LEBANON: SAFADI DESCRIBES FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000764 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY PARIS FOR JMILLER USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN OVP FOR HMUSTAFA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON SY SA FR QA LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAFADI DESCRIBES FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON'S GOVERNMENT FORMATION REF: RIYADH 896 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a June 9 meeting with the Ambassador, Tripoli Sunni leader and caretaker Minister of Economy Mohammad Safadi said the Saudis had made a serious negotiating mistake in accepting the Syrian demand for a pre-government formation meeting of Lebanese political leaders with the Saudi King and Syrian President in Damascus. Because of the Saudi "error," the regional reconciliation and government formation processes are "stuck," he declared, and would not move forward until Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri reached out to the Syrians himself. He believed the French, Qataris, and Egyptians were opposed to Hariri's designation as Prime Minister, preferring Tripoli Sunni Najib Mikati for the position. ¶2. (C) Safadi said Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Amal leader Nabih Berri had agreed in principle to leave their respective political blocs to unite under the president, but Syria would not allow Berri to ally with Jumblatt. He stated that President Sleiman was determined to have at least five ministers in the new cabinet, despite what Hariri might want, and that Hizballah would not insist on a blocking minority for the opposition. Safadi asserted that March 14 is most likely "dead," given that Jumblatt had drifted away from the alliance and its leaders were working on their own agendas. He expressed a desire to stay on as Minister of Economy and Trade in the new government. End summary. THE SAUDI MISTAKE -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/EconOff, called on Tripoli Sunni leader Mohammad Safadi in his private office in Beirut July 9. Safadi, who made his fortune in Saudi Arabia and is close to the royal family, assessed that because of a lack of experience, Saudi King Abdullah, his intelligence chief Prince Muqrin, and his son Prince Abdelaziz had made a grave miscalculation in their negotiations with Syria about Lebanon. While the Saudis were anxious to move quickly in drawing Syria away from Iran, recounted Safadi, the Syrians were settling in for long negotiations. "The Syrians can talk forever. They are professional negotiators," said Safadi. "They always ask for the Rolls Royce, even if they really want a Cadillac." The Rolls Royce they asked for in this case was a meeting in Damascus bringing together the Saudi King, Syrian President Bashar Asad, President Michel Sleiman, Hariri, and the other political leaders of Lebanon. According to Safadi, this was Syria's initial bargaining position, which they knew was impossible. The shocking thing is that the Saudis said yes, he added incredulously. ¶4. (C) Safadi explained that the Saudi "yes" turned out to be an embarrassment for the Syrians and the Lebanese, and has left everything "stuck," with both Saudi-Syrian reconciliation and Lebanese government formation at a standstill. The only way beyond the current situation, supposed Safadi, was for Hariri himself to reach out to the Syrians, if not directly then through a mediator. Safadi believed the Syrians would accept a Hariri visit to Damascus after cabinet formation, because what they want is peace with the Sunnis in Lebanon, something that only Hariri can offer. It is therefore in Syria's interest for Hariri to succeed in forming a government, he said. FRANCE, QATAR, EGYPT DON'T WANT HARIRI -------------- ¶5. (C) Safadi disclosed that the French and the Qataris were BEIRUT 00000764 002 OF 002 against Hariri's appointment as PM, preferring Najib Mikati for the premiership. French President Nicolas Sarkozy in particular was anxious to break the "Hariri grip" on France that held when Saad's father Rafiq was PM and Jacques Chirac was at the Elysee, said Safadi. In addition, he added, the French know Mikati well, because of a joint venture in the 1990s between France Telecom and Mikati's firm to run Lebanon's first mobile telecom company. Given the convergence of interests, Safadi gauged that the French and Qataris had begun talking to the Egyptians, who also oppose Hariri's appointment. All of these actors are hoping Hariri will fail, believed Safadi. BERRI LEAVING MARCH 8? -------------- ¶6. (C) Safadi believes that Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri have agreed to break off from March 14 and March 8 respectively to form their own parliamentary bloc under the president's auspices, though Safadi joked that a bloc with two such wily leaders would more likely be a bloc "to strangle the president." According to Safadi, Syria had agreed that Berri could leave Hizballah and Aoun to be independent, but they so far had not given him permission to ally with Jumblatt, who had angered the Syrians with his virulently anti-Syrian rhetoric in recent years. Safadi did not believe Hizballah would have the leverage to insist that Berri stay in March 8 if Syria approved his move. "Hizballah will not have a choice," he said. "Berri is Syria's man, not Iran's." SHAPE OF THE CABINET -------------- ¶7. (C) On the internal cabinet formation process, Safadi confirmed that Hariri was still advocating a 16-10-4 distribution of cabinet seats (16 majority, 10 opposition, 4 for President Sleiman),but the President was insistent he should receive at least five ministries. He said the opposition's demand for a blocking third of the cabinet would not be an issue, as Hizballah had received a Saudi guarantee that the cabinet will not discuss any controversial issues (such as Hizballah's weapons) unless there is a pre-negotiated consensus on how to move forward. Safadi noted that after the elections, Hizballah no longer viewed Sleiman as a neutral broker, sensing that he is actually pro-March 14, so the Saudi guarantee is crucial. FUTURE OF MARCH 14 -------------- ¶8. (C) Safadi declared that he was "with March 14, but there is no March 14 anymore." He said he had declared his participation in Hariri's Lebanon First bloc and therefore now considered himself more a Hariri ally than a member of the March 14 alliance. He doubted the March 14 leadership would meet again, particularly given Walid Jumblatt's strong criticisms of his colleagues in recent weeks, and the other March 14 leaders' post-election preoccupations. RETURN TO MINISTRY OF ECONOMY? -------------- ¶9. (SBU) When asked about what role he would play in the new government, Safadi said he would likely take the "low pressure" route and ask to remain at the Ministry of Economy and Trade. "Unless I choose the high-pressure job and they offer to make me Prime Minister," he added. SISON