LEBANON: WITH CODEL ACKERMAN, MARCH 14 FIGURES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000595

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC IS KPAL SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH CODEL ACKERMAN, MARCH 14 FIGURES
LOOK TO PRESIDENT, ARMY FOR SOLUTIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) March 14 figures Amine Gemayel, Samir Geagea, Mohammed
Chatah, and Marwan Hamadeh stressed to Codel Ackerman on May
27 the importance of the June 7 parliamentary elections in
determining Lebanon's sovereignty. Concerned about the
period after the elections, the four agreed that if it
retained the majority, March 14 should not give Hizballah a
blocking third in the cabinet, and should instead expand
President Sleiman's powers in the cabinet to counter
Hizballah. They reasoned that strengthening the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) was a crucial step in making Lebanese feel
safe and weakening Hizballah's role as a resistance.


2. (C) The March 14 members urged the United States to move
cautiously with its messaging during the period immediately
before and after the elections. Specifically, they urged
that President Obama's June 4 speech from Cairo not include
anything that would suggest support for permanent
resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, a delicate
political issue across the Lebanese political spectrum.
"Discreet support," such as visits by Vice President Biden
and Secretary Clinton, was viewed favorably, and they hoped
the United States could convince the Europeans to take a
similar stance. End summary.


3. (C) The Ambassador hosted a lunch on May 27 in honor of
visiting Representative Gary Ackerman, D-NY, chairman of the
subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee; Representative Sheila Jackson,
D-TX; Representative Keith Ellison, D-MN; and subcommittee
staffer Howard Diamond. Former President Amine Gemayel
(Kataeb),Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, Finance
Minister Mohammed Chatah (Future),and MP and former minister
Marwan Hamadeh (representing Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's
PSP) also attended the luncheon. LES Senior Advisor and
PolOff were also present.

ELECTIONS DETERMINE
LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY
--------------


4. (C) Gemayel stressed that the June 7 parliamentary
elections were important for determining whether March 14
will retain the majority, and also for determining Lebanese
sovereignty. Citing Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's
public remarks the previous day that a "Hizballah victory is
an Iranian victory and would change the regional map,"
Gemayel was alarmed at the prospect of a Hizballah-dominated
government changing Lebanon's "orientation and traditional
policies away from democratic states."


5. (C) Hamadeh echoed Gemayel's assertion that Lebanon was
most threatened by Iran and added that direct confrontation
with Israel was another threat facing Lebanon. Hamadeh
pressed Ackerman for greater detail on the direction the U.S.
planned to take with Iran. Ackerman said that while the U.S.
is indeed heading toward engagement with Iran, a military
solution remained on the table as well as the possibility of
more stringent economic sanctions.

SOLUTION LIES IN PRESIDENT,
LAF, AND MARCH 14
--------------


6. (C) Confident that March 14 would win the elections by one
or two seats, Geagea said he was worried about the period
after the elections because Hizballah would not accept
anything short of a blocking third in the next cabinet, a
demand which March 14 has, up until now, rejected. Geagea
said Hizballah could incite violence if it were denied a veto
power and, equally troubling, could paralyze the government
if it had the blocking third.


7. (C) Chatah declared that the majority in the next
parliament needs a majority in the cabinet, without

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succumbing to a veto power. He suggested President Sleiman
appoint three ministers in the next cabinet (with the
opposition appointing a smaller number than it currently
holds) and these ministers would serve as the swing vote.


8. (C) Chatah also proposed that a separate channel, not the
cabinet, manage sensitive issues, such as appointments of
security officials. Noting that the constitution does not
call for this, he suggested that Sleiman could manage such a
process, and require that a consensus, rather than simple
majority, be reached on sensitive topics. Hamadeh agreed
that expanding the President's powers was a good way to
overcome Hizballah's demand for a veto. (Comment: We point
out that it was the Sunni and Druze guests who recommended
expanding the Christian president's powers. End comment.)


9. (C) Hamadeh, who is running uncontested in the Chouf with
Jumblatt, said that he is assuring voters that if March 14
retains the majority, the coalition will work to give more
power to the President and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).
Everyone agreed that the solution rested with the President.
Geagea proposed 19 seats for March 14 (assuming it wins),9
for the opposition, and 3 for the President. In his view,
the President wields power on his own and does not require a
larger number of cabinet seats.

HIZBALLAH SUCCESSFULLY
ARGUED ITS ROLE AS PROTECTOR
--------------


10. (C) Chatah remarked that although March 14 may not be
supported by a large percentage of the population, a large
majority does indeed share March 14's principles. The
problem, he argued, was that on issues such as the Israeli
threat, Hizballah has been able to convince people that they
need two armies to protect them -- the LAF and Hizballah's
militia. He praised President Obama's efforts to reach a
comprehensive Middle East peace and said that this would send
the message to the Lebanese that there is an alternative to
fighting Israel with arms.


11. (C) He added that there was a battle between the Shia and
Sunni communities, and the Christians are adopting the view
that their future is best protected by allying with the more
powerful side. Christian leader Michel Aoun explains to his
constituents that he allied with Shia Hizballah to ensure
their protection, Chatah explained.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE;
HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP
--------------


12. (C) Chatah conveyed concern that President Obama might be
planning to announce the details of a comprehensive Middle
East peace during his June 4 speech from Cairo, just days
before the Lebanese elections. Chatah hoped that the U.S.
would refrain from moving ahead with anything definitive on
the issue of Palestinian refugees while the Lebanese were
forming their government in the weeks after the elections,
fearing that such a move could adversely affect March 14
given the delicacy of the issue.


13. (C) Gemayel, backed by all of the Lebanese guests,
implored the U.S. to refrain from signaling support for
"tawteen" (permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon). Chatah explained that the opposition was drumming
up fear among the Christians that the Sunnis, under March 14
leader Saad Hariri, were pushing for "tawteen" (a fear shared
by all Lebanese). Ackerman said the U.S. supported "two
states for two people."


14. (C) Chatah said that a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace
was necessary, but that until it was achieved, Lebanon needed
an interim solution regarding its relations with Israel,
based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Continued
support for the LAF was another way the U.S. could help
Lebanon, Gemayel contributed. Chatah said that Obama's
"honeymoon" in the Middle East was finite, and that the U.S.
should work to gain support from the Europeans and the Arab

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world.


15. (C) Hamadeh said "discreet support" from Lebanon's allies
was most helpful and complimented the U.S. approach,
highlighting Vice President Biden's May 22 visit and
Secretary Clinton's April 26 trip as good messages of
support. He noted that March 14 had Arab support, but that
it was not "vocal."


16. (C) Hamadeh worried about European "exotic diplomacy,"
criticizing the French, in particular, for "flirting" with
Hizballah, Syria, and Iran, and asked if the U.S. could
convince the Europeans to remain committed to Lebanon.
(Note: Ackerman asked the Lebanese if they considered
Hizballah an terrorist organization. Gemayel demurred,
saying, "Hizballah is credited for getting rid of Israel in
southern Lebanon. It is associated with terrorist
activities, but it is a difficult question to answer." The
others concurred. Ackerman suggested the Lebanese decide
whether it considered Hizballah a terrorist organization
before asking the Europeans to designate it as such. End
note.)

SISON