Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BELGRADE863
2009-11-27 09:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Belgrade
Cable title:  

Serbia: Security Aspects of Russian President Medvedev's

Tags:  PREL MARR PGOV SR RS 
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VZCZCXRO1406
RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #0863/01 3310939
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 270939Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0428
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000863 

SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/27
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV SR RS
SUBJECT: Serbia: Security Aspects of Russian President Medvedev's
Visit

CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah Mennuti, Political Counselor, State, POL;
REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

Summary

------------



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000863 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/27 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV SR RS SUBJECT: Serbia: Security Aspects of Russian President Medvedev's Visit CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah Mennuti, Political Counselor, State, POL; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev's October 20 visit to Belgrade went according to a script agreed and announced well in advance, with two surprising exceptions: Belgrade's purported support for the Russian initiative to revamp European security, and an agreement to create a joint humanitarian response center in Nis. Serbian officials are seeking to downplay the significance of both initiatives. End Summary. European Security Architecture -------------- ¶2. (C) Despite President Medvedev's claims of having received Serbian support for Russia's proposal to revamp the architecture of European security (reftel),the Serbian government denies that any detailed discussion of the issue took place. Presidential advisor Miki Rakic told us on November 11 that the topic was not raised in the restricted meeting between Presidents Tadic and Medvedev, in which he and Medvedev foreign policy advisor Sergey Prikhodko also participated. "I learned about it from the press," Rakic said. Presidential foreign policy advisor Aleksandar Knezevic, Jovan Ratkovic's deputy, said the Russians had raised European security architecture "only briefly toward the end of the talks" (apparently over lunch),and had shared no details and made no specific request for Serbian action. Knezevic emphasized that while Serbia thought that NATO and the OSCE were far from perfect, it would never support reopening existing arrangements. Russian DCM Vladimir Ulasevich did not mention the topic while briefing us on the results of the visit. ¶3. (U) In a November 27 interview with the Belgrade daily "Politika," Defense Minister Dragan Sutanovac downplayed the issue, saying "I did not have the chance to be present at any part of the
visit of Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev where there was a conversation about a Moscow vision of security. I am not clear myself about this suggestion and so I do not have a final decision about it. I think, however, that for Serbia it is important, above all, to be a leader in the region and to begin to fulfill its international obligations, which are being fulfilled by most countries in the world." Joint Humanitarian Response Center in Nis -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) If one believes the press reports, the agreement to establish a joint Serbian-Russian humanitarian response center in the southern city of Nis was a major deliverable o f the Medvedev visit. The announcement provoked immediate speculation about plans for a Russian military base in Serbia (reftel). Once again, however, Rakic downplayed the significance of the commitment, telling us privately on November 11 that there "would be no base and possibly no agreement." He promised to keep us informed as discussions proceeded. Russian DCM Ulasevich clarified that the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS) and the Serbian Ministry of Interior (MOI) had signed only a framework agreement on general cooperation; the details of the humanitarian response center would need to be spelled out in a separate annex. Ulasevich claimed that Russia was seeking a way to respond to frequent requests for assistance fighting forest fires from the countries of BELGRADE 00000863 002 OF 002 Southeast Europe, and would station only firefighters at the base. ¶5. (C) Presidency staffer Knezevic and MOI Chief of Staff Branko Lazarevic each reinforced the "only firefighters" message when we asked them about the project; Lazarevic added that a mine clearing team might be stationed there while the route of the South Stream pipeline was being cleared. Knezevic said the center, which had received very little discussion during the Medvedev visit, had the support of several neighboring countries, would host at most "two or three planes and helicopters" from Russia, and would focus on dealing with the aftermath of earthquakes, floods, and fires. Serbia would not permit a Russian military installation on its soil, Knezevic said, and the Russian side had not tried to pressure Tadic to permit a military presence. Ministry of Defense contacts hasten to emphasize that the initiative was purely MOI's doing; they also express concern over any permanent Russian presence in Serbia and skepticism of the need to station Russian firefighting aircraft in the region when neighboring countries already have similar capabilities. Comment: Need for Dialogue with NATO and OSCE -------------- -------------- - ¶6. (C) In our follow-up discussions with Serbian government counterparts, it quickly became apparent that the GOS had not fully considered the ramifications of including these two security-related items on the agenda of the Medvedev visit. Our interlocutors at the Presidency did not appear to be aware of the ongoing Corfu Process within the OSCE or to have given any consideration to making sure the new humanitarian response center would mesh with the NATO disaster response mechanisms most recently displayed in the MEDCEUR 2009 exercise in Nis. We have encouraged them to channel any future discussion of European security architecture within the Corfu Process or its extension, and to brief NATO fully on the planned center in Nis if/as it moves forward. Post recommends that Washington decision makers reinforce these messages in their discussions with Serbian government officials, including during MOD Sutanovac and MOI Dacic's upcoming visits to Washington. End Comment. BRUSH

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