SLEIMAN URGES GOVERNMENT FORMATION BEFORE UNGA,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000987 SIPDIS DEPT FOR IO A/S EBRIMMER P FOR AWELLS/RWALLER DRL/NESA FOR JBARGHOUT PARIS FOR DNOBLES USUN FOR AWOLFF/EGERMAIN/ASCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR DSHAPIRO/MMCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON OVP FOR HMUSTAFA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LE SUBJECT: SLEIMAN URGES GOVERNMENT FORMATION BEFORE UNGA, CRITICIZED FOR NOT PUSHING ENOUGH REF: BEIRUT 984 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Presidential Advisor Naji Abi Assi and independent Christian MP Boutros Harb told the Ambassador in separate meetings September 2 that Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri needed to take a next step in the government formation process. Abi Assi contended the problem was local, while Harb believed it was regional circumstances that were interfering. President Sleiman was prepared to facilitate Hariri's next steps, Abi Assi reported, as long as the public reaction did not lead to violence. In contrast, Harb criticized Sleiman for not taking a more assertive role in the process. Hariri will certainly need the backing of Sleiman, but it is unlikely that Sleiman will be able tangibly to influence opposition Christian leader Michel Aoun to come to an agreement. Ultimately, Hariri will need to weigh whether submitting a cabinet list to Sleiman without Aoun's ministers or starting over from scratch will put him in the strongest position. End summary. PRESIDENT IS READY TO FACILITATE, HAS NO OBJECTION TO BASSIL -------------- ¶2. (C) Naji Abi Assi told the Ambassador and poloff September 2 that President Sleiman was ready to "facilitate" PM-designate Saad Hariri's government formation process. Abi Assi, who wrote Sleiman's September 1 speech (reftel) urging the government be formed before the start of the UN General Assembly in late September, said the president intended the speech to be a "warning" without being aggressive. Government formation blockage, he said, was more likely due to internal, Lebanese pressures than to external, regional pressures. He sensed Hariri was almost ready to present a draft list of ministers to the president and assured us Sleiman would sign off on it, provided the list was "reasonable" and did not provoke violence. Abi Assi planned to suggest to Hariri's advisor, Nader Hariri, that the PM-designate float his draft list in the press to gauge reaction from the opposition prior to submitting it to the president. ¶3. (C) Abi Assi claimed that Sleiman has no objection to opposition Christian leader Michel Aoun's son-in-law, Gebran Bassil, being included in a list of ministers. He criticized Hariri for taking such a strong position against Bassil, saying Hariri could have solved this problem weeks ago by just "giving Bassil something." If the standoff between Hariri and Aoun remains as it is, Abi Assi analyzed that both Hariri and Sleiman would be weakened, economic and social pressures would increase, and investors in Lebanon would become nervous -- a situation that benefits no one. MAJORITY DOESN'T WANT TO CONCEDE TO AOUN, BUT WANTS VIOLENCE EVEN LESS -------------- ¶4. (C) In contrast, majority-aligned Christian MP Boutros Harb assessed that the standoff between Hariri and Aoun is under the influence of regional actors. Harb called Aoun a "coward" and said it is impossible that Aoun would take his intractable position without the backing of Syria or Hizballah, since "the paralysis is not solely because of Bassil or the Ministry of Interior." Harb, a longtime politician who attended the negotiations in Taif in 1989 and Doha in 2008, was exasperated by the government formation process. He said he was disappointed by Sleiman's speech because the president did not go far enough and he criticized both Sleiman and Hariri for not daring to force the opposition into anything because of the threat of Hizballah's arms. If the majority accepts Aoun's conditions, "you would BEIRUT 00000987 002 OF 002 not have a Council of Ministers, but a ring full of wrestlers," he remarked. (Note: At a September 2 iftar, Hariri declared that "the opposition will not impose conditions on the majority. The electorate's choices are to be respected at the end of the day. If people endorsed (the opposition's) platform, they would have voted for them," he added. End note.) In Harb's view, the possibility of forming a government is slim, and, if formed, the chance that it would be effective is bleaker still. ¶5. (C) Harb insisted, however, that the majority would still select Hariri as PM-designate if new consultations started from the beginning. He advocated "changing the rules" if the opposition continued to play hardball. Harb suggested Hariri should consider forming a majority government, as long as Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and President Sleiman would support it. He admitted this could be risky, but as long as it did not lead to violence, then it was worth attempting. Otherwise, he argued, the opposition would continue to "blackmail" Hariri's majority with the intent of creating a de facto change to the entire constitution to enable a blocking minority without changing the actual text. The only guarantee, Harb declared, is that if no steps are taken, the risk to the future of the country is guaranteed. COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) Despite the two men's different readings of the reasons behind the current political paralysis, they agreed that Hariri must make a move. Both were certain that President Sleiman would support Hariri. It is doubtful, however, that Sleiman has enough influence with Aoun and the opposition to produce any tangible benefit for Hariri if he chooses to continue to pursue a national unity government, and the president's resolve will likely waver at any threat of civil unrest. SISON