SCENESETTER FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000402 SIPDIS FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR MUNTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV SR SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO SERBIA Classified By: Ambassador Cameron Munter; reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Mr. Vice President: We eagerly anticipate your May 20 visit to Belgrade as an opportunity to refocus Serbia's leadership on the key tasks of Euro-Atlantic integration and economic development. The Serbian government has the potential to be a constructive partner and a force for regional stability, but is hobbled by its obsessive focus on Kosovo and its growing fear of the domestic consequences of the global economic crisis. Your message that the United States is prepared to deepen bilateral political, security, and economic cooperation with Serbia will strengthen the Serbian government's resolve to take bold steps on reform and relations with its neighbors. Euro-Atlantic Integration -------------- ¶2. (C) After winning re-election in February 2008 and forming a pro-European coalition government in July 2008, Serbian President Boris Tadic set European integration as the country's top strategic goal. Tadic, a charismatic leader, is the country's most influential politician; although on paper his powers are relatively modest, in actuality he wields wide executive authority through his party power. Despite this, he is often indecisive and politically timid. He heads a government made up of those who fought Milosevic in the 1990s. He will want to brief you on - and obtain your support for - Serbia's European aspirations: obtaining visa-free travel to the European Union, and unblocking Serbia's stalled Stabilization and Association Agreement that will outline Serbia's path to the EU. Serbia faces significant hurdles on its road to EU membership: it must fulfill its obligations to The Hague War Crimes Tribunal by capturing Ratko Mladic, tackle its significant corruption problem, and force a mountain of reform legislation through its creaky bureaucracy and inefficient Parliament. ¶3. (C) Unlike most EU aspirants, Serbia is not pursuing NATO membership simultaneously; this is primarily due to the lasting impact of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, which remains the single most traumatic episode in the country's post-World War II history. The public views the intervention as unjustified because post-Milosevic governments have never dealt with the realities of the Milosevic regime's brutality. Minister of Defense Dragan Sutanovac, a reformer who is one of Tadic's top lieutenants within the Democratic Party (and as such, a potential rival),is working hard to change public attitude toward NATO and the U.S. through active participation in Partnership for Peace and the State Partnership Program with the Ohio National Guard. The recent entry of Croatia and Albania into NATO has sparked a lively public debate about Serbia's relationship with the organization, an opening that you can capitalize on by explaining to the public the benefits of collaboration with NATO and underscoring to the government and military leadership that it is time for Serbia to play a constructive role in resolving problems outside its immediate region. Regional Dynamics -------------- ¶4. (C) President Tadic has waged a charm offensive with Serbia's neighbors to overcome lingering disputes, welcoming Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader in March and encouraging Macedonia and Montenegro to name new envoys after Belgrade expelled their previous ambassadors in response to Kosovo recognitions. While Serbia has generally taken a responsible approach toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, it could use its significant influence with Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik to more forcefully discourage his secessionist rhetoric and efforts to claw back constitutional competencies. Serbia's trade and economic links to the region are significant and growing; border controls, police cooperation, and anti-trafficking efforts are also improving. Business connections are helping to build shared interests across the region, but more can be done. Facing the Economic Crisis -------------- ¶5. (C) Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic is charged with implementing Serbia's response to the global economic crisis. BELGRADE 00000402 002 OF 002 Cvetkovic is Tadic's opposite: older, unassertive, apolitical, technocratic, and institutionally weaker than the Constitution prescribes. Despite his shortcomings, Cvetkovic has so far cobbled together a sufficient package of economic measures: the government stabilized the banking system and currency in the fall, and recently passed a dramatic budget revision cutting public spending to meet International Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements. The IMF is expected to approve a $4 billion Stand-By Agreement in mid-May. The funds will be crucial to help Serbia cope with plummeting state revenue and a GDP expected to shrink by at least 2%, and possibly up to 6%, in 2009. Public confidence in the government's ability to handle the crisis is low, however, and small protests over wage arrears and layoffs have cropped up around the country. The economic situation is likely to get worse before improving. The Serbian government needs to press ahead with reforms, cutting bureaucracy, and improving the business climate, but efforts to date have suffered as a result of the diverse interests of the multi-party governing coalition. Serbia's Kosovo Complex -------------- ¶6. (C) These financial woes and the desire for good relations with the EU are influencing Serbia's Kosovo policy, which has moderated in recent months. Though peaceful, Serbia's approach toward Kosovo is still unsatisfactory: Serbia needs to cooperate fully with EULEX, the EU's rule of law mission in Kosovo; engage on practical humanitarian issues, such as property rights, return of displaced people, and employment issues; end its unregulated, non-transparent funding of Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo; remove the Kosovo Serb hardliners who are organizing violent protests; and end its embargo on Kosovo's exports. Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic, a 34-year old Harvard-educated wunderkind who aspires to be Prime Minister, is the architect of Serbia's diplomatic offensive to prevent recognitions of Kosovo. He is largely responsible for Serbia's intransigence on Kosovo, as well as its courtship of Non-Aligned countries such as Iran and Cuba. Jeremic's nostalgia for being courted by both Russia and the West remains a part of Serbia's yearning for self-importance and leads to a mistaken belief that it can chart an independent path while still committing to EU membership as a strategic objective. This bipolarity contributes to Jeremic's inability to see the inherent contradiction between antagonizing the EU over Kosovo and asking for flexibility on EU membership criteria for Serbia with regard to Hague cooperation. ¶7. (C) Many in Serbia fear that the EU will eventually demand that Serbia recognize Kosovo as a condition for entry, a specter that drives Serbia's diplomatic campaign to challenge Kosovo's legitimacy in the International Court of Justice and to re-open status negotiations (possibly with the goal of partition). Your assurances that the international community is not pressing Serbia to recognize Kosovo would relieve the domestic political pressure on Tadic to fight us on this issue at every turn. It would also make him more receptive to the message that Serbia must find a way to coexist with an independent Kosovo. While the EU has not yet set out any criteria, it is clear that Serbia will not be able to join while it remains in open conflict with a neighbor. Comment: The "Biden Factor" -------------- ¶8. (C) The Serbian public closely associates you with the 1999 NATO intervention and therefore doesn't quite know what to make of the fact that that you will be the first visitor to Serbia from the Obama administration. The government and the general public alike are thrilled to receive high-level U.S. attention and are hoping that your visit will usher in a new era in our bilateral relationship. Your message: Serbia is no longer the regional problem, but rather a partner in solving regional issues and as such a valued member of the international community, ready to take on greater responsibilities on the world stage. Recognition of Serbia's democratic values and European orientation would reinforce and encourage the type of constructive, good neighborly behavior that we need from Serbia to ensure continued stability in the Balkans. End Comment. MUNTER