LEBANON: DEFMIN MURR TELLS GENERAL PETRAEUS NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000821

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
PARIS FOR JMILLER
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MCAP MOPS IS SA SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: DEFMIN MURR TELLS GENERAL PETRAEUS NEW
GOVERNMENT WILL BUILD STRONGER MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.
4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Defense Minister Elias Murr affirmed to visiting
CENTCOM Commanding General David Petraeus in a June 30
meeting that the strong U.S.-Lebanese military partnership
will grow stronger under the new Lebanese government. Murr
said the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) work on a Five Year
Plan would continue, and he noted the LAF benefits greatly
from U.S. support because of shared values, strategy, and
policies. Murr said PM-designate Saad Hariri would acquire
nearly $1.5 billion (presumably from Saudi Arabia) to equip
the LAF. Murr noted he would like foremost to acquire
platforms that could be used for close air support (CAS),
such as the Cessna Caravan, the UAE's Hawk, or light attack
helicopters (e.g. the Bell 412). Murr said it was time to
build the LAF from the "bottom up" with 80% of new funding
going to basic equipment and training and 20% going to
"strategic hardware" such as tanks and the air force. Murr
declared that the proposed National Defense Strategy was
nothing more than an attempt to allow Hizballah to keep its
arms. He cautioned that he would reject any policy to
integrate Hizballah militia into the LAF.


2. (C) Murr confided that the new government must concur
with the LAF's strategic mission and then build up the army
before it begins to consider disarming Hizballah. He stated
that his task was to "strengthen the Army" so that, "one day
the Army will be strong and Hizballah will be weak." General
Petraeus advised Murr to make acquisitions, particularly
aircraft, based on a cost consideration for the initial
procurement cost and on the cost of operating and maintaining
the equipment. Murr commented that PM-designate Saad Hariri
needed good advisors who are "real believers" in the future
of the country and the LAF's role or the country would "pay
dearly." He said current LAF Commander Jean Kahwagi has the
"will" to continue improving the LAF. No one can move
Kahwagi, Murr assessed, but, nonetheless, he must be coached
to become more "politically correct" and judicious. Murr
intimated that he would consider accepting the post of
Foreign Minister in the new government.


3. (C) In a separate meeting, LAF Commander General Jean
Kahwagi told General Petraeus he greatly appreciated U.S.
support but requested that it could arrive more quickly.
Kahwagi was detailed in his requests, asking for Cessna
Caravans, refurbished M113 armored personnel carriers (APC),
M4 rifles, body armor, and attack helicopters. Kahwagi
asked Gen. Petraeus to help get 45 German Leopard tanks
delivered. General Petraeus advised Kawahgi to make wise
acquisitions based on cost effectiveness and to concentrate
on good training and maintenance. General Petraeus requested
both Murr's and Kahwagi's help in finalizing plans for
expansion of the Embassy's Office of Defense Cooperation
(ODC) in a new compound to allow the ODC to provide
additional training to the LAF. End Summary.

MURR: WE WON
--------------


4. (C) Visiting CENTCOM Commander David Petraeus, accompanied
by the Ambassador, met with Defense Minister Elias Murr on
June 30 at Murr's residence in Rabieh. Also attending the
meeting were Defense Attach' LTC James Lantz, Office of
Defense Cooperation Chief Col. Joshua Berisford, PolOff, Col.
Michael Iverson, Executive Officer, Col. Michael Bell, of the
Commander's Initiative Group, Mr. Sadi Othman and Mr. Ali
Khedery, advisors to the Commander, LTC Dave Wilson, Defense
Department Lebanese Desk Officer and Maj. Ronald Clark, Aide
De Camp.

MURR'S PLAN MOVING FORWARD
--------------

BEIRUT 00000821 002 OF 004




5. (C) Murr spoke positively about the outcome of the June 7
parliamentary elections, saying that a a pro-western, March
14-led government will continue strengthening the
U.S.-Lebanese military relationship. Murr told General
Petraeus that PM-designate Saad Hariri would be able to
acquire as much as $1.5 billion (presumably from Saudi
sources) to support equipping the LAF. Murr proposed buying
two more Cessna Caravans to complement the one already in
inventory and the one soon to arrive. ODC Chief Berisford
and General Petraeus affirmed the merits of the Caravan as a
strong CAS platform but cautioned Murr on the high cost to
outfit the aircraft from its basic configuration. With an
initial cost of $1.8-$2.2 million each, the Caravan's fully
weaponized cost could reach $22 million, they noted. Murr
seemed interested in the 11-12 OV-10s that General Petraeus
showed him and reported they might be available on a
short-deployment timeline. General Petraeus urged Murr to
consider two points in allocating limited funds to purchase
aircraft: initial purchase cost and the overall operating and
maintenance costs over the long term. General Petraeus
cautioned Murr not to be seduced by a low price of a platform
(or even the gift of a weapon system),but consider the costs
associated with operating the equipment, its maintenance, the
availability of spare parts, and the tools and facilities
required.


6. (C) General Petraeus affirmed that the U.S. procurement
system was slow but "shortcuts" to acquiring equipment were
inadvisable. He used the previous offer by Russia to provide
Lebanon with a gift of Russian MIG-29s as an example of
wasting funds on a very expensive aircraft to operate and
maintain despite some very attractive initial costs.


7. (C) Murr agreed with General Petraeus' recommendations and
added that he, too, had advised Hariri of the same points.
Murr stated that he intended to focus on building the LAF
from the "bottom up" by ensuring more attention be paid to
"basic needs," although he continued to mention other
specific weapons platforms such as light attack helicopters
and M-60 tanks. Murr had interest in these weapons as a part
of his "strategic" acquisitions program for the LAF. Murr
envisioned using future funds divided 80% for basic equipment
and 20% for strategic acquisitions consistent with his Five
Year Plan. He underscored the presence of volatile
Palestinian camps and Sunni extremist sanctuaries as threats
requiring the need for an air force to deal with them and
provide close air support. General Petraeus mentioned the
LAF would be well served with V-hulled wheeled vehicles in
lieu of more heavy tracked vehicles (e.g. M113 personnel
carriers and tanks) because they would be more maneuverable
and less destructive on Lebanon's roadways. Murr reiterated
Hariri's claim to access to $1.5 billion in funds in a Saudi
no-interest loan repaid over 20 years.


8. (C) Murr stated he and LAF Commander Kahwagi would update
the LAF five year plan before going to the new government for
funds. Murr said he would ask the government rhetorically
"what kind of LAF do we need?" Murr concluded it was a force
to secure the borders, enforce UNSCR 1701, and
counter-terrorism. General Petraeus emphasized the
importance of training soldiers' "minds," and supporting good
officers with high level command and staff education.
General Petraeus invoked Murr to reciprocate U.S. support by
helping ODC concluded arrangements to move into a new
compound and overall expansion efforts that would ultimately
increase the level of support and training ODC provides to
the LAF.

VALUES BIND THE RELATIONSHIP
--------------


9. Murr appreciated General Petraeus' compliments on "feel
good accomplishments" related to fighting terrorism and
building up the LAF. Murr mused that he had made life
difficult for those in the government that wanted to subvert

BEIRUT 00000821 003 OF 004


efforts to strengthen the Lebanese military institution.
Murr noted that although the "United States is not an arms
dealer, it is the country that possesses the strategy,
values, and policy" to assist Lebanon. To that list, General
Petraeus added "partnership."


10. (C) Murr said PM-designate Saad Hariri needed good
advisers on military affairs so Hariri would maintain the
principles and values inherent in building Lebanon's military
establishment above the sectarian and fractious political
life in Lebanon. Murr said military leadership should not be
"designated," but built through action and devotion to the
institution. On the new government, Murr remarked that
Hariri should disregard advisers that want to move quickly or
haphazardly. Hariri needed a team of "real believers" in the
military as an institution or the country would pay dearly,
he believed.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY IS
A RUSE
--------------


11. (C) Murr advised strongly not to put much faith in the
so-called National Defense Strategy, initiated in the
National Dialogue, that would lead to a policy to disarm
Hizballah. In fact, it is a ploy to allow Hizballah to
maintain its arms, he averred. Murr said he adamantly
refused President Michel Sleiman's offers to lead the defense
strategy discussions. Murr surmised there were only two
current options concerning Hizballah's militia: the army
would be "diluted" into Hizballah (i.e. by means of Hizballah
supporting leadership appointments) or worse, Hizballah would
be directly integrated into the LAF. Murr spoke of his
efforts to reduce the percentages of Shia in the army from
about 58% to a current 26%, and he declared he "would not go
back" to those higher levels of Shia percentages. He claimed
there were Hizballah spies in the LAF and that if he remained
Minister of Defense he would work to "clean up" some areas in
the LAF, stating he would start in the intelligence branch
(G-2). Murr added the caveat that current G-2 Chief BG Edmond
Fadel was a trusted "good man," but there were problems in
the levels directly below Fadel in Beirut.

GREAT JOB IN THE
COUNTER-TERRORISM ARENA
--------------


12. (C) General Petraeus told Murr that his and Kahwagi's
efforts combating Sunni extremists, Fatah al-Islam and
Al-Qaeda in particular, had been impressive. General
Petraeus said his own intelligence officers underestimated
the success the LAF had in capturing or killing at least five
highly sought after terrorists. The LAF had put out a notice
to others that Lebanon would not be a safe harbor for
terrorists, he discerned. General Petraeus advised Murr to
maintain the heightened efforts on counter-terrorism.
Defeating Hizballah, he added, would not be won
"head-to-head," but through patience, built up over time, and
pursuing multiple avenues linked to U.S. and Saudi pressure
on Syria, and keeping "Iran busy."

MURR AND KAHWAGI
ON THE SAME PAGE
--------------

13.(C) In a separate meeting with LAF Commander General Jean
Kahwagi at the LAF HQ in Yarze, General Petraeus and Kahwagi
discussed particular weapon systems that Kahwagi believed
were critical additions. Kahwagi was well prepared with his
list of requests starting with M113 APC refurbishment's,
personal body armor, ammunition, M4's, Up-armored Hummers,
and Caravans. ODC Chief noted the status of the items in the
procurement process and offered to Kahwagi the possibility of
acquiring OV-10s instead of more expensive Caravans to
satisfy the LAF's CAS requirements. General Petraeus quickly
reiterated his message of keeping costs low and considering

BEIRUT 00000821 004 OF 004


the long term operating costs of aircraft, such as the
gas-guzzling MIG-29 versus the prop-driven OV-10. General
Petraeus also recommended to Kahwagi the acquisition of
V-hulled, armored, wheeled vehicles and economizing on
helicopters by considering the OH-6 rather than
higher-priced, more sophisticated, and larger helicopters.
General Petraeus noted the Cobra attack helicopter was not in
consideration due to a lack of parts in the supply chain. He
also advised Kahwagi to "talk to the French" about the
Giselle helicopters (and acquiring missiles for them) in the
LAF inventory. Kahwagi declared he had the required $9
million to purchase 45 German Leopard tanks and asked General
Petraeus to help push the Germans to release them.


14. (C) General Petraeus and Kahwagi agreed that training was
as much an investment in the future of the LAF as equipment.
He informed Murr that the Comprehensive Training Program
(CTP) was scheduled to star in November and that it was
expected to complement and fit in well with the Five Year
Plan. He also highlighted the fact that Lebanon had 155
students in the United States this year for International
Military Education and Training, a cadet entering West Point,
and a new midshipmen at Annapolis. He also told Kahwagi
about a new CENTCOM-funded fellowship opportunity through the
Near East South Asia Center for a senior LAF colonel to study
for six months in the United States.


15. (C) General Petraeus praised the efforts of LAF special
forces in combating terrorists and noted that Kahwagi's
support to finalize plans for an expanded ODC compound
without the need for a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
would only help the LAF in its future training and security
assistance programs. Kahwagi replied that ODC supported the
training efforts well and he would do what was necessary to
assist ODC expansion plans.


16. (U) General Petraeus has cleared this message.
SISON