SERBIA: PRESEVO VALLEY ISLAMIC COMMUNITY RETAINS KOSOVO

UNCLAS BELGRADE 000507 DEPT FOR EUR/SCE (PETERSON AND COFFIN) SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL KIRF KV SR SUBJECT: SERBIA: PRESEVO VALLEY ISLAMIC COMMUNITY RETAINS KOSOVO TIES REF: 07 Belgrade 1392 Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Despite strained relations between Belgrade and Pristina following Kosovo's February 2008 declaration of independence, the Islamic community in the South Serbian region of the Presevo Valley has been able to maintain its historically strong ties with the Kosovo Islamic Community. According to top South Serbian religious leaders, Serbian government officials do not interfere in this relationship, which contrasts sharply with the government's concerns about ties between the Novi Pazar-based Islamic Community in Serbia and the Islamic community in Bosnia. Although there are two Islamic communities in the Presevo Valley, mirroring the situation in the rest of the country, the potential for conflict in South Serbia is low because religion and politics remain firmly separated. There is a small Wahhabi presence, but local religious leaders do not view it as a threat. End Summary. Basic Facts and Figures -------------- ¶2. (U) The South Serbian Islamic community, which includes Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac municipalities in the Presevo Valley that borders Kosovo, consists primarily of ethnic Albanians, although there also are some Roma and Slavic Muslims. Due to the Ottoman influence, South Serbian Muslims, like most Balkan Muslims, adhere to Hanafi Sunni Islam, which Adnan Ahmedi, President of the Council of the Islamic Community in Presevo, characterizes as one of the more liberal schools within Islam. According to sociologist and religion expert Milan Vukomanovic, there are also a limited number of adherents to Sufism in South Serbia. ¶3. (U) There are approximately 50 mosques in the Presevo Valley. The majority of imams, all of whom are native to the region, received religious training in Kosovo, Egypt, Syria, or the United Arab Emirates. Students in primary and secondary schools are able to attend classes on Islam in line with a government program that offers religious instruction in the seven "traditional" religions. According to Ahmedi, 90% of Presevo Valley Albanians are "believers," but turnout at mosques during daily prayers is minimal. Presevo Valley Islamic Communities Peacefully Coexist -------------- -------------- ¶4. (U) There are two Islamic communities in South Serbia. The 
Council of the Islamic Community (CIC) in Presevo and Bujanovac falls under the Kosovo Islamic Community headed by Chief Mufti Naim Trnava. The smaller, parallel Islamic Community of Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac (ICPMB),created in 2003 by current National Democratic Party leader Nedzmedin Sacipi, is led by Xhemaledin Hasani. The Serbian religion ministry has formal ties only with the CIC. ¶5. (U) Within Serbia, the CIC cooperates with Muamer Zukorlic's Novi Pazar-based Islamic Community in Serbia (ICiS),which is part of the Bosnian Islamic Community and supports Bosnian reis-ul-ulema (Chief Mufti) Mustafa Ceric. The CIC is one of four regional Islamic communities in Serbia recognized by the ICiS through a system of decentralization, and it is represented on the ICiS board in Novi Pazar. This arrangement provides the CIC considerable autonomy, which allows it, for example, to organize its hajj through Pristina. ¶6. (SBU) The CIC does not acknowledge the legitimacy of the Belgrade-based Islamic Community of Serbia (ICoS),which does not recognize the supremacy of Sarajevo and has elected its own reis-ul-ulema, Adem Zilkic. (The ICPMB has loose ties with the ICoS but no formal relationship.) CIC mufti Mumin Tahiri told us in November 2008 that the CIC chose to side with the ICiS when the Serbian Islamic community split in 2007 (reftel) because this allowed the CIC to retain its ties with Kosovo. ¶7. (SBU) Unlike in neighboring Sandzak where tensions between the ICiS and the ICoS frequently result in violent clashes, relations between the CIC and ICPMB are good due to personal and familial ties that bridge the two groups. Ahmedi told us on May 5 that he would like to see the two groups united and that he had engaged with Hasani to this end. President of the CIC in Bujanovac Sherifali Musliu pointed out that the cordial relations could be attributed to the lack of political patrons that caused religion and politics to become intertwined in Sandzak. (The ICiS is associated with the Sandzak Democratic Party of Labor Minister Rasim Ljajic, while the ICoS maintains close ties with the Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak of Minister-without-portfolio Sulejman Ugljanin.) In fact, CIC regulations prohibit imams from being members of a political party. Professor Darko Tanaskovic, a former Serbian Ambassador to Turkey and Azerbaijan who closely follows Islam in Serbia, commented to us on June 11 that playing the religious card represented too great a risk for South Serbian Albanian politicians. Belgrade Accepts Relations with Kosovo -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Ahmedi and Musliu, both personally appointed by Chief Mufti of Kosovo Trnava as his representatives in Presevo and Bujanovac, told us that the relationship with the Kosovo Islamic Community was based on a shared culture and common language. Ahmedi stressed that Belgrade did not object to this relationship, through which the CIC reports through the religious hierarchy directly to Pristina, even after Kosovo's February 2008 declaration of independence. In fact, Ahmedi told us, former Religion Minister Milan Radulovic from the nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) of Vojislav Kostunica expressly supported the ties. (Comment: This stance contrasts markedly with the government's tacit support for the ICoS, alleged by some to be a Kostunica creation, vis-a-vis the ICiS, which retains considerable ties with Sarajevo. It also is curious within the broader context of overall GOS policy toward Kosovo, which aims to limit or eliminate ties that would implicitly recognize Kosovo's independence. End comment.) ¶9. (SBU) Religion expert Vukomanovic told us on June 5 that there was little academic and government knowledge about Islam in South Serbia. The absence of potentially explosive interplay between politics and religion was one explanation for this lack of interest and concern. Vukomanovic, however, also pointed out that Belgrade viewed South Serbia almost exclusively through an ethnic prism, viewing local inhabitants as Albanians first and foremost and only then as Muslims. Wahhabi Influence Minimal -------------- ¶10. (SBU) According to CIC representatives Ahmedi and Musliu, there are some individuals in the Presevo Valley who subscribe to Wahhabism. Although Ahmedi characterized the Wahhabi presence as a potentially destabilizing factor, both leaders went to great lengths to stress that the Wahhabis were not an organized group and did not control any mosques. There was one imam in Bujanovac who was Wahhabi, but he, like all imams, must sign a yearly "contract" with the CIC in which he pledged to abide by seven tenets of Hanafi faith. This gave the CIC sufficient leverage in the event that he espoused radical or extremist positions. Tanaskovic confirmed that in his opinion there was "little chance" that Wahhabism would take root in the Albanian community. ¶11. (SBU) Ahmedi, who received his formal education in Pristina and at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, told us that he would like to build a proper madrassa, or religious school, in Presevo since most students now travel to Kosovo or Macedonia. He stressed, however, that he was interested only in financial support from Turkey because assistance from Arab countries "comes with strings attached." Comment -------------- ¶12. (SBU) In contrast to the political realm, where there are significant tensions between the central government and South Serbia, the Islamic community in the Presevo Valley seemingly has received Belgrade's blessing to pursue its own course. The GOS' willingness to allow Muslims in Presevo and Bujanovac to retain ties with Kosovo, while discouraging similar contacts between the Islamic community in Sandzak and Bosnia, can be traced to the clear separation of religion and politics in South Serbia. Belgrade's constructive approach, even if it stems from preoccupation with other matters, is a welcome respite from its hard-headed approach to relations with Pristina-based institutions. End Comment. BRUSH