LEBANON: MARCH 14 SYG TO PUSH FOR STRONGER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000656 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN OVP FOR HMUSTAFA USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON PARIS FOR WALLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019 TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC KPAL SY IS IR LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 SYG TO PUSH FOR STRONGER COALITION POST-ELECTION REF: A. BEIRUT 654 ¶B. BEIRUT 634 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Following March 14's victory in the June 7 parliamentary elections (Ref B),March 14 Secretariat SYG Fares Souaid is intent on carrying on the work of the Secretariat, which held its first post-election meeting on June 10. Souaid believed the elections proved opposition Christian leader Michel Aoun was losing support, and blamed his own electoral defeat in Jbeil on the awkward and biased intervention of President Michel Sleiman and the army, respectively. Souaid believed March 14 leaders' desire to reconcile with their defeated opponents, and the Shia and Hizballah's need to have a moderate face, would lead to Speaker Berri's reelection. He also believed Hizballah would insist on a blocking third in cabinet as the only way to protect its arms in light of regional developments. ¶2. (C) Souaid advocated turning March 14 into a tre political party, but noted that some March 14 leaders (i.e., Samir Geagea) preferred to keep their confessional blocs. Souaid also shared the Secretariat's just-released statement congratulating the Lebanese on their elections, and indirectly criticizing both Michel Aoun and Hizballah. Souaid relayed that the Patriarch was pleased with President Obama's reference to Lebanon's Maronite community. End summary. ELECTION PROVES DECLINING SUPPORT FOR MICHEL AOUN -------------- ¶3. (C) Despite having lost his own campaign for a seat in Jbeil, March 14 Secretariat SYG Fares Souaid told Pol/Econ Chief and Senior Political LES was pleased with March 14's victory in the June 7 parliamentary elections (reftel). In his view, the elections proved that opposition Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun can no longer claim he holds the majority of the Christian population. Souaid claimed March 14 received 58 percent of the Christian vote to Aoun's 42 percent. (Note: This is in dispute. While all agree Aoun can no longer claim the support of 70 percent of Lebanon's Christians as he once did, the FPM leader claims he still represents over half following the elections, septel. End note.) PRESIDENT SLEIMAN, ARMY DISAPPOINTS IN JBEIL, WHILE HIZBALLAH INTERFERES -------------- ¶4. (C) Souaid was critical of President Michel Sleiman, accusing him of mishandling the elections process in Jbeil by trying to help Souaid and former advisor presidential advisor Nazem Khoury, both of whom lost to Aounist candidates. (Note: Many interpret these losses as blow to the President. End note.) He believed the President should have positioned himself in the elections early on rather than wait until the last two days. "Sleiman should have stated his position clearly and acted accordingly," Souaid said. He also criticized Khoury, who, although also running against Michel Aoun, refused to hold a joint press conference with Souaid, fearing negative reactions from voters for being seen publicly with the March 14 SYG. ¶5. (C) Souaid also criticized the performance of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) during the election process; while three hours were sufficient for the 10,000 Shia voters in Jbeil to cast their ballots, it took the few hundred Sunni voters registered in the same district the whole day to vote, he BEIRUT 00000656 002 OF 004 charged. The Shia voters in Jbeil voted massively in favor of Aoun's list, he said, adding that Hizballah Deputy SYG Sheikh Naim Qassem personally led the electoral machine of Hizballah in the district. Souaid claimed Hizballah issued a "fatwa" banning any kind of cooperation from the Shia voters with him. "Hizballah delegates at the polling stations even refused my donations for refreshments," he added. ¶6. (C) As a result, President Sleiman was "very weak and fragile," Souaid continued. The President was caught between two fires: on the one hand, the international community is pressuring him to implement international resolutions, while on the other Hizballah is totally opposed to these resolutions. "Sleiman is neither a strong man nor a person who can make decisions," Souaid concluded. NEXT STEPS: BERRI AS SPEAKER, HIZBALLAH WILL INSIST ON BLOCKING THIRD -------------- ¶7. (C) Turning to next steps, Souaid believed incumbent Speaker Nabih Berri would be reelected, especially because majority leader Saad Hariri was seeking reconciliation with the Shia community, including Hizballah. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt also wanted "peace" with them, he said, adding that Jumblatt's softening towards Hizballah stemmed primarily from security concerns. (Note: Several Druze areas and Jumblatt himself were the targets of Hizballah aggression during the May 2008 violence. Jumblatt has been noticeably "softer" on Hizballah since then, even going so far as striking a pre-election agreement with Druze rival Talal Arslan to secure him a seat in Jumblatt-dominated Aley. End note). ¶8. (C) Souaid further speculated that Kataeb leader Amine Gemayel, in a goodwill gesture towards the Muslim community, might also soften his position against Hizballah and endorse Hariri and Jumblatt's choice of Berri as the new Speaker. He warned that the position of those three leaders will ultimately isolate Geagea in the March 14 internal debate over the Speaker. Souaid also argued that Hizballah's supports Berri to use him as a "window" with the Lebanese political class and the international community -- similar to what it hoped to do with President Michel Sleiman. ¶9. (C) On cabinet formation, Souaid believed March 8 will insist on a blocking third and feared that Hariri, who wants to be the Prime Minister, would reconcile with the Shia in general and Hizballah in particular to allow him to govern without impediments. He claimed Hizballah's demand for a blocking third was based on fear of regional and international developments that could isolate the group, and that it viewed the blocking third was the only way to protect its arms. Souaid, describing Hizballah's future as dark given the elections in Lebanon and regional developments, agreed that it might spark some incidents in south Lebanon to either block a possible Syrian-Israeli deal or reenergize its own support domestically. NEED TO INSTITUTIONALIZE MARCH 14 -------------- ¶10. (C) Souaid said there was very good turnout at the first regular Wednesday of the Secretariat since the election, on June 10. All four major March 14 blocs were represented, including Amine Gemayel's Kataeb. (Note: Ref A reports Gemayel's preference for disbanding the Secretariat in favor of a "directorate" or March 14 leaders. End note.) ¶11. (C) As for the future of the March 14 coalition, Souaid insisted on institutionalizing the group as a formal party, noting that people voted for March 14 en bloc and not for individual personalities. However, he cautioned that Samir Geagea planned to have a Christian bloc in parliament, as BEIRUT 00000656 003 OF 004 opposed to a March 14 bloc, which could hinder efforts to hold March 14 together. He said the leaders of March 14 should convene a meeting to assess the post election period and steps to be taken regarding the next speaker and the next cabinet. ¶12. (U) Following the June 10 meeting, the Secretariat issued a statement congratulating the Lebanese people and the government, claiming the elections were a clear referendum in favor of March 14 and condemning the incidents of intimidation and fraud that occurred. The statement indirectly criticized both Aoun and Hizballah, criticizing Aoun for his claims to represent the majority of Lebanon's Christians and Hizballah for violence against March 14 Shia during the elections (see paragraph 15, below, for informal Embassy translation). PATRIARCH PLEASED WITH POTUS SPEECH -------------- ¶13. (C) Souaid applauded President Obama's speech in Cairo, and said the reference to the Maronites of Lebanon pleased Patriarch Sfeir. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Souaid's electoral loss may be more a result of his aggressive stance against Hizballah than any last minute maneuverings on the part of President Sleiman or the LAF in his district. Despite his disappointment over his own defeat, Souaid appeared determined to carry on with the March 14 Secretariat. Although Souaid probably harbors hopes of a cabinet position in the next government, his loss (and President Sleiman's) in Jbeil made this unlikely. We suggest he keep his current day job. End comment. ¶15. (U) Begin informal Embassy translation of the March 14 Secretariat's June 10 statement: ¶1. The March 14 coalition congratulates the Lebanese, in general, and the independent public opinion specifically and the relevant authorities for the success in the democratic exercise held last Sunday, amidst Arab and international interest. Lebanon, government and people, was able to display its bias for peace and democracy, with the attestation of the Arab and international observers that monitored the elections closely. ¶2. The results and the unprecedented high voter turnout were a true referendum on the free, independent, and sovereign state. The peaceful and quiet process demonstrated a definitive response to the waves of violence and intimidation that tried to provoke the Lebanese for the past year. The June 7, 2009 referendum is a renewed expression of the March 14, 2005 referendum. At the same time it is a true pledge for continuing on the road to freedom, democracy, and sovereignty. ¶3. These elections showed where the true majority lies according to the numbers of the ballot boxes and more clearly than the 2005 elections. Therefore, we call on the minority not only to accept the results but also to commit to democratic behavior inside and outside the legitimate institutions, away from the ideology of obstruction and reckless adventures. ¶4. Before and during the election process, there was consensus that it would be a true test of the Christian voters' choice. The results showed the Christian public opinion's rejection of the choices that are not within its historical, national, and cultural context. It asserted its commitment to its national, ethical, and spiritual references. The Christian voter responded with a loud voice BEIRUT 00000656 004 OF 004 to the claims of dominance and unilateral representation that tried to conceal its truth for the past four years. ¶5. The March 14 coalition, based on the renewed trust gained by these elections, renewed its pledge of continuing to work towards reaching a state, according to the conditions of a state and not states within a state and with the conditions of a nation and not a "playing field." ¶6. The March 14 coalition strongly regrets and condemns what some of the candidates were exposed to, before, during, and after the elections of attacks against themselves and their supporters, namely Bassem el-Sabaa, Salah Harake, and Ahmad el-Assaad. The Secretariat puts these aggressions before the state, on the judicial and security level, and holds those who were responsible accountable. ¶7. Finally, we call on the Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for overlooking the electoral process, to take the necessary measures for completing the investigation into the issue of fake IDs and to inform the public regarding this issue. SISON