SCENESETTER: GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER WESTERWELLE'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001392

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE CHARGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPAL KWBG MNUC AF GM IR RS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER WESTERWELLE'S
VISIT TO WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 4-5

REF: BERLIN 1373

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor George Glass for reasons 1.
4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle will
visit Washington on the heels of Chancellor Merkel and one
week after assuming his cabinet position. He is painfully
conscious of being inexperienced; out of his element, he has
clung to his scripts. However, his staff assured us that
Westerwelle is well prepped for his meetings in Washington.
His first visits abroad have been close by and safe: to the
EU Summit in Brussels at Chancellor Merkel's side, to Warsaw,
and then to The Hague and Paris. He said recently in public
that he will be in listening mode in Washington. His visit,
therefore, provides the opportunity to establish a strong
relationship with Westerwelle, set him at ease, and convey
our priorities in the bilateral relationship early on. A
politician first and foremost, Westerwelle will want to be
portrayed in the media as a close U.S. ally and
transatlanticist. He has criticized former Foreign Minister
Steinmeier, arguing that he failed to seize the opportunity
during the first months of the new U.S. Administration to
influence the formation of U.S. foreign policy. Westerwelle
will be especially keen on discussing arms control issues and
specifically the removal of the remaining non-strategic
nuclear weapons from German soil, which he made a part of his
campaign pledge and has already raised on his first trips
abroad. End summary.

Westerwelle: Politician Becomes Foreign Minister
-------------- ---


2. (C) Guido Westerwelle (Free Democratic Party - FDP)
shares with the Secretary the fact that his appointment as
the country's top diplomat was directly preceded by a very
strong political career. Westerwelle, the politician, is
self-confident, still riding high on his party's historic
September 27 election results after 11 years spent in the
opposition. In his new role as Foreign Minister, however,
Westerwelle is inexperienced -- which he openly admitted to
the Ambassador -- and cautious. He took the position because
of its prestige and profile although, as one FDP Bundestag
deputy told us, it is not his first love. We understand that
he may be seeking the counsel of his more experienced and
trusted counterparts. We should not hesitate to take this
opportunity.


3. (C) Federal Chancellery USA Director told us that the
Chancellery very much wants Westerwelle to succeed as Foreign
Minister. They said that they did not/not want to compete
with the MFA to see who made foreign policy. (Comment: It is
yet to be seen, however, whether Germany's new Defense
Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg of the Christian Social
Union, who is well-connected in Washington and a foreign
policy veteran, feels likewise. End comment.) The
Chancellery said that it is well known that former FM
Steinmeier did not get off on the right foot with
then-Secretary Rice. Because of this, Steinmeier only
traveled to Washington once or twice a year. However, the
Chancellery hopes that Westerwelle would develop a better
relationship with Secretary Clinton and that he would be able
to travel to Washington more often on specific issues, and
have the ability to have open and honest exchanges with the
Secretary.

Arms Control/Disarmament
--------------


4. (C) Given his public advocacy over the past several months
for the withdrawal of all remaining nuclear weapons from
Germany, Westerwelle will possibly raise this issue with the
Secretary, if only as a matter for further discussion. He
knows he will get questions from the German press after the
meeting and he will want to confirm that he is moving forward
on one of the few foreign policy issues that distinguishes
his FDP from Chancellor Merkel's CDU. We are assured by the
MFA, however, that Westerwelle is not looking for a "quick
fix," that he will not take any action unilaterally and that
he understands the need to consult widely before any decision
is taken on withdrawal.


5. (C) The MFA also emphasizes that the call for the
withdrawal of all remaining nuclear weapons in Germany does
not necessarily mean that Westerwelle wants to end Germany's
participation in the NATO nuclear share. Germany may be
willing to remain part of that program and maintain its fleet
of dual-capable aircraft, but have the applicable nuclear
weapons stored in the U.S. or elsewhere. Likewise, the call

for removing nuclear weapons from Germany does not mean that
Westerwelle is insisting that all remaining non-strategic
nuclear weapons be withdrawn from Europe. He understands
that some Allies may feel very wedded to maintaining their
current stock of NATO nuclear weapons. While the MFA
acknowledges the need to take account of Russian tactical
nuclear weapons, it believes that insisting on reciprocal
cuts would probably make Westerwelle's proposal dead on
arrival since the Russians seem unlikely to budge from their
current posture any time soon. The Secretary's meeting with
Westerwelle will be a good opportunity to emphasize any red
lines or concerns we have about his proposal before he gets
too far down the road.


6. (C) The Chancellery had a different take. Asked about
Westerwelle's statements on tactical nuclear weapons, the
Chancellery official indicated this is a bit of a challenge.
He made it clear that the Chancellery is not comfortable with
this issue and saw no reason for it at this time. Our
interlocutor hoped that Westerwelle would not raise it when
he came to Washington. He suggested that it would be very
helpful if the Secretary might find an opportunity to take
Westerwelle aside and explain the importance of such issues
being run quietly through NATO and not unilaterally.

Afghanistan: Small Window for More Troops
--------------


7. (C) Westerwelle has strongly defended German engagement in
Afghanistan, both military and civilian, as vital to German
national security interests. However, he supports the
Chancellor's recent decision to put off any consideration of
deploying additional German soldiers until after the proposed
international conference on Afghanistan early next year,
notwithstanding the significantly deteriorated security
situation in the north. The new government sees the
conference as critical for setting a new framework and
benchmarks for the international engagement in Afghanistan,
as well as for prescribing what is expected of the Afghan
government in return. While Merkel seems to have made up her
mind against seeking more troops when the ISAF mandate comes
up for renewal in December -- despite recommendations from
MFA and MOD to the contrary -- the formal Cabinet decision on
the mandate will not be taken until November 18. Therefore,
Westerwelle's visit to Washington this week still offers a
small window of opportunity for reconsideration of the German
position. If the Secretary were prepared to preview the new
U.S. approach for Westerwelle and lay out a compelling case
for additional troops in the short run to implement GEN
McChrystal,s counterinsurgency strategy, that could be a
catalyst.


8. (C) MFA and MOD officials are concerned that the U.S.
will read Germany's reluctance to increase its troop ceiling
in December as confirmation that Germany is not prepared to
do what is required to meet the growing security challenges
in the north, which they consider to be "their" area of
responsibility. It is in our interest to capitalize on the
Germans' sense of "ownership" of the north in getting a
commitment from Westerwelle to seriously re-consider a troop
increase after the Afghanistan conference early next year,
if, in fact, he and Merkel rule out any increase before then.


9. (SBU) Germany is the fourth largest provider of civilian
development assistance in Afghanistan and is an enthusiastic
supporter of the U.S. Focused District Development (FDD)
civilian police training program, which it joined in January
of this year. Germany's plans for FDD are relatively unknown
and under-appreciated, a message of recognition and
appreciation of this and its overall development effort would
help ensure Germany follows through with its plans and
continue close coordination with U.S. officials.

Iran
--------------


10. (C) In your first opportunity to discuss Iran with
Germany's new FM, Westerwelle, it is imperative that you
emphasize the importance of P5 1 unity. He will be keen to
hear your views on the Iran negotiations. Westerwelle's
party is known in Germany as the "voice of business" and has
a history of views against the efficacy of sanctions,
including former FDP FM and Westerwelle's mentor Genscher.
Westerwelle's rank and file aides contend he shares his
commitment to non-proliferation and Israel's security with
the Chancellor and this view is stronger than his business
friendly policy on Iran. This will be his first opportunity
to reassure you of his commitment to the dual track policy of
engagement and pressure. You should stress the importance of

German support to EU measures or measures taken by
"like-minded" countries should a UNSCR be unattainable due to
a possible Iranian rejection of the engagement track.


11. (C) The new coalition agreement has language that implies
a distillation of German export control aligning it with the
EU to "level the playing field" for German industry opposite
EU competition. Specifically, the agreement states that
regulations will be eliminated and approval on duel-use
exports will be granted when a high degree of civilian use is
ascertained. You should try to nip this in the bud stressing
the leadership and responsibility Germany has exhibited in
the EU on export control since the Libyan chemical weapons
controversy in the 1980's and that now is not the time to
water down export control given the Iran's efforts to develop
nuclear weapons.

Middle East
--------------


12. (C) Westerwelle's views on Israel and Middle East peace
may stem more from his past experience in addressing
criticism against Israel and his interpretation of Germany's
historical responsibility toward Israel than from his own
assessment of Middle East policy or strategic calculations.
Some attribute Westerwelle's need to firmly state his and
Germany's historic role regarding Israel to his having been
burned politically both domestically and in Israel in 2002.
At that time, Westerwelle was accused of failing to distance
himself quickly enough from an FDP politician, Juergen
Moellemann, who had published a brochure strongly critical of
then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's actions towards
the Palestinians and who had also strongly criticized the
leader of Germany's Jewish Community. Some accused
Moellemann of being anti-Semitic. At the time Westerwelle
warned against branding criticism against Israel as
anti-Semitism.


13. (C) Westerwelle will likely continue his drive to prove
his pro-Israel credentials. When queried during his recent
visit to Paris about his views regarding Secretary Clinton's
approach to Israeli settlement policy, Westerwelle reportedly
responded that, "Responsibility for the Near East is
Germany's 'raison d'tre' which has nothing to do with
generations or parties." The MFA Near East division
explained that Westerwelle was not prepared to address this
issue in Paris, and that he was using the Chancellor's phrase
"raison d'tre" in this context. The MFA said that in
general, Westerwelle will be supportive of U.S. efforts in
the Middle East, and may seek a greater German role to
promote peace, for example to offer German support in
coordinating Middle East policy with the EU. According to
the MFA, Westerwelle may also raise the concept of creating
some type of OSCE-like security structure for the Middle
East. In an August "Der Spiegel" interview, Westerwelle had
called for the EU to launch an initiative to establish a
conference for security and cooperation in the Middle East.
In addition, Westerwelle may raise the idea of a "conference
approach" in the Middle East which would include, aside from
the parties to the conflict, the U.S., the EU, Russia, and
the UN.

Skepticism about International Military Deployments
-------------- --------------


14. (C) Westerwelle, and the FDP in general, tend to be more
skeptical about Bundeswehr overseas deployments than Merkel's
CDU and this is reflected in the government coalition
agreement. The FDP has long opposed, for example, the
Bundeswehr's participation in the maritime taskforce of the
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) out of misplaced concern
for maintaining Germany's "neutrality" in the Middle East.
The coalition agreement therefore calls for a "gradual
reduction" of German participation in UNIFIL "with the
perspective of bringing it to an end." Similarly, the
agreement calls for a "critical review" of the "multitude" of
parliamentary mandates for the Bundeswehr to participate in
counterterrorism and piracy operations off the Horn of
Africa, again with a view toward to reducing them. The
mandate that allows the Bundeswehr to participate in OEF
maritime operations -- currently involving one German frigate
and about 100 sailors -- comes up for renewal in December and
seems to be the most vulnerable to be eliminated in this
review. It would be helpful for the Secretary to emphasize
how important we view Germany's contributions to these
international operations and our hope that they will be no
diminution under the new government.

Russia

--------------


15. (C) We expect Germany to be less forgiving of Russian
bullying of its eastern European neighbors through cut-offs
of natural gas supplies, especially given the departure of
former Foreign Minister Steinmeier -- known for his
relatively pro-Russian views. Still, we expect Germany to
continue to place a heavy emphasis on maintaining good
relations with Russia, believing that constructive engagement
and assistance with modernization are the best way to deal
with this difficult "strategic partner."


Climate Change
--------------


16. (C) Westerwelle has little record on environmental
issues, but as a close confident of Chancellor Merkel, we can
expect him to echo her concerns about U.S. climate change
policy. Like Merkel, Westerwelle will push for strong U.S.
leadership going into the Copenhagen Summit and may ask if
the President will attend the conference. Westerwelle is
likely to push for a unified US/EU position towards the major
emerging economies, particularly China and India, to urge
them to commit to ambitious national actions at Copenhagen.
German officials remain hopeful, but have lowered their
expectations for the possibility of reaching an agreement at
Copenhagen. They are looking for further evidence of a U.S.
commitment to domestic and international actions that will
allow us to collectively meet science-based targets. German
government advisors have expressed concern that U.S. domestic
midterm climate goals, as proposed by the Administration and
as they appear in both pieces of pending Congressional
legislation, are inadequate
DELAWIE