LEBANON: WITH CODEL ACKERMAN, MARCH 14 FIGURES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000595 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN OVP FOR HMUSTAFA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC IS KPAL SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH CODEL ACKERMAN, MARCH 14 FIGURES LOOK TO PRESIDENT, ARMY FOR SOLUTIONS Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) March 14 figures Amine Gemayel, Samir Geagea, Mohammed Chatah, and Marwan Hamadeh stressed to Codel Ackerman on May 27 the importance of the June 7 parliamentary elections in determining Lebanon's sovereignty. Concerned about the period after the elections, the four agreed that if it retained the majority, March 14 should not give Hizballah a blocking third in the cabinet, and should instead expand President Sleiman's powers in the cabinet to counter Hizballah. They reasoned that strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was a crucial step in making Lebanese feel safe and weakening Hizballah's role as a resistance. ¶2. (C) The March 14 members urged the United States to move cautiously with its messaging during the period immediately before and after the elections. Specifically, they urged that President Obama's June 4 speech from Cairo not include anything that would suggest support for permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, a delicate political issue across the Lebanese political spectrum. "Discreet support," such as visits by Vice President Biden and Secretary Clinton, was viewed favorably, and they hoped the United States could convince the Europeans to take a similar stance. End summary. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador hosted a lunch on May 27 in honor of visiting Representative Gary Ackerman, D-NY, chairman of the subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Representative Sheila Jackson, D-TX; Representative Keith Ellison, D-MN; and subcommittee staffer Howard Diamond. Former President Amine Gemayel (Kataeb),Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, Finance Minister Mohammed Chatah (Future),and MP and former minister Marwan Hamadeh (representing Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's PSP) also attended the luncheon. LES Senior Advisor and PolOff were also present. ELECTIONS DETERMINE LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY -------------- ¶4. (C) Gemayel stressed that the June 7 parliamentary elections were important for determining whether March 14 will retain the majority, and also for determining Lebanese sovereignty. Citing Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's public remarks the previous day that a "Hizballah victory is an Iranian victory and would change the regional map," Gemayel was alarmed at the prospect of a Hizballah-dominated government changing Lebanon's "orientation and traditional policies away from democratic states." ¶5. (C) Hamadeh echoed Gemayel's assertion that Lebanon was most threatened by Iran and added that direct confrontation with Israel was another threat facing Lebanon. Hamadeh pressed Ackerman for greater detail on the direction the U.S. planned to take with Iran. Ackerman said that while the U.S. is indeed heading toward engagement with Iran, a military solution remained on the table as well as the possibility of more stringent economic sanctions. SOLUTION LIES IN PRESIDENT, LAF, AND MARCH 14 -------------- ¶6. (C) Confident that March 14 would win the elections by one or two seats, Geagea said he was worried about the period after the elections because Hizballah would not accept anything short of a blocking third in the next cabinet, a demand which March 14 has, up until now, rejected. Geagea said Hizballah could incite violence if it were denied a veto power and, equally troubling, could paralyze the government if it had the blocking third. ¶7. (C) Chatah declared that the majority in the next parliament needs a majority in the cabinet, without BEIRUT 00000595 002 OF 003 succumbing to a veto power. He suggested President Sleiman appoint three ministers in the next cabinet (with the opposition appointing a smaller number than it currently holds) and these ministers would serve as the swing vote. ¶8. (C) Chatah also proposed that a separate channel, not the cabinet, manage sensitive issues, such as appointments of security officials. Noting that the constitution does not call for this, he suggested that Sleiman could manage such a process, and require that a consensus, rather than simple majority, be reached on sensitive topics. Hamadeh agreed that expanding the President's powers was a good way to overcome Hizballah's demand for a veto. (Comment: We point out that it was the Sunni and Druze guests who recommended expanding the Christian president's powers. End comment.) ¶9. (C) Hamadeh, who is running uncontested in the Chouf with Jumblatt, said that he is assuring voters that if March 14 retains the majority, the coalition will work to give more power to the President and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Everyone agreed that the solution rested with the President. Geagea proposed 19 seats for March 14 (assuming it wins),9 for the opposition, and 3 for the President. In his view, the President wields power on his own and does not require a larger number of cabinet seats. HIZBALLAH SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED ITS ROLE AS PROTECTOR -------------- ¶10. (C) Chatah remarked that although March 14 may not be supported by a large percentage of the population, a large majority does indeed share March 14's principles. The problem, he argued, was that on issues such as the Israeli threat, Hizballah has been able to convince people that they need two armies to protect them -- the LAF and Hizballah's militia. He praised President Obama's efforts to reach a comprehensive Middle East peace and said that this would send the message to the Lebanese that there is an alternative to fighting Israel with arms. ¶11. (C) He added that there was a battle between the Shia and Sunni communities, and the Christians are adopting the view that their future is best protected by allying with the more powerful side. Christian leader Michel Aoun explains to his constituents that he allied with Shia Hizballah to ensure their protection, Chatah explained. MIDDLE EAST PEACE; HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP -------------- ¶12. (C) Chatah conveyed concern that President Obama might be planning to announce the details of a comprehensive Middle East peace during his June 4 speech from Cairo, just days before the Lebanese elections. Chatah hoped that the U.S. would refrain from moving ahead with anything definitive on the issue of Palestinian refugees while the Lebanese were forming their government in the weeks after the elections, fearing that such a move could adversely affect March 14 given the delicacy of the issue. ¶13. (C) Gemayel, backed by all of the Lebanese guests, implored the U.S. to refrain from signaling support for "tawteen" (permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon). Chatah explained that the opposition was drumming up fear among the Christians that the Sunnis, under March 14 leader Saad Hariri, were pushing for "tawteen" (a fear shared by all Lebanese). Ackerman said the U.S. supported "two states for two people." ¶14. (C) Chatah said that a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace was necessary, but that until it was achieved, Lebanon needed an interim solution regarding its relations with Israel, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Continued support for the LAF was another way the U.S. could help Lebanon, Gemayel contributed. Chatah said that Obama's "honeymoon" in the Middle East was finite, and that the U.S. should work to gain support from the Europeans and the Arab BEIRUT 00000595 003 OF 003 world. ¶15. (C) Hamadeh said "discreet support" from Lebanon's allies was most helpful and complimented the U.S. approach, highlighting Vice President Biden's May 22 visit and Secretary Clinton's April 26 trip as good messages of support. He noted that March 14 had Arab support, but that it was not "vocal." ¶16. (C) Hamadeh worried about European "exotic diplomacy," criticizing the French, in particular, for "flirting" with Hizballah, Syria, and Iran, and asked if the U.S. could convince the Europeans to remain committed to Lebanon. (Note: Ackerman asked the Lebanese if they considered Hizballah an terrorist organization. Gemayel demurred, saying, "Hizballah is credited for getting rid of Israel in southern Lebanon. It is associated with terrorist activities, but it is a difficult question to answer." The others concurred. Ackerman suggested the Lebanese decide whether it considered Hizballah a terrorist organization before asking the Europeans to designate it as such. End note.) SISON