LEBANON: SOME GOL OFFICIALS ADMIT 1701 VIOLATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000859 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN OVP FOR HMUSTAFA PARIS FOR JMILLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SOME GOL OFFICIALS ADMIT 1701 VIOLATION TO NSC DIRECTOR, OTHERS PIN THE BLAME ON ISRAEL REF: BEIRUT 819 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Denise Herbol for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Several GOL officials expressed their confidence July 24-25 to visiting National Security Council Senior Director for Middle East and North Africa Dan Shapiro that the opposition would drop its demand for a blocking third and that the cabinet would be formed, though no one could commit to a timeframe. While Pesident Sleiman, PM-designate Saad Hariri, and Deense Minister Murr unequivocally denounced the Jly 14 weapons cache explosion as a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, outgoing PM Fouad Siniora and Speaker Nabih Berri's advisor demurred (primarily out of fear of crossing Hizballah),and attempted to shift the focus to Israeli violations. All but Druze leader Walid Jumblatt believed Lebanon was prepared to assume membership to the Security Council in 2010, despite the inevitable conflicts of interest. End summary. ¶2. (C) Visiting National Security Council Senior Director for Middle East and North Africa Dan Shapiro and the Ambassador, accompanied by PolOff, met separately with President Michel Sleiman, outgoing PM Fouad Siniora, PM-designate Saad Hariri, Defense Minister Elias Murr, Speaker Nabih Berri's advisor Ali Hamdan, and Druze leader and MP Walid Jumblatt on July 24-25. SLEIMAN: GOL READY FOR UNSC MEMBERSHIP DESPITE INTERNAL DIVISIONS -------------- ¶3. (C) At the presidential palace in Baabda, President Sleiman expressed his opposition to the blocking third concept, but emphasized that there are key topics that must be agreed upon by consensus. Sleiman insisted that the cabinet formation process be an internal, Lebanese effort and rejected the idea of another Doha conference, even if that meant it took more time to form a new cabinet. ¶4. (C) Stressing the GOL's full commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, President Sleiman acknowledged that the weapons cache discovered after exploding July 14 (reftel) was a violation and stated that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was doing its best to abide by the resolution. However, he argued, the uncovering of the "Israeli spy ring" constituted a more dangerous violation for Lebanese citizens than the weapons cache violation because it has undermined the credibility of the LAF. (Note: Several LAF officers have been arrested on charges of espionage against Lebanon. End note.) ¶5. (C) Shapiro expressed concern over the Lebanese Mission to the UN's letter suggesting Israeli culpability for the weapons cache explosion and inquired about Lebanon's possible 2010-2012 UN Security Council membership in view of probable conflicts of interest. Sleiman responded that the GOL would decide its position for new resolution "in accordance with the Arab League." On resolutions pertaining to Lebanon, he said the GOL would always act in the interest of Lebanon. "It is not possible to be a part of the UNSC and not defend Lebanon," Sleiman argued. SINIORA: "RED LINE" TO FINGER HIZBALLAH FOR WEAPONS CACHE -------------- ¶6. (C) Siniora justified the letter from the Lebanese Mission to the UN as reasonable because it was a way to communicate that there are many Israeli violations that do not receive attention. According to Siniora, the Foreign Minister's office drafted the letter, circulated it through the BEIRUT 00000859 002 OF 004 President's office, then to his office, at which point he made "substantial" edits. ¶7. (C) Siniora indicated that the letter's acknowledgment of the weapons cache "implies" GOL admission of a UNSCR violation. However, he argued, the Israelis do not take responsibility for their violations, so why should the Lebanese be expected to take responsibility? Nevertheless, he said that if the GOL did single out Hizballah, it would be taking a great risk and crossing a line that could not be crossed. He referred to the risks his government took in May 2008 that resulted in Hizballah's takeover of Beirut. ¶8. (C) Shapiro responded that the letter had not been warmly received in Washington. He said it called into question what kind of partner the United States had in Lebanon, if the GOL could not even call a clear violation of UNSCR 1701 on its territory by its name. This failure had potential implications for the kind of assistance the USG and Congress would support for Lebanon and the LAF. We need to know that we have a reliable partner in confronting all violations, including those by Hizballah, he said. The incident and the letter also raised serious concerns about how the GOL would deal with such difficult questions, as well as tough decisions about Iran and other matters, when it takes its seat on the UN Security Council. GOL decisions on the UNSC could exacerbate tensions in U.S.-Lebanese relationship. Shapiro repeated these concerns with all of his interlocutors. HARIRI: HASTE MAKES WASTE IN CABINET FORMATION; JUMBLATT WON'T BOLT MARCH 14 -------------- ¶9. (C) Hariri declared that it was more important to take his time in forming the new cabinet to ensure that the victory won by March 14 in the June 7 parliamentary elections was not lost in the negotiation process. Initially declaring that he "needed to be convinced" why to give the opposition a blocking third in the cabinet, Hariri then asserted that he would not agree to a blocking third because he did not see the need for it, or a "king minister" (someone trusted by all who would fall under the president bloc to resolve the opposition's demand for more than ten ministerial seats). ¶10. (C) Hariri indicated that the opposition had "retracted a lot" from its earlier positions on cabinet formation and accused Syria of being the origin of the opposition's demands. He said he understood that as painful as it would be, he would need to speak to the Syrians at some point (although not necessarily in Damascus),but certainly not before the cabinet was formed and a vote of confidence held. ¶11. (C) Shapiro stated that cabinet formation was a Lebanese decision, and that the United States supported a government that represents the people's wishes, that can govern effectively, and that allows a continuation of the USG's assistance. ¶12. (C) Unaware of the Lebanese Mission's letter to the UN, Hariri was surprised that no one had informed him, but not surprised about the content. He flatly declared the weapons cache a violation of UNSCR 1701 and added that the real culprit for the violation was Syria, the origin of the weapons. He disclosed that there had been unrest in northern Lebanon, instigated by local Sunni "gangs" taking orders from Hizballah and anticipated that Hizballah was "preparing something." ¶13. (C) Addressing Jumblatt's June meeting with Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah, Hariri said he was unconcerned about Jumblatt's loyalties. "For four years, people have been questioning Walid's political allegiances, but no one has attacked Hizballah effectively except for Walid," he declared. He said that Jumblatt sees "everyone" going to Syria and had determined that he should as well in order to BEIRUT 00000859 003 OF 004 ensure his political survival. MURR: JOINT UNIFIL/LAF REPORT OFFERS POLITICAL COVER TO GOL -------------- ¶14. (C) Murr relayed that the LAF G-2 (intelligence bureau) believes Hizballah and its Christian ally, Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun, do not want the cabinet formed before Ramadan (expected to begin after August 20). Murr worried that the momentum of March 14's victory and Hariri's credibility would both be lost if it took "too long." ¶15. (C) Mentioning that he would prefer to assume the Foreign Minister's portfolio, he said he understood why President Sleiman and Hariri were inclined to keep him as Defense Minister. He said he wanted to focus on developing the LAF's counter-terrorism capabilities, believing that it was fruitless to build its defensive capabilities because "if Israel wants to invade Lebanon, it will." ¶16. (C) Murr stated clearly that Kherbet Selim was an illegal munitions depot in UNIFIL's Area of Responsibility and a "huge" violation of UNSCR 1701. Revising his July 17 account of the explosion (reftel),Murr said there were no Katyusha rockets, only munitions left by the collaborator South Lebanon Army in 2000, that killed between one and two Hizballah operatives. ¶17. (C) Murr also said that UNIFIL and the LAF arrived on the scene "together." Hizballah members drove a van containing bombs away from the explosion, Murr disclosed, but were intercepted by the LAF and UNIFIL and arrested. ¶18. (C) The LAF and UNIFIL were both conducting investigations and would produce one report, due within days, Murr said. Noting that LAF Commander General Jean Kahwagi had departed minutes earlier, Murr said he had asked Kahwagi for a commitment that the LAF would make it clear in the report that there had been a violation of UNSCR 1701. Reportedly, Kahwagi had readily agreed. Murr said that the LAF is the only entity that could credibly call the incident a "violation," and advised that Siniora refer to the LAF's report if he chose to take a stand against Hizballah. ¶19. (C) Murr added that the LAF intends to continue searching buildings in the area after the report's submission to "support" UNIFIL. Murr criticized the French UNIFIL contingent leadership and performance, saying they avoided conducting searches in their area of responsibility. He would like to mix French and other UNIFIL forces, to improve performance. Murr was complimentary of UNIFIL Commander General Claudio Graziano, supporting his extension from January 2010 for another year. Murr said he was meeting UNSCOL Michael Williams and Graziano on July 27; the next tripartite meeting (UNIFIL-LAF-IDF) was scheduled for July ¶28. BERRI NO LONGER DEMANDING BLOCKING THIRD? -------------- ¶20. (C) Hamdan hinted that Speaker Berri had dropped his demand for a blocking third and conveyed Berri's optimism that there were "no obstacles" to cabinet formation. On the incidents in the south, Hamdan parroted the Lebanese Mission's letter, describing the weapons cache as Hebrew-inscribed munitions dating back to the South Lebanon Army in 2000. He added that Hizballah does not use the types of weapons found in the cache. ¶21. (C) Hamdan affirmed Berri's support for UNSCR 1701, but said that UNSCR 1559 was "in the past." He added that Berri was still holding out for a ceasefire to the 2006 hostilities. Hamdan described that the protests against UNIFIL (reftel) as out of the ordinary, characterizing the BEIRUT 00000859 004 OF 004 residents' relations with UNIFIL as "very good." JUMBLATT CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶22. (C) As the only interlocutor who recognized the dangers of assuming a seat on the UNSC, Jumblatt said, "I wish we did not have this poisoned gift, but Saad and the others really want it." On the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), Jumblatt repeated his fear that any indictments would cause a civil war. He suggested the STL delay indictments or the United States "quietly" use the indictments as a bargaining chip with Syria. Shapiro assured Jumblatt that the USG would not make any deals with Syria at Lebanon's expense, and that the STL was non-negotiable. ¶23. (U) NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Dan Shapiro has cleared this cable. HERBOL