LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI WORRIED HAMAS PLANS TO USE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000091 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR I/O PDAS WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE SY IS SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI WORRIED HAMAS PLANS TO USE PALESTINIAN CAMPS TO CONFRONT FATAH, ISRAEL REF: A. BEIRUT 88 ¶B. BEIRUT 77 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador January 21, March 14 majority leader Saad Hariri expressed concern the past weeks' events in Gaza could lead to Hamas using Lebanon's Palestinian camps to confront Fatah and Israel. Hariri urged the new U.S. administration to "do something" about the Palestinian-Israeli crisis because if left for much longer, not even moderate Arab governments could afford to intervene, he believes. Hariri said that while he disagreed with President Sleiman's attendance at an Arab senior leaders' meeting in Doha in the aftermath of Gaza, he "respects" Sleiman's decisions. Hariri downplayed the import of the meeting between March 14 Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Hizballah MP Mohammad Raad (septel),saying it was necessary to "stabilize" the security situation in Druze districts. On elections, he admitted that the date of the March 14 convention to roll out its candidate lists and electoral platform remained undecided. Negotiations continued over candidate seats in Tripoli, as well as with independent MP Michel Murr, he said. End summary. HAMAS PLANNING TO USE THE CAMPS? -------------- ¶2. (C) Majority leader Saad Hariri told us January 21 that he was concerned that Hamas may use several of Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps as a base of operations to regroup and prepare for future conflict with Israel. Hariri speculated that Hamas might use the Palestinian camps of Baddawi (in the north, near Tripoli),Sabra and Shatila (both in the suburbs south of Beirut),and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) military camps near the Syrian border to push for an "intifada" against Fatah. He also speculated that Hizballah was planning an operation prior to Israel's parliamentary election on February 10. ¶3. (C) Hariri repeated several times his concern that the U.S. needed to "do something soon" to help Abu Mazen regain credibility and strengthen the Palestinian Authority. He believed Israeli action in December 2008 had weakened Hamas' credibility and that Hamas was "finished." However, Iran would need to find another way to challenge Israel. Domestically, most Lebanese do not support Hamas but were "disgusted" by the images coming out of Gaza that they see in the media, he said. Unless Israel gives up something, neither Lebanon, nor Saudi Arabia or Egypt, could fight to keep the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative alive, he continued. At a subsequent conference in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia had sought to reconcile with Syria. This reconciliation had "bought time" for Lebanon as the Syrians had not yet responded and Iran would wait to see what the Syrians would do, Hariri assessed. SLEIMAN UNDER PRESSURE, BUT HARIRI RESPECTS HIS CHOICES -------------- ¶4. (C) Hariri also asserted that the Gaza crisis created fissures in Arab leadership, as evidenced by the lack of quorum for an Arab League summit. When the Qataris called for an alternative "senior meeting," Hariri advised President Sleiman not to attend, arguing it would put Lebanon in a difficult position. In contrast, Sleiman was urged to attend by members of the opposition. However, Sleiman told Hariri that because the Qataris had brokered the 2008 Doha Agreement for the sake of Lebanon, Sleiman believed he should attend as a show of support. Hariri said that despite the disagreement, he "respects" Sleiman's decisions, and continued that were he in Sleiman's position, he probably would have done the same. The most negative impact of BEIRUT 00000091 002 OF 002 Sleiman's attendance in Doha was that it gave the appearance that Sleiman could be pressured by the opposition, including Hizballah, Hariri lamented. ¶5. (C) In a separate meeting, MP Marwan Hamadeh, confidante of March 14 Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, told the DCM that Sleiman was genuinely "afraid" of the pressure he received from a variety of pro-Syrian sources to attend the Doha summit. Furthermore, Sleiman was reportedly concerned that the pressure would continue and pointed to an increase in the number of news articles critical of Sleiman coming from opposition media outlets. HARIRI DOWNPLAYS JUMBLATT'S MEETING WITH HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶6. (C) Hariri downplayed the significance of the meeting between Jumblatt and a delegation led by Hizballah MP Mohammad Raad scheduled later the same day. According to Hariri, the purpose of the meeting was to "stabilize" security in the Druze areas. Jumblatt discussed the meeting with him several days ago, Hariri said. (Note: Hariri met with Hizballah officials for the first time since the 2006 war on October 26, followed by several subsequent meetings between party officials to discuss overall security. He speculated that Hizballah wanted to find a way to "save face" after the May 2008 events. Hamadeh, on the other hand, told the DCM that he personally disagreed with Jumblatt about the wisdom of meeting Hizballah. End note.) ELECTORAL TIDBITS -------------- ¶7. (C) On March 14's electoral preparations, Hariri said the coalition would hold a rally February 14 to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the assassination of his father, former PM Rafiq Hariri. However, the exact date of March 14's political convention to roll out its candidates and platform for the June elections was not yet decided, he said. He confirmed that negotiations over the candidate lists were ongoing, including in Tripoli where Hariri is exploring an alliance with either Najib Mikati or Mohammad Safadi. While negotiations continued with Greek Orthodox independent MP Michel Murr, Hariri remained unconvinced that the Armenian Tashnaq party (Michel Aoun's allies) would embrace the political program of March 14. ¶8. (C) Hariri reaffirmed his view that conducting the elections should remain the number one priority for the government. While the opposition publicly claims that it will be victorious in the elections, Hariri believed the opposition was only posturing and preferred to see the elections delayed. Syria, he claimed, still had it "its puppets" in Lebanon and could do anything to interfere. Although "we are the majority now," he said, if the opposition "assassinates three or four of us, then what?," he asked rhetorically. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Saad Hariri's focus on Gaza and the U.S. role in restoring Palestinian leader Abu Mazen's credibility are familiar refrains. While the possibility that Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps could be used as a base for confrontation with Israel -- with or without Hizballah fingerprints -- is real, all signs at the moment suggest the situation in the camps remains calm (reftels). ¶10. (C) Meanwhile, Hariri appeared relatively unconcerned that March 14's candidate lists or convention date were not yet determined. While Hariri -- and others in the March 14 leadership -- continue to believe they are on track with their electoral preparations, we note the elections are just 19 weeks away. End comment. SISON