MOBILE TELECOM PRIVATIZATION HELD HOSTAGE TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000953 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TAKING OUT WORD IN PARA 5) SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA EEB/IFD/ODF RDEMARCELLUS F FOR RNAPOLI IO FOR A/S BRIMMER P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT STATE PASS TO USAID ESCOTT TREASURY FOR SAHERN AND CKNOWLES COMMERCE FOR CLOUSTOUNAU/TSAMS/NWIEGLER PARIS FOR DNOBLES USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT OVP FOR HMUSTAFA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2019 TAGS: ECON EFIN EIND ECPS PGOV KCOR LE SUBJECT: MOBILE TELECOM PRIVATIZATION HELD HOSTAGE TO PRIVATE INTERESTS REF: A. BEIRUT 920 ¶B. 08 BEIRUT 1359 BEIRUT 00000953 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) Once the Lebanese cabinet is formed and the USG begins to work with the GOL to reform and build up its state institutions, we must also push the Lebanese leadership to move certain sectors out of the public realm through privatization. The most logical place for the GOL to begin would be in the mobile telecommunications sector, which is ready to be privatized, though there is not yet a political consensus on how it should be done. Not surprisingly, the primary obstacle to privatization is the political class, which worries that a sale might benefit political enemies either politically or financially. In addition, many political leaders may be working to ensure that they personally receive a proportion of the profits from any privatization transaction. Their maneuvering merely highlights further how crucial it is to extract the telecom sector -- simultaneously critical to the Lebanese economy and vulnerable to use for political patronage and corruption -- from the politicians' grip. The USG should work with partner donors to push Lebanese across the political spectrum to move ahead with privatization. End summary and comment. GOL COMMITTED TO REFORM AT PARIS III -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In its Paris III reform plan, the GOL committed to reform and privatization in the telecom sector, and donors pledged budget support to Lebanon tied to reform benchmarks. The sale of the two state-owned mobile telecom licenses to the private sector is expected to bring in $4-$8 billion, money earmarked by law for paying down part of Lebanon's massive debt burden, currently representing over 160% of GDP. The disbursement of the $75 million final tranche of the USG's $250 million budget support pledge from Paris III is tied to this privatization. MOBILE LICENSES READY TO SELL, BUT HOW? -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Experts agree that the sale of Lebanon's two mobile telecommunications licenses would be the easiest privatization to execute and could be done reasonably quickly. Ziad Hayek, Secretary General of the Higher Council for Privatization (HCP),believes that once the government decides to go through with the sale, the technical preparations could be complete within nine months. Kamal Shehadi, chairman of the independent Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA),agrees, saying that the sale would be technically simple but politicians differ over how it should be structured. ¶4. (SBU) While the original idea was that the GOL would auction the licenses to foreign bidders, Embassy contacts speak increasingly about the importance of Lebanese ownership of a portion of the mobile operations, and chatter along these lines has translated into public statements by current caretaker Telecom Minister Gebran Bassil advocating Lebanese participation in any deal. While a foreign mobile operator might own a large portion of the new company, and would certainly exercise management control, Bassil has pushed for the Lebanese public to have a chance to reap financial benefit from the privatized firms through partial ownership. BEIRUT 00000953 002.2 OF 003 GOL officials are increasingly echoing this sentiment in public and private comments, the most recent example being Central Bank of Lebanon Governor Riad Salameh in an August 14 meeting with the Ambassador (ref A). ¶5. (C) While such rhetoric plays to Lebanese Christian and Shia fears of Gulf Sunnis buying up valuable state assets, neither Hayek nor Shehadi -- both of whom are strongly pro-March 14 and pro-Hariri -- objects on economic grounds to selling a percentage of the operations to Lebanese, as long as it is done fairly and transparently. They point out that floating a percentage of the mobile companies on the Beirut Stock Exchange would not only give the Lebanese people the opportunity to profit from the new privately managed companies, but would also be a big boost to the development of the exchange, where market activity is currently dominated by trading in the shares of Hariri family real estate giant Solidere. In addition, Shehadi notes that many Lebanese banks, currently awash with liquidity, have been inquiring about the possibility of investing in the privatized companies, which they expect to turn a tidy profit in the coming years. POLITICIANS LOOKING FOR FINANCIAL BENEFIT... -------------- ¶6. (C) Ultimately, lack of progress on reform leading to privatization has been the result of political maneuvering by various interested parties. The history of the telecom industry in Lebanon is a sordid story of deals cut to benefit political actors. Former PM Rafiq Hariri essentially handed ownership of Lebanon's two mobile phone companies to the Syrian occupiers and their Lebanese proxies (including at least one close to Hariri himself) in the 1990s, and the financial exploitation of that ownership led to a political battle that resulted in their nationalization in 2003. A few years later, then-Telecom Minister Marwan Hamadeh delayed the issuance of spectrum licenses to internet service providers (ISPs) until his son could set up his own company, Cedarcom, and bid for a license. Today, the list of major ISP owners is a who's who of advisors to Lebanon's political scions from across the spectrum (septel). ¶7. (C) Despite the bad precedents, Gebran Bassil arrived as minister in July 2008 professing enthusiasm for privatizing the mobile pone companies (ref B). While the global financia crisis offered a convenient and legitimate excuse for delay, the change in the political discourse about the sale is telling. Mandating "Lebanese participation" in the ownership of the companies is a convenient way to ensure that Lebanese political figures can negotiate a cut of the profits of the privatized entities. HCP's Hayek believes strongly that Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri is particularly interested in finding ways to profit financially from the telecom sales and might block legislative progress until he is ensured of his personal financial benefit. ¶8. (C) Shehadi agrees that Berri will look for ways to leverage his position in parliament to extract part of the proceeds from the sale, but he stresses that Berri would not be alone, as various political leaders appear to be jockeying for a share in the spoils of privatization. Shehadi points out that the interest banks have shown in participating in the sale also reflects political intervention, as several of the largest Lebanese banks are at least partially owned by the political bigwigs, including the PM-designate's family. Fortunately for the cause of transparency, Shehadi's independent TRA, set up in 2007, should help to limit the ability of the politicians to insert themselves into the process. BEIRUT 00000953 003 OF 003 ...AND POLITICAL BENEFIT TOO -------------- ¶9. (C) In addition to personal financial concerns, Lebanon's leaders will be loath to allow their political opponents to reap any political benefit from a privatization. In fact, most politicians' understanding of the economic and financial implications of a sale is limited at best, so for them the issue is either fodder for political horsetrading or simply uninteresting. In these cases, outside pressure may be effective in moving the process forward. ¶10. (C) Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt recently came out publicly against privatization of any state assets, in what he characterized as a return to his socialist roots. Hayek insists that Jumblatt has no clear comprehension of what the term means: "He thinks it will mean giving away valuable assets to foreigners, but there are many ways to do it, and it needs to be done," Hayek told us. A recent Financial Times (FT) article quotes opposition Amal party MP Yassine Jaber as saying the opposition is not diametrically opposed to privatization, but would "look at every case at its own merits." Jaber told us the same thing, and though he displays a sophisticated knowledge of the economic consequences of such a move, we agre with the FT that his less sophisticated colleagus -- not to mention Jumblatt -- may see the licese sale as an opportunity to extract political concessions from new PM Saad Hariri, who has said that he is committed to privatization. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) International pressure has so far yielded little progress from the GOL on privatization of any kind, partially because short-term political considerations have dominated donor country discussions with Lebanese political leaders. Contacts from other donor country embassies increasingly say that the eventual formation of a new government represents a fresh opportunity to engage high-level officials on the need to move forward immediately, not only for fiscal reasons, but also to improve service for the Lebanese people and remove political interference from the sector as much as possible. Since the technical steps are not difficult, a sustained, coordinated expression of interest from the international community might nudge the political class toward resolving the impasse. SISON