now planning the second round of German-Israeli government consultations, likely before the end of the year. She may raise this with you and seek your advice on messages to Netanyahu. We understand that Westerwelle may also be planning to visit Israel. The MFA said that Westerwelle may seek a greater German role to promote peace, for example to offer German support in coordinating Middle East policy with the EU. According to the MFA, Westerwelle may also raise the concept of creating some type of OSCE-like security structure BERLIN 00001403 003 of 003 for the Middle East. Reluctance with Overseas Deployments -------------- ¶9. (C) Germany continues to wrestle with the issue of overseas deployments. Westerwelle, and the FDP in general, tend to be more skeptical than Merkel's CDU on this topic and this is reflected in the government coalition agreement. The coalition agreement calls for a "gradual reduction" of German participation in UNIFIL "with the perspective of bringing it to an end." Similarly, the agreement calls for a "critical review" of the "multitude" of parliamentary mandates for the Bundeswehr to participate in counterterrorism and piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, again with a view toward reducing them. It would be helpful for you to emphasize how important we view Germany's contributions to these international operations. Russia/Energy Security -------------- ¶10. (C) We expect Germany to be less forgiving of Russian bullying of its eastern European neighbors through cut-offs of natural gas supplies, especially given the departure of former Foreign Minister Steinmeier -- known for his relatively pro-Russian views. Still, we expect Germany to continue to place a heavy emphasis on maintaining good relations with Russia, believing that constructive engagement and assistance with modernization are the best way to deal with this difficult "strategic partner." Germany is Europe's largest energy user and is highly dependent on Russia for energy supplies, but Berlin does not view this as a vulnerability, believing that Moscow is equally dependent on Germany as a consumer. Germany nevertheless recognizes that it must diversify its sources of supply, routes, and means of energy generation to gain greater energy security. Climate Change -------------- ¶11. (C) As the Chancellor's remarks underline, German officials want strong U.S. leadership going into the Copenhagen Summit. They are advocating for a unified US/EU position towards the major emerging economies, particularly China and India, to urge them to commit to ambitious national actions at Copenhagen. They are looking for signals of our commitment to domestic and international actions that will allow us to collectively meet science-based targets. German leaders recognize the challenge of passing climate change legislation in the U.S. and have lowered their expectations for the possibility of reaching a legally binding agreement next month at Copenhagen. They have begun to describe the Summit as one step in a larger process -- a politically binding framework -- and may be preparing the German public for a less ambitious outcome. Mission Germany -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Madam Secretary, the U.S. government presence in Germany currently numbers 744 US direct-hire (USDH) employees, 683 locally engaged (LE) staff, and 951 USG EFMs and a State operating budget of $153 million annually. This includes a Frankfurt cohort of over 500 USDH employees whose responsibilities support USG operations globally. Berlin's USG presence -- over 500 USDHs and LE staff -- is centered in the new Chancery next to the Brandenburg Gate. The LE staff includes many employees who have worked for the USG for over 30 years. Mission Germany is on the cutting edge of using IT solutions xxxxx. MURPHY