WILL THE REAL SYRIAN AMBASSADOR PLEASE STAND UP?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000911 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT PARIS FOR JMILLER USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON OVP FOR HMUSTAFA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER MARR MOPS LE SY SUBJECT: WILL THE REAL SYRIAN AMBASSADOR PLEASE STAND UP? REF: A. BEIRUT 01542 ¶B. DAMASCUS 562 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Syrian Ambassador to Lebanon Ali Abdel Karim has been essentially absent from the political scene since his March 2009 appointment, supplanted by various informal interlocutors, most recently Lebanese Druze opposition leader Wiam Wahhab. Damascus' use of such intermediaries increases its leverage in Lebanon as Lebanese politicos sense the tide shifting back towards Damascus. Political contacts note Syria's historical use of Lebanese allies as "message men," and opine that, with the two countries' "exceptional relationship" enshrined in the Taif Accord, the best way forward remains to strengthen the Lebanese state. End summary. A CHIMERAL EMBASSY -------------- ¶2. (U) The insignificance of Syrian ambassador to Lebanon Ali Abdel Karim to Syria's overall relationship with Lebanon has become increasingly apparent following the June 2009 parliamentary elections. Karim has avoided the spotlight since his March 2009 appointment, arriving in Beirut weekly on Thursday afternoons and returning to Damascus on Sundays. Karim has reportedly not visited with any Lebanese politicians (even Syria's many allies in Lebanon),with the exception of President Michel Sleiman, whom he has seen twice, the first time to present his credentials. TOYING WITH LEBANON'S POLITICOS -------------- ¶3. (U) Instead of using Ambassador Karim to carry out its political goals, Damascus is apparently currently favoring Druze opposition figure Wiam Wahhab for the task. Operating through Wahhab shows that Syria rewards loyalty and increases Syria's leverage: Damascus is free to choose a new unofficial representative in Lebanon at any moment, thus encouraging other Lebanese politicians to jockey for Syria's blessing. A visit from Wahhab, who has recently visited such prominent figures as Walid Jumblatt, Amin Gemayel, and Michel Murr, has become a dog whistle in the Lebanese political consciousness that the personality in question is signaling a new openness to Syria. Wahhab is only the first interlocutor, though: following an August 11 meeting with Wahhab, Michel Murr declared that he would "telephone the (Syrian) presidential palace" (not work through diplomatic channels or through Wahhab) when the time is right for a visit to Damascus. A HYDRA-HEADED RELATIONSHIP -------------- ¶4. (C) According to Al-Akhbar senior editorialist Nicholas Nassif, Lebanon-Syria diplomatic relations, built on the French mandate model, offer a limited role for ambassadors. Ambassadors were charged with official diplomatic relations according to international law, mainly related to commercial concerns and the interests of citizens abroad. The real work of diplomacy -- discussions of regional and domestic issues and foreign affairs -- historically occurred between presidents or prime ministers. Along these lines, Nasri Khoury, the head of the post-1991 Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council (reftel) was a "postman" between the countries, playing a strictly coordination role. Khoury's role grew after the 2005 assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri -- which terminated all visits and discussions between Lebanese and Syrian prime ministers -- but Damascus favored personal links with its Lebanese BEIRUT 00000911 002 OF 002 political allies to exert its influence, Nassif said. However, despite Saad Hariri's assertion to us on July 21 that the Syrians had committed to the Saudis that all signed agreements previously approved by the Higher Council would be redone through the Syrian embassy, the Higher Council is still active. On August 13 a sub-committee of the Council announced that it would head the investigation of recent violent border clashes between villagers in the Aarsal region north of Baalbeck. ¶5. (C) The three most important relationships between Lebanon and Syria, Nassif opined, are the relationship between the two presidents, the relationship between the two armies, and the relationship between the Syrian regime and its allies in Lebanon. Damascus' relations with its allies in Lebanon are most critical to the regime; ties between he presidents and the armies can cease (and haveseveral times in the past), but Syria, through its proxies, has always maintained its ability to exert direct influence in Lebanon. REFORMING THE SYSTEM -------------- ¶6. (C) "Exceptional relations" between Lebanon and Syria, called for in the Taif Accord and reaffirmed in the 1991 "Fraternity, Cooperation and Coordination Treaty," will be difficult to annul, especially in their informal form. However, as Nassif told Poloff, the international community can "create controls" in the bilateral relationship. Efforts to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) enable the GOL to demand border security and delineation, putting the neighbors on more equal footing. Continuing pressure for actual diplomatic relations that limit the role of Damascus-based Khoury and informal interlocutors such as Wahhab would strengthen Lebanon as well. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) The much-ballyhooed establishment of a Syrian embassy in Beirut is a good symbol that has remained just that. As Lebanese politicians sense that Syrian influence in Lebanon is strengthening, a number are opening their doors wide to Syrian proxies and keeping mum about the need for all relations to be government-to-government. Proxy relationships offer Syria a deniability that it will be loathe to relinquish, much less when a decreasing number in Lebanon are complaining. End comment. SISON