Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT921
2009-08-17 13:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

AOUN REJECTS HARIRI'S INVITATION, GEMAYEL

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR LE SY 
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171356Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5547
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3543
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4074
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000921 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA
PARIS FOR JMILLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LE SY
SUBJECT: AOUN REJECTS HARIRI'S INVITATION, GEMAYEL
REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO MARCH 14

REF: BEIRUT 910

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000921 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN OVP FOR HMUSTAFA PARIS FOR JMILLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LE SY SUBJECT: AOUN REJECTS HARIRI'S INVITATION, GEMAYEL REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT TO MARCH 14 REF: BEIRUT 910 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun dismissed charges that he was obstructing progress on government formation and declared he would not accept Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri's lunch invitation if the latter does not put an end to attacks by his allies on the FPM leader. Aoun's insistence on retaining son-in-law Gebran Bassil as Telecommunications Minister in the next cabinet simply was a pretext to impede cabinet formation, according to Kataeb Party leader Amine Gemayel. Gemayel maintained he would remain a part of the March 14 coalition. Gemayel believed he and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea now must vie with Jumblatt for Hariri's attention within the March 14 coalition, and said his greatest fear was that Jumblatt would exert pressure to draw Hariri into Syria's web. End summary. ¶2. (C) In an August 17 press conference, Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun dismissed charges that he was obstructing progress on government formation and declared he would not accept Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri's publicly-extended invitation to lunch if the latter did not put an end to attacks by his allies on the FPM leader. Aoun insisted he was more concerned with "national unity" than putting together the next cabinet and repeated his assertion that the FPM receive a second key ministry in addition to the Telecommunications portfolio. Aoun also renewed his calls for the Ministry of Interior to be given to the FPM. Lashing out at his detractors, Aoun declared his unwavering support for his son-in-law and caretaker Minister of Telecommunications Gebran Bassil and charged Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt's split from March 14 destroyed the 15-10-5 cabinet formula. "You do the math. You will see the formula has become 12-5-10-3." ¶3. (C) Aoun's insistence on retaining Bassil as Telecommunications Minister in the next cabinet simply was a pretext to impede cabinet formation, according to Kataeb Party leader Amine Gemayel, who met with the Ambassador and PolOff at his Bikfaya residence on August 14. "This isn't normal," Gemayel complained about Aoun's maneuverings. "He's taken the government hostage." Gemayel maintained he would remain a part of the March 14 coalition despite rumors he would be the next to abandon the alliance (reftel). Gemayel admitted he did not trust Jumblatt and expressed fear that the Druze leader had struck a deal with Syria at the expense of his March 14 partners. Gemayel also expressed concern that Hariri might strike a deal with Hizballah regarding its arms to the exclusion of his political allies. Frustrated with the maneuverings of both Jumblatt and Hariri, Gemayel observed that the prevailing atmosphere was "much more that of May 7 (2008) than of June 7 (2009)." (Note: May 7, 2008 was the start of violent clashes between Hizballah and Sunni/Druze fighters that ended in a political compromise with the adoption of the Doha Agreement. End note.) Lebanon had replaced its constitution with the Doha Agreement and replaced its cabinet with the National Dialogue, he complained. ¶4. (C) Gemayel believed he and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea now must vie with Jumblatt for Hariri's attention within the March 14 coalition but he reiterated the commitment of March 14's Christian leaders to maintaining a strong relationship with the Prime Minister-designate. He admitted his greatest fear was that Jumblatt would pressure Hariri into Syria's web. Gemayel said his meeting the day before with former Environment Minister and self-proclaimed "Syrian Goodwill Ambassador" Wiam Wahhab was indicative of his willingness to normalize relations with Syria although he contended that no Lebanese government official should visit BEIRUT 00000921 002 OF 002 Damascus until after the government formation process was completed. Kataeb would not take any steps in this regard unless all March 14 parties agreed. The Kataeb position, he underscored, was that issues such as border demarcation and the detainees should be resolved by the Lebanese state and Syria. SISON

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