LEBANON: NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR SAYS HIZBALLAH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000605 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/ARP, SCA/FO ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN OVP FOR HMUSTAFA PARIS FOR POLOFF RWALLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LE SA PK SUBJECT: LEBANON: NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR SAYS HIZBALLAH "CONCERNED" MARCH 14 WON'T JOIN UNITY GOVERNMENT REF: BEIRUT 537 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The new Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon, Ali Saeed Awadh Asseri, told the Ambassador June 1 that Hizballah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem was worried that if the Hizballah-led March 8 alliance won the majority in Lebanon's June 7 parliamentary elections, the March 14 coalition would not participate in a unity government. March 14 leader Saad Hariri, Asseri opined, was not the best choice for Prime Minister in the next government due to lack of experience and poor relations with Syria -- while noting this would be a Lebanese decision, not a Saudi decision. On the contrary, in a separate meeting, French Ambassador Andre Parant privately advocated Hariri's possible premiership if the March 14 coalition won the majority. ¶2. (C) Saudi Arabia has similar goals to the United States for a stable, united Lebanon, Asseri asserted. He expected Lebanon would be raised in the context of other regional issues during President Obama's June 3 visit to Saudi Arabia. Still accredited as the Saudi Ambassador to Pakistan, he advised also that the U.S. approach to Pakistan should include additional development objectives, education reforms, and outreach to tribal leaders, as well as military aid. End summary. HIZBALLAH WELCOMES NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR -------------- ¶3. (C) The recently-arrived Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon, Ali Saeed Awadh Asseri, told the Ambassador and Poloff on June 1 that he had met with Hizballah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem the previous week. (Comment: Asseri's meeting with such high-level Hizballah official is the first between a Saudi Ambassador and Hizballah since 2006. Previous meetings had typically been at the Hizballah MP level. End comment.) Qassem received him "with jubilation", Asseri reported, and the two had a candid discussion. Asseri said he advised Hizballah that Lebanon and its national interests should be Hizballah's top priority and theorized that Hizballah could gain greater support if it adopted this approach. Qassem was receptive to the argument, but also expressed concerns that if the Hizballah-led March 8 alliance won a majority in Lebanon's June 7 parliamentary elections, the March 14 coalition would refuse to participate in the government, Asseri reported. SAAD HARIRI IS "NOT READY TO BE PM" -------------- ¶4. (C) Asseri confirmed that he had met several March 14 leaders, including Sunni leader Saad Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, at a dinner hosted by Prince Mukrin in Riyadh (reftel) on May 9. Asseri believed that the best candidate for Lebanese Prime Minister in the next government should be someone who maintained good relations with Syria and Hizballah and could move the country forward. He was uncertain whether Hariri would be the best person for the PM job now, citing lack of experience and Hariri's contentious relationship with Syria. Asseri was careful to state, however, that this decision would be a Lebanese decision, not a Saudi decision, and that he was voicing his own personal opinion. ¶5. (C) In a separate meeting on June 1, French Ambassador to Lebanon Andre Parant offered the opinion that Hariri should only become the next PM if the March 14 coalition won the BEIRUT 00000605 002 OF 002 majority. (There is talk of Saad accepting the premiership under either March 14 or March 8 scenario in some circles.) He believed that in the event of a March 8 victory, Hariri and his March 14 counterparts should participate in a unity government, contrary to their public statements to date. A refusal to participate in a March 8 government would fracture March 14 and damage Hariri's support base. It would be a "trap," however, for Hariri to be PM in a March 8 government, Parant said. The French government, he confirmed, would work with either a March 14 or March 8 majority. SAUDI-U.S. INTERESTS INTERSECT -------------- ¶6. (C) Saudi Arabia and the United States have "almost the same objectives" in Lebanon, Asseri said. The Saudis, he continued, were interested in a unified, stable Lebanon. The political system, as currently exists, paralyzes the Lebanese, he said. However, it was important for the system to reflect Lebanon's multi-confessional nature and include all groups in its participation. ¶7. (C) On Saudi-U.S. relations, Asseri said the two countries shared many regional interests. He expected that during President Obama's June 3 visit to the Kingdom, Lebanon would be part of the discussion in the context of the search for a comprehensive Middle East peace, Iran, and other regional issues. ASSERI'S APPROACH TO PAKISTAN -------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador Asseri suggested a reexamination of the U.S. approach to Pakistan. He believed that the U.S. approach should include additional plans for development, educational reform, outreach to intellectuals and "enlightened" tribal and religious leaders, in addition to military assistance. The Government of Pakistan, he continued, suffers from two major problems: the GOP lacks any type of strategy of its own and the credibility of the Interior Minister "was zero," he claimed. SISON