JUMBLATT OBSESSED WITH AVERTING DRUZE-SHIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000972 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S EBRIMMER P FOR AWELLS/RWALLER DRL/NESA FOR JBARGHOUT PARIS FOR DNOBLES USUN FOR AWOLFF/EGERMAIN/ASCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR DSHAPIRO/MMCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON OVP FOR HMUSTAFA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR LE SUBJECT: JUMBLATT OBSESSED WITH AVERTING DRUZE-SHIA CONFLICT AND SEEKS POLITICAL RELEVANCE REF: A. BEIRUT 914 ¶B. BEIRUT 426 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's close advisors, as well as his Druze competition, believe that Jumblatt is obsessed with averting a Druze-Shia conflict. Contacts suggest that one-third of the Druze "like" Jumblatt personally and will follow (some say "obey") his lead; one-third support Jumblatt out of fear; and one-third do not believe they have any other alternative. To protect the Druze community following the May 7, 2008, flash of violence between the Shia and Druze and to maintain his own political relevance, Jumblatt has made successful overtures to Hizballah to tamp down any lingering tensions. However, there is a growing consensus that Jumblatt harbors deep fears of what danger to the Druze community could result if the Special Tribunal for Lebanon implicates Hizballah in the assassination of Rafik Hariri. Others point to the political debut of Jumblatt's son Taymur "through the doors of the Shia," as evidence of Jumblatt's calculations. Jumblatt's August 2 pronouncement that his Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) was withdrawing from the March 14 coalition has been nuanced by his publicly declared support to Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri, but it is further evidence of his courting the Shia. It is unrealistic to expect Jumblatt will take any action that does not address his primary goals of protecting Druze existential interests and satisfying his quest for continued political relevance. End summary. PROTECTING THE DRUZE BY TAMPING DOWN DRUZE-SHIA TENSION -------------- ¶2. (C) Jumblatt's obsession with calming Druze-Shia tensions drove his exit from the March 14 coalition, according to Druze MP and close advisor to Jumblatt Akram Shehayyeb. Shehayyeb acknowledged to poloffs August 20 that Jumblatt (who inherited his position after the assassination of his father, Kamal, in 1977) had made some mistakes throughout the years, notably precipitating the May 2008 crisis that led to violent clashes between Druze and Shia in the Druze homeland region of the Chouf. The Druze community has suffered as result of the crisis and cannot bear another conflict, he argued. In recognition of the potential peril to the community, since that time, Jumblatt mended his relationship with rival Druze leader Talal Arslan and is opening up towards Hizballah, the dominant Shia group, Shehayyeb reported. ¶3. (C) In any future conflict the Druze -- who number approximately 150,000 -- would be outnumbered quickly, asserted Shehayyeb. In a crisis, he continued, the Druze would not be able to smuggle in enough weapons or ammunition to defend themselves because they now live "in a sea of Shia." In an August 28 visit to his Mukhtara estate in the Chouf, Jumblatt echoed Shehayyeb by matter-of-factly pointing out to the Ambassador that the mountains to the south are controlled by Hizballah, while Syria controls the mountains to the west and north. Druze journalist Suleiman Takieddine, meanwhile, concurred that the spectre of Druze-Shia conflict was driving Jumblatt's behavior. When asked about the Druze community's support for Jumblatt, Takieddine assessed that the community was both worried and afraid that Hizballah was gaining power, Syria was regaining influence, and the possibility of a new civil war erupting was increasing as sectarian tensions deepened. However, he characterized the Druze community as grouped into thirds: one-third who support Jumblatt out of fear; one-third who would "obey" Jumblatt and follow blindly; and one-third who do not believe they have any alternative but to support Jumblatt. BEIRUT 00000972 002 OF 003 NEITHER HIZBALLAH NOR SYRIA TRUST JUMBLATT -------------- ¶4. (C) Takieddine accused Jumblatt of supporting Hizballah and reconciling with the Shia because it was "less dangerous." Shehayyeb confirmed as much when he boasted that Druze-Shia relations "on the mountain" (in areas such as the Chouf, Aley and Baabda) are generally better at all levels, although some problems still exist in the villages where Druze and Hizballah fighters clashed in 2008, such as Choueifat. However, while Jumblatt's relations with Hizballah and its regional ally Syria have ostensibly improved, contacts tell us that neither Hizballah nor Syria fully trusts Jumblatt because of his perceived ambiguity. Many contacts also assess that the Syrian regime will never forgive Jumblatt for his harsh defamation of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, and some say that he is actually under greater threat of assassination now because his opening to Syria means that he is under no one's protection and subject to everyone's threats. ¶5. (C) Supporters of Arslan share a similar view of Jumblatt's motives (ref A). Arslan's advisors Marwan Khaireddine (a Druze businessman) and Marwan Abu Fadel (Greek Orthodox and a possible cabinet minister) assessed August 26 that Jumblatt was afraid of what charges might come out of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon tasked with investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. If the Tribunal implicates Hizballah or Syria, Jumblatt fears that the Shia will take advantage of the situation to initiate a new conflict and take revenge on the minority Druze community, Khaireddine explained. Therefore, Jumblatt is seeking not only to protect the community but to protect himself, Khaireddine and Abu Fadel theorized. TAYMUR'S POLITICAL DEBUT THROUGH THE SHIA -------------- ¶6. (C) In a move that Khaireddine and Abu Fadel believe was intended to ingratiate himself further with Hizballah, Walid arranged for the political debut of his heir, Taymur, to occur through "the doors of the Shia." Taymur's political coming-out is tied to the twin Shia events of the year: he took a place of honor at Hizballah's celebrations marking the end of the 2006 war on August 14 and is expected to attend the Amal party's commemorations for the missing Imam Musa Sadr on August 31. Shehayyeb, who accompanied Taymur to the August 14 event, described the PSP participation as marked by Hizballah's solicitous and welcoming treatment of its Druze guests, even though Shehayyeb is held responsible by Hizballah for the murder of Shia civilians in Choueifat during the May 2008 conflagration. JUMBLATT: A RECKLESS POLITICAL CHAMELEON? -------------- ¶7. (C) Walid Jumblatt's August 2 declaration that his party would no longer be part of PM-designate Saad Hariri's March 14 coalition was a "shock," said Takieddine. However, PSP spokesperson Rami Rayes downplayed the move saying the repositioning would allow the PSP to "return to its (socialist) roots." Rayes defended Jumblatt's speech at the August 2 PSP annual conference, arguing that its date had been set in December 2008 -- "long before the June 7 parliamentary elections and before anyone would have predicted that a government would not yet be formed." The reactions to the announcement were "disproportionate" from both March 14 coalition members and opposition Christian leader, Michel Aoun, Rayes added. ¶8. (C) Jumblatt has not shied away from rhetorical turnabouts in the past. During the May 2008 crisis, for example, it was Jumblatt who pushed Lebanon beyond the brink, and only after BEIRUT 00000972 003 OF 003 four days of heavy losses in the Druze community did he recant his position, forced by his Druze supporters to reconcile with Hizballah-aligned Arslan and make overtures towards he Shia. During his most recent move away from March 14, Jumblatt suggested that the coalition had fostered a polarizing attitude in the country, particularly against the Shia. Many contacts assess that Jumblatt was surprised by the sharp reaction of Hariri who, in the words of March 14 Secretary General Faris Souaid, "kicked him out." Since Hariri's sharp reaction and repeated visits by Saudi Minister of Culture Khoja, Jumblatt has moved back toward Hariri and on August 25 issued strong statements in support of the PM-designate. MPs from the PSP assure us, though, that Jumblatt cannot return the PSP to the March 14 Secretariat but will support from the outside on issues of common interest. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Jumblatt, although known for his political shifts, by most accounts considers himself a strategist and is regarded as such by most Lebanese. Between May 2008 and August 2009, Jumblatt's political instincts have caused more problems for the Druze community than they have solved. Positioning himself and his political heir, Taymur, to receive the protection of Hizballah while also keeping his party in Saad Hariri's parliamentary majority (though not in March 14) lessens the Shia threat against the Druze community and builds Jumblatt's political cache as a swing vote. His defection from March 14, rumored since early April (ref B), became a reality in August contrary to the natural inclinations of his followers. In the days following his August 2 speech, we believe Jumblatt intentionally nuanced his withdrawal from March 14 and reiterated his continued support for Hariri to retain his position of political relevance with the power to sway decisions, especially related to the still-pending government formation. SISON