SCENESETTER: GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER WESTERWELLE'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001392 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE CHARGE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPAL KWBG MNUC AF GM IR RS SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER WESTERWELLE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 4-5 REF: BERLIN 1373 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor George Glass for reasons 1. 4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle will visit Washington on the heels of Chancellor Merkel and one week after assuming his cabinet position. He is painfully conscious of being inexperienced; out of his element, he has clung to his scripts. However, his staff assured us that Westerwelle is well prepped for his meetings in Washington. His first visits abroad have been close by and safe: to the EU Summit in Brussels at Chancellor Merkel's side, to Warsaw, and then to The Hague and Paris. He said recently in public that he will be in listening mode in Washington. His visit, therefore, provides the opportunity to establish a strong relationship with Westerwelle, set him at ease, and convey our priorities in the bilateral relationship early on. A politician first and foremost, Westerwelle will want to be portrayed in the media as a close U.S. ally and transatlanticist. He has criticized former Foreign Minister Steinmeier, arguing that he failed to seize the opportunity during the first months of the new U.S. Administration to influence the formation of U.S. foreign policy. Westerwelle will be especially keen on discussing arms control issues and specifically the removal of the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons from German soil, which he made a part of his campaign pledge and has already raised on his first trips abroad. End summary. Westerwelle: Politician Becomes Foreign Minister -------------- --- ¶2. (C) Guido Westerwelle (Free Democratic Party - FDP) shares with the Secretary the fact that his appointment as the country's top diplomat was directly preceded by a very strong political career. Westerwelle, the politician, is self-confident, still riding high on his party's historic September 27 election results after 11 years spent in the opposition. In his new role as Foreign Minister, however, Westerwelle is inexperienced -- which he openly admitted to the Ambassador -- and cautious. He took the position because of its prestige and profile although, as one FDP Bundestag deputy told us, it is not his first love. We understand that he may be seeking the counsel of his more experienced and trusted counterparts. We should not hesitate to take this opportunity. ¶3. (C) Federal Chancellery USA Director told us that the Chancellery very much wants Westerwelle to succeed as Foreign Minister. They said that they did not/not want to compete with the MFA to see who made foreign policy. (Comment: It is yet to be seen, however, whether Germany's new Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg of the Christian Social Union, who is well-connected in Washington and a foreign policy veteran, feels likewise. End comment.) The Chancellery said that it is well known that former FM Steinmeier did not get off on the right foot with then-Secretary Rice. Because of this, Steinmeier only traveled to Washington once or twice a year. However, the Chancellery hopes that Westerwelle would develop a better relationship with Secretary Clinton and that he would be able to travel to Washington more often on specific issues, and have the ability to have open and honest exchanges with the Secretary. Arms Control/Disarmament -------------- ¶4. (C) Given his public advocacy over the past several months for the withdrawal of all remaining nuclear weapons from Germany, Westerwelle will possibly raise this issue with the Secretary, if only as a matter for further discussion. He knows he will get questions from the German press after the meeting and he will want to confirm that he is moving forward on one of the few foreign policy issues that distinguishes his FDP from Chancellor Merkel's CDU. We are assured by the MFA, however, that Westerwelle is not looking for a "quick fix," that he will not take any action unilaterally and that he understands the need to consult widely before any decision is taken on withdrawal. ¶5. (C) The MFA also emphasizes that the call for the withdrawal of all remaining nuclear weapons in Germany does not necessarily mean that Westerwelle wants to end Germany's participation in the NATO nuclear share. Germany may be willing to remain part of that program and maintain its fleet of dual-capable aircraft, but have the applicable nuclear weapons stored in the U.S. or elsewhere. Likewise, the call for removing nuclear weapons from Germany does not mean that Westerwelle is insisting that all remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons be withdrawn from Europe. He understands that some Allies may feel very wedded to maintaining their current stock of NATO nuclear weapons. While the MFA acknowledges the need to take account of Russian tactical nuclear weapons, it believes that insisting on reciprocal cuts would probably make Westerwelle's proposal dead on arrival since the Russians seem unlikely to budge from their current posture any time soon. The Secretary's meeting with Westerwelle will be a good opportunity to emphasize any red lines or concerns we have about his proposal before he gets too far down the road. ¶6. (C) The Chancellery had a different take. Asked about Westerwelle's statements on tactical nuclear weapons, the Chancellery official indicated this is a bit of a challenge. He made it clear that the Chancellery is not comfortable with this issue and saw no reason for it at this time. Our interlocutor hoped that Westerwelle would not raise it when he came to Washington. He suggested that it would be very helpful if the Secretary might find an opportunity to take Westerwelle aside and explain the importance of such issues being run quietly through NATO and not unilaterally. Afghanistan: Small Window for More Troops -------------- ¶7. (C) Westerwelle has strongly defended German engagement in Afghanistan, both military and civilian, as vital to German national security interests. However, he supports the Chancellor's recent decision to put off any consideration of deploying additional German soldiers until after the proposed international conference on Afghanistan early next year, notwithstanding the significantly deteriorated security situation in the north. The new government sees the conference as critical for setting a new framework and benchmarks for the international engagement in Afghanistan, as well as for prescribing what is expected of the Afghan government in return. While Merkel seems to have made up her mind against seeking more troops when the ISAF mandate comes up for renewal in December -- despite recommendations from MFA and MOD to the contrary -- the formal Cabinet decision on the mandate will not be taken until November 18. Therefore, Westerwelle's visit to Washington this week still offers a small window of opportunity for reconsideration of the German position. If the Secretary were prepared to preview the new U.S. approach for Westerwelle and lay out a compelling case for additional troops in the short run to implement GEN McChrystal,s counterinsurgency strategy, that could be a catalyst. ¶8. (C) MFA and MOD officials are concerned that the U.S. will read Germany's reluctance to increase its troop ceiling in December as confirmation that Germany is not prepared to do what is required to meet the growing security challenges in the north, which they consider to be "their" area of responsibility. It is in our interest to capitalize on the Germans' sense of "ownership" of the north in getting a commitment from Westerwelle to seriously re-consider a troop increase after the Afghanistan conference early next year, if, in fact, he and Merkel rule out any increase before then. ¶9. (SBU) Germany is the fourth largest provider of civilian development assistance in Afghanistan and is an enthusiastic supporter of the U.S. Focused District Development (FDD) civilian police training program, which it joined in January of this year. Germany's plans for FDD are relatively unknown and under-appreciated, a message of recognition and appreciation of this and its overall development effort would help ensure Germany follows through with its plans and continue close coordination with U.S. officials. Iran -------------- ¶10. (C) In your first opportunity to discuss Iran with Germany's new FM, Westerwelle, it is imperative that you emphasize the importance of P5 1 unity. He will be keen to hear your views on the Iran negotiations. Westerwelle's party is known in Germany as the "voice of business" and has a history of views against the efficacy of sanctions, including former FDP FM and Westerwelle's mentor Genscher. Westerwelle's rank and file aides contend he shares his commitment to non-proliferation and Israel's security with the Chancellor and this view is stronger than his business friendly policy on Iran. This will be his first opportunity to reassure you of his commitment to the dual track policy of engagement and pressure. You should stress the importance of German support to EU measures or measures taken by "like-minded" countries should a UNSCR be unattainable due to a possible Iranian rejection of the engagement track. ¶11. (C) The new coalition agreement has language that implies a distillation of German export control aligning it with the EU to "level the playing field" for German industry opposite EU competition. Specifically, the agreement states that regulations will be eliminated and approval on duel-use exports will be granted when a high degree of civilian use is ascertained. You should try to nip this in the bud stressing the leadership and responsibility Germany has exhibited in the EU on export control since the Libyan chemical weapons controversy in the 1980's and that now is not the time to water down export control given the Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Middle East -------------- ¶12. (C) Westerwelle's views on Israel and Middle East peace may stem more from his past experience in addressing criticism against Israel and his interpretation of Germany's historical responsibility toward Israel than from his own assessment of Middle East policy or strategic calculations. Some attribute Westerwelle's need to firmly state his and Germany's historic role regarding Israel to his having been burned politically both domestically and in Israel in 2002. At that time, Westerwelle was accused of failing to distance himself quickly enough from an FDP politician, Juergen Moellemann, who had published a brochure strongly critical of then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's actions towards the Palestinians and who had also strongly criticized the leader of Germany's Jewish Community. Some accused Moellemann of being anti-Semitic. At the time Westerwelle warned against branding criticism against Israel as anti-Semitism. ¶13. (C) Westerwelle will likely continue his drive to prove his pro-Israel credentials. When queried during his recent visit to Paris about his views regarding Secretary Clinton's approach to Israeli settlement policy, Westerwelle reportedly responded that, "Responsibility for the Near East is Germany's 'raison d'tre' which has nothing to do with generations or parties." The MFA Near East division explained that Westerwelle was not prepared to address this issue in Paris, and that he was using the Chancellor's phrase "raison d'tre" in this context. The MFA said that in general, Westerwelle will be supportive of U.S. efforts in the Middle East, and may seek a greater German role to promote peace, for example to offer German support in coordinating Middle East policy with the EU. According to the MFA, Westerwelle may also raise the concept of creating some type of OSCE-like security structure for the Middle East. In an August "Der Spiegel" interview, Westerwelle had called for the EU to launch an initiative to establish a conference for security and cooperation in the Middle East. In addition, Westerwelle may raise the idea of a "conference approach" in the Middle East which would include, aside from the parties to the conflict, the U.S., the EU, Russia, and the UN. Skepticism about International Military Deployments -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) Westerwelle, and the FDP in general, tend to be more skeptical about Bundeswehr overseas deployments than Merkel's CDU and this is reflected in the government coalition agreement. The FDP has long opposed, for example, the Bundeswehr's participation in the maritime taskforce of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) out of misplaced concern for maintaining Germany's "neutrality" in the Middle East. The coalition agreement therefore calls for a "gradual reduction" of German participation in UNIFIL "with the perspective of bringing it to an end." Similarly, the agreement calls for a "critical review" of the "multitude" of parliamentary mandates for the Bundeswehr to participate in counterterrorism and piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, again with a view toward to reducing them. The mandate that allows the Bundeswehr to participate in OEF maritime operations -- currently involving one German frigate and about 100 sailors -- comes up for renewal in December and seems to be the most vulnerable to be eliminated in this review. It would be helpful for the Secretary to emphasize how important we view Germany's contributions to these international operations and our hope that they will be no diminution under the new government. Russia -------------- ¶15. (C) We expect Germany to be less forgiving of Russian bullying of its eastern European neighbors through cut-offs of natural gas supplies, especially given the departure of former Foreign Minister Steinmeier -- known for his relatively pro-Russian views. Still, we expect Germany to continue to place a heavy emphasis on maintaining good relations with Russia, believing that constructive engagement and assistance with modernization are the best way to deal with this difficult "strategic partner." Climate Change -------------- ¶16. (C) Westerwelle has little record on environmental issues, but as a close confident of Chancellor Merkel, we can expect him to echo her concerns about U.S. climate change policy. Like Merkel, Westerwelle will push for strong U.S. leadership going into the Copenhagen Summit and may ask if the President will attend the conference. Westerwelle is likely to push for a unified US/EU position towards the major emerging economies, particularly China and India, to urge them to commit to ambitious national actions at Copenhagen. German officials remain hopeful, but have lowered their expectations for the possibility of reaching an agreement at Copenhagen. They are looking for further evidence of a U.S. commitment to domestic and international actions that will allow us to collectively meet science-based targets. German government advisors have expressed concern that U.S. domestic midterm climate goals, as proposed by the Administration and as they appear in both pieces of pending Congressional legislation, are inadequate DELAWIE