SERBIA'S YEAR OF UNREALIZED FEARS AND UNFULFILLED

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000173 DEPT FOR EUR/SCE (P. PETERSON) SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O.12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL SR SUBJECT: SERBIA'S YEAR OF UNREALIZED FEARS AND UNFULFILLED POTENTIAL Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) One year after Boris Tadic's reelection as president of Serbia, the country has achieved several notable successes. Rather than succumbing to nationalism in the wake of Kosovo's declaration of independence, its citizens elected a new government that declared European Union membership its top strategic goal, arrested war crimes indictee Radovan Karadzic, and took several important steps toward institutional reform and economic recovery. Despite these achievements, however, the government has frequently strayed from its commitment to move the country forward, maintaining a rigid and unhelpful stance toward Kosovo, antagonizing the European Union, and strengthening its ties to Russia and the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement. Tadic, though hesitant, is the only leader capable of refocusing Serbian political practices on the goal of a European future. We should help him where we can, and press him where we must, to achieve what he set out to accomplish with his victory a year ago. End Summary. Domestic Stability -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Following Boris Tadic's February 2008 reelection as president of Serbia by a narrow margin over then-Radical leader Tomislav Nikolic, it was not clear how the Serbian government then led by Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) head Vojislav Kostunica would react to Kosovo's impending declaration of independence. The worst-case scenarios involved widespread protests, violence and population movements; while those did not come to pass, the demonstrations orchestrated by DSS leadership that resulted in attacks on the U.S. and other embassies severely damaged Serbia's international image. A year later, most Serbians have grudgingly accepted that Kosovo is no longer part of Serbia. In recent polls the question of Kosovo has fallen to fifth or sixth place among citizens' priorities, trailing economic and other real-world issues. ¶3. (SBU) The Serbian public demonstrated its priorities in the May 2008 parliamentary and local elections, in which Tadic's Democratic Party (DS) was able to cobble together a government committed to a platform of European integration and DSS lost power. The coalition government formed in July 2008 under Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic identified European Union membership as its top goal. In an important break with the past, the Socialist Party (SPS) of former strongman Slobodan Milosevic joined the democratic government after shifting the party's platform and rhetoric to explicitly support Serbia's EU aspirations. The July 2008 arrest and extradition of ICTY indictee Radovan Karadzic, which triggered only limited public demonstrations, created high expectations that the new government would be willing and able to tackle the many sensitive issues facing the country. ¶4. (SBU) Despite its early successes and its clear mandate to take the country to Europe, the new government has not moved boldly. A lack of strategic vision at the top has been compounded by the difficulty of achieving consensus among the 19 parties in the governing coalition, the lack of a true interagency coordination process, and the dominance of President Tadic in policy areas normally the domain of the Prime Minister. The result has been a government of individual actors following their own visions rather than a team pursuing agreed goals. While there have been a few tangible successes, including improved ICTY cooperation and the passage of important anti-corruption and judicial reform legislation, the government has been slow to propose reform legislation and the Parliament even slower to vote on it. Much of the fall and winter was consumed with rumors of new parliamentary elections aimed at consolidating the Democratic Party's popularity gains; thankfully, the leadership appears to have realized that the Serbian public is sick of endless election cycles and decided to make the current coalition work for the time being. Economic Responsibility -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The growing economic crisis was a definite factor in tamping down dreams of new and better parliamentary elections. As the pinch of the financial crisis began to be felt in Serbia, in January President Tadic and his DS colleagues began to repeat the message that political stability was necessary to prepare Serbia for worse days ahead. ¶6. (SBU) Prime Minister Cvetkovic and his economic experts have taken several steps to shore up domestic and international BELGRADE 00000173 002 OF 002 confidence in the Serbian economy, including agreeing to a Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF; backing the banking system with increased deposit insurance; postponing a problematic collective bargaining agreement; fighting to preserve the Fiat investment in Kragujevac; and unilaterally implementing the Interim Trade Agreement with the European Union in the face of significant political pressure. ¶7. (SBU) The government initially took some hits as a result of the Russia-Ukraine gas cutoff, which - coming on the heels of the agreement to sell the national oil company, NIS, to Gazprom at a bargain-basement price -- undermined the GOS argument that closer linkages with Russia would guarantee Serbia's energy security. President Tadic's success in obtaining emergency gas supplies from Hungary and Germany soon eclipsed the news stories about Russia, however, and even allowed Serbia to play the part of a responsible regional leader by sharing gas with Bosnia-Herzegovina. Aggressive and Inflexible Foreign Policy -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Unfortunately, Serbia's help to BiH during the gas crisis was one of the few bright spots in the country's relations with the region, the European Union, and the United States over the past year. The expected chill in relations following Kosovo's declaration of independence was prolonged needlessly by a Serbian government "contact policy" barring cabinet-level or above meetings with the USG until October 2008. While limiting his contact with the U.S. and the EU, for months Foreign Minister Jeremic traveled the globe to lobby against recognitions of Kosovo and for UN General Assembly support for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence. ¶9. (SBU) The Serbian government argued that the ICJ referral would "compartmentalize" the Kosovo issue and allow it to address the real problems affecting the Serb minority in Kosovo; instead, the government has used the case to justify not taking any pragmatic steps that could possibly be construed as acknowledging Kosovo's sovereignty. The GOS fought the deployment of the EULEX rule of law mission tooth and nail, acquiescing only after protracted UN negotiations resulting in the "Six Point Plan." Although the Serbian government did then direct the Serb minority in Kosovo to accept rather than resist EULEX deployment, this significant step was immediately overshadowed by FM Jeremic's strident and puzzling condemnations of the EU for adding "new and unacceptable pre-conditions" for Serbia's membership. The move not only negated EU goodwill resulting from the agreement on EULEX, it also ensured that EU countries would intervene only half-heartedly on Serbia's behalf with the Netherlands on the question of ICTY conditionality and unfreezing the Stabilization and Association Agreement. The Serbian government's continued hesitation in engaging with EULEX has caused relations with the EU to deteriorate even further. ¶10. (SBU) While trumpeting EU membership as its top strategic goal, the Serbian government has devoted considerable energy to highlighting its relationship with Russia and to reclaiming the glory days of Yugoslav leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement. It is not clear whether Serbian leaders are simply playing to the domestic audience, seeking to build up the country's importance in the eyes of the EU, establishing a network of ties to counterbalance the eventual obligations of EU membership, or simply preserving a "Plan B" in case the prospect of EU membership recedes. Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Although today's Serbian government falls short of expectations, it is nevertheless a far cry from the belligerence of the Kostunica era and has the potential to be more constructive than it currently is. The fact that the one-year anniversary of Kosovo's independence coincides with the arrival of the new U.S. administration provides an opportunity to urge the Serbian government to open a new chapter in its relations with its neighbors and the broader world. Key to this process is President Tadic who, while often indecisive, remains broadly popular, free of the taint of corruption, and personally committed to a European future. If Tadic moves forward, Serbia will move with him. Yet this is still a traumatized country, given the events of the last two decades. Though many in Serbia will never fully recover from the final loss of Kosovo, a year marks a decent interval of mourning; we must continue to press Serbia to move beyond the conflicts of the past and claim its European future. End Comment. MUNTER