LEBANON: HARIRI PREPARED TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000715 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT PARIS FOR RWALLER USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON OVP FOR HMUSTAFA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER MARR LE IR SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI PREPARED TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER BY JUNE 29; MEETS NASRALLAH REF: BEIRUT 705 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Presumptive PM-designate Saad Hariri confirmed to the Ambassador June 26 that he had met with Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah the previous day. Nasrallah did not request any "guarantees" from the new government, and Hariri did not offer any, Hariri said. Although mandatory bloc consultations to name the new Prime Minister are still ongoing, Hariri said he was prepared to begin his own consultations as the Prime Minister-designate by June 29 and was confident that cabinet formation would not be a protracted process. He was not certain whether opposition Christian leader Michel Aoun would participate in the government, asserting that Aoun "does not know how to be happy." Without Aoun's participation, Hariri believed a cabinet of fewer than 30 seats could be a possibility. Separately, Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud was critical of Hariri's management of his majority so far, and said he would decline to become a minister in the new cabinet if Aoun boycotted, due to concern that a non-participatory model would soon lead to public disorder. Hariri said he preferred both Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Jean Kahwagi and G-2 Brigadier General Edmond Fadel remain in their positions, but he was prepared to take a hard line with them. He advised the United States to push Kahwagi and Fadel a "little more." ¶2. (C) Hariri explained that he launched his "Lebanon First" parliamentary bloc on June 25 to strengthen the parliament's ability to "get work done" and said other blocs were jockeying to expand their memberships to gain a seat at the National Dialogue. Although nearly everyone expects that Saad Hariri will receive the nomination as PM by Saturday evening, June 27, there continues to be much speculation about cabinet formation and whether or not there will be a "blocking third" for the opposition. End summary. HARIRI-NASRALLAH JUNE 25 MEETING -------------- 
¶3. (C) In a June 26 meeting, presumptive Prime Minister Saad Hariri told the Ambassador, DCM, and POLOFF that he had met with Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah the previous evening, June 25. Hariri, who was accompanied by his close advisor and cousin Nader Hariri, said the meeting was "positive." Hariri said he outlined his priorities for the new government and bluntly told Nasrallah that unlike the current caretaker Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, he would not accept Hizballah creating problems for the government. ¶4. (C) Hariri said he was pleased that Nasrallah had not asked for any "guarantees" in the new government and confirmed that he did not offer any either. The lack of a request for guarantees was beneficial to him, Hariri believed. (Note: In the past, Nasrallah has said that Hizballah does not need any guarantees, which is widely seen as an oblique reference to its ability to mobilize its fighters and weaponry when it wants to, as it did in May ¶2008. Hariri said Nasrallah indicated the same position to him on June 25, hence the need for no guarantees on weapons from the new government. End note.) The issue of Hizballah's weapons would remain in the National Dialogue, Hariri confirmed. When the Ambassador asked whether this was of concern, Hariri responded that he was not worried and despite what Nasrallah might say, Hizballah had been damaged by its actions during the May 2008 events and its reputation suffered worldwide because of it. Eventually, Hizballah and the other opposition parties will be forced to choose "what they really want" because they are "losing," he continued. ¶5. (C) Nasrallah, Hariri reported, said that the electoral BEIRUT 00000715 002 OF 003 crisis and ensuing demonstrations in Iran were "finished." Nasrallah claimed that President Obama had sent a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei requesting the start of a U.S.-Iran dialogue. This indicated that Khamenei would be the ultimate decision-maker on this type of decision and so the outcome of the Iranian presidential election was not an important factor, Hariri said Nasrallah had claimed. HARIRI READY TO TAKE CHARGE -------------- ¶6. (C) Hariri was confident that the new government led by him would be formed without much delay and affirmed that Saudi-Syrian negotiations regarding Lebanon were going well. He expected the President to officially designate him Prime Minister by late June 28 or June 29 and he then would begin his consultations to form the government. The cabinet, he said, would have the same number of seats (30) as the current caretaker cabinet, but said it could have fewer seats if opposition Christian leader Michel Aoun and his bloc decided not to join. Aoun, he complained, "does not know how to be happy." (Note: Contrary to press reports, Hariri has not met with Aoun recently. Advisors to both sides tell us that the two will likely meet during the coming days during Hariri's formal consultations with ex-Prime Ministers, but the meeting time has not been fixed. Aoun was an interim PM at the end of the civil war, prior to the signing of the 1989 Taif Accord which now stipulates that the PM be a Sunni. End note.) Hariri speculated that Hizballah may not ask to name any of the ministers if Aoun participates. The ministerial statement which outlines the work of the government, Hariri said, would be the similar to the last government's statement. ¶7. (C) By contrast, Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud and others were skeptical about cabinet formation. In a separate meeting June 26, Baroud, maintaining his assiduously apolitical stance as minister, told the Ambassador that he would decline to become a minister in the new government if it did not include the participation of all parties, especially that of Michel Aoun. Baroud said he could not join such a "non-participatory" government because if he participated, he expected there to be fighting in the streets. Despite the agreement between the political blocs to reelect Nabih Berri as Speaker of Parliament on June 25 (reftel) and support for Saad Hariri to become Prime Minister, the election of Berri was not managed well, he criticized. Local press on June 26 highlighted the breakdown in the agreement for Berri's reelection -- although he still won -- and suggested that Hariri might not be able to control the members of his majority. (Note: As of June 26, Speaker Berri announced that his bloc would not participate in a cabinet "of real agreement and partnership." Meanwhile, Aoun said that if the "PM-designate formed an acceptable cabinet" then Hariri would win Aoun's bloc's vote of confidence. End note.) HARIRI SAYS HE WILL TAKE HARD LINE WITH MILITARY LEADERSHIP -------------- ¶8. (C) Hariri characterized his relationship with President Sleiman as "excellent." He said the "chemistry" between them was good, despite not agreeing on every issue. He advised the U.S. to encourage and "pull the ears" of LAF Commander Jean Kahwagi and G-2 Brigadier General Edmond Fadel. He reported that he had not met with Kahwagi since the elections, but had met Fadel. He claimed to have told Fadel that he needed "to work more and to shape up," reminding Fadel (as he had with Nasrallah) that he was "not Fouad Siniora." Specifically, he admonished Fadel for not forming a Special Security Directorate under the LAF G-2 under pressure or fear from Hizballah. Hariri affirmed that the creation of the directorate would occur under his premiership. BEIRUT 00000715 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) On Kahwagi, Hariri postulated that Kahwagi's alleged moves closer towards the March 8 opposition prior to the election may not have been genuine, but rather wrongly gaming the outcome of the June 7 elections. He believed that Kahwagi should remain as LAF Commander, but opined that Kahwagi's relationship with Sleiman was "not very good." Kahwagi, he said, would "never be fit to be President" but is thinking that way. PARLIAMENTARY BLOCS JOCKEYING FOR MEMBERS -------------- ¶10. (C) The launching of Hariri's "Lebanon First" bloc (reftel) was not designed to replace the March 14 coalition, but rather to enhance it, Hariri said. He and his allies claimed that for parliamentary work to move forward, the core of those who support his Future Movement would not be sufficient. Therefore, Hariri reached out to "independents" and other blocs (the Armenians, the Zahle bloc, etc.) to strengthen parliamentary alliances. The members of Lebanon First would meet once per month and coordinate on key decisions in parliament, such as the vote for Berri, government formation, and the budget, he explained. Nader Hariri continued that everyone was jockeying to create parliamentary blocs with at least four members to gain a seat at the National Dialogue. Hariri, however, said that he expected President Michel Sleiman to change the criteria for representation at the dialogue table to something different from the present four parliamentary members. Hariri added that with 42 members, and perhaps more in the future, Lebanon First could dominate the outcome of the talks and would represent at least ten blocs. ¶11. (C) With respect to Zahle, in particular, Hariri said that Zahle was a "sensitive area" and would be an important district in the 2010 municipal elections. Although independents allied with March 14 won all seven of Zahle's parliamentary seats, it was important that Zahle's population viewed its representatives as maintaining their independence. Hariri informed the Ambassador that he had met with the Zahle bloc the previous day and encouraged them to also align their bloc with Samir Geagea's bloc. However, he admitted that Geagea's bloc, named for his Lebanese Forces party, could also be viewed negatively by Zahle voters because of the name and historical animosity towards Geagea. Hariri believed a better name for Geagea's bloc should have been "The Cedar Coalition" or something not identified with Lebanese Forces. SISON