LEBANON: PRESIDENT SLEIMAN: ONE YEAR IN OFFICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BEIRUT 000570 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT OVP FOR HMUSTAFA DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IS SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: PRESIDENT SLEIMAN: ONE YEAR IN OFFICE REF: A. ANKARA 633 ¶B. BEIRUT 522 ¶C. BEIRUT 155 ¶D. 08 BEIRUT 1542 ¶E. 08 BEIRUT 1296 ¶F. 08 BEIRUT 1201 ¶G. 08 BEIRUT 936 ¶H. 08 BEIRUT 766 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During his first year in office, President Michel Sleiman has emerged as a popular leader who has sought a "middle road" to defuse Lebanon's confessional tensions. Since his May 25, 2008 swearing in, Sleiman has worked to polish Lebanon's international stature. Lebanon and Syria established diplomatic relations for the first time since Lebanon's independence, and Sleiman has made strides in putting his country on equal footing with its "sisterly" neighbor. However, international support has not yet translated into stronger presidential powers at home, one of Sleiman's other key goals. He has generally stayed above the political fray in the run-up to the June 7 parliamentary elections, but nevertheless would like to see the emergence of a strong centrist bloc. Sleiman opposes opposition control of the blocking third in the next cabinet. ¶2. (C) Sleiman has not been able to live up to his inaugural promise to incorporate Hizballah's arms into Lebanon's national defense strategy, although he has managed to keep disputes at the dialogue table rather than on the streets. On the other hand, he has been one of Lebanon's strongest supporters of UNSCR 1701, especially during the January 2009 Gaza crisis, and has consistently supported the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The issue of permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees ("tawteen") in Lebanon remains one of his biggest concerns. ¶3. (C) Given the cards he was dealt, Sleiman has played his cards fairly wisely his first year in office. As he enters his second year, we expect to see a more assertive president, especially if moderates do well in the elections. To encourage him to tackle the tough issues -- which he thus far has preferred to postpone to avoid confrontation -- we should employ the full range of diplomatic, economic and military assistance tools available. End summary. A POPULAR PRESIDENT -------------- ¶4. (C) Most often described as "a decent man," Sleiman has emerged as a highly popular president, outranking even Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah in a recent poll on Lebanon's most popular leaders (Sleiman's pick for Interior Minister, Ziad Baroud, came in second, followed by Nasrallah). From the start, he has attempted to play a unifying role, representing all Lebanese rather than only Lebanon's Christian population. ¶5. (C) One year later, Sleiman is visibly more confident in his role. However, he remains constrained by the domestic political standoff and has tread slowly, delaying sensitive issues to avoid outright confrontation. In the "do no harm" vein, diplomatic advisor Naji Abi Assi highlighted Sleiman's greatest achievement to us recently as "avoiding any missteps," noting that past presidents, shortly after their election, dragged the country into civil war. Sleiman has successfully walked a fine line between March 14 and the opposition through his moderate speech and behavior and by remaining above partisan politics. ¶6. (C) Although critics accuse Sleiman of being "absent" on major issues, it is doubtful whether anyone else in his position could have acted otherwise. We should not mistake his "neutrality" for unwillingness to play a more proactive leadership role, nor should we underestimate his desire to address Lebanon's most pressing challenges. Sleiman has to a BEIRUT 00000570 002 OF 007 large extent spent his first year consolidating his authority, repositioning himself for a more assertive role after the June 7 parliamentary elections. As he becomes more empowered, we and the international community should encourage him to take on the tough decisions. ¶7. (C) Following is our line item "grading" of Sleiman's performance during his first year in office. MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS: A- -------------- ¶8. (C) Sleiman's presidency got off to a rocky start with a prolonged and contentious cabinet formation process (Ref G). Nevertheless, most observers agree that Sleiman's three ministerial appointments (Interior Minister Ziad Baroud, Defense Minister Elias Murr, and State Minister Youssef Taqla) were strong choices. Baroud in particular is viewed as playing an effective and independent role in ensuring that the June 7 parliamentary elections proceed smoothly. ¶9. (C) Murr, while still viewed by the opposition as more of a March 14 than a Sleiman man, has increased international assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),maintained LAF unity, and, in conjunction with UNIFIL, prevented the January Gaza conflict from spiraling into a regional war by ensuring that the LAF did not respond to Israeli artillery attacks into Lebanon. The LAF's ability to maintain order during the elections and prevent sectarian clashes will be another key test of Murr's effectiveness. Even Taqla, who does not hold his own portfolio, is seen as a competent, albeit insignificant, minister. NATIONAL RECONCILIATION: B -------------- ¶10. (C) Despite the fanfare and optimism that surrounded Sleiman's election (Ref H),he thus far has failed to achieve the national reconciliation highlighted in his inaugural address, and the country remains deeply divided. Given the enormity of the task, however, Sleiman, recognizing his limitations, has successfully defused tensions through the ongoing National Dialogue. Although the Dialogue has yet to produce any tangible results, under Sleiman's chairmanship it has brought together parties from all sides to address the sticky issue of Lebanon's defense strategy, a common euphemism for Hizballah's arms. ¶11. (C) Sleiman is credited with keeping disputes at the table, rather than on the streets, preventing a repeat of the May 2008 violence that led to his election. Tashnaq MP Hagop Pakradunian (Ref B) and others have credited Sleiman's negotiation techniques at the National Dialogue table for maintaining an atmosphere of collegiality. RELATIONS WITH SYRIA: B -------------- ¶12. (C) As agreed at the August 13-14, 2008 summit between Sleiman and Syrian President Bashar Asad (Ref F),Lebanon and Syria have moved forward in establishing diplomatic relations. Lebanon's first-ever Ambassador to Syria, Michel Khoury, presented his credentials on May 7, while his Syrian counterpart, Ali Abdel Karim (currently the Syrian Ambassador to Kuwait),has not yet arrived in Beirut. Lebanon and Syria have not progressed on the other two main items on the agenda, demarcating their common border and addressing the issue of Lebanese detainees in Syria. On the thorny issue of the Higher Syrian-Lebanese Council (Ref B),Sleiman claimed in an April 25 interview that Syrian authorities are ready to reconsider the need for the Council and related treaties if the Lebanese consider them to be unfair to Lebanon. (Note: These bilateral agreements tend to favor Syria, and March 14 has called for the Council to be abolished now that Lebanon and Syria have established diplomatic relations. End note.) ¶13. (C) Generally speaking, Sleiman speaks of "sisterly Syria" in positive terms, and welcomes recent U.S. engagement with Syria as good for Lebanon. At the same time he is seeking to reposition the relationship, after decades of Syrian dominance, to one of equals. Most notably, Sleiman BEIRUT 00000570 003 OF 007 asserted his independence from Syria at the January 16 emergency Arab League meeting on Gaza in Doha, where he stressed Lebanon's support for the Arab Peace Initiative (API) in defiance of Syrian President Asad's comments that the API was dead. Initially criticized by March 14 for going to the meeting (which Saudi Arabia and Egypt refused to attend, and which included representatives from Iran and Hamas leader Khalad Meshaal),Sleiman succumbed to intense Hizballah pressure to attend. However, the opposition subsequently was not pleased with his contradiction of his Syrian counterpart on the API. According to Abi Assi, President Sleiman felt he was left "standing alone" trying to walk a middle line. ¶14. (C) Recently, Sleiman received a high-ranking Syrian military delegation headed by Chief of Staff (and former Commander of the Syrian military) General Ali Habib, the first visit of a Syrian military delegation since Syria's withdrawal in 2005. Sleiman praised Syrian-Lebanese relations "at all levels," especially "the relations between the two armies to confront suspicious plans as well as the joint enemy, Israel and terrorism," and thanked the Syrian army "for the assistance it has been providing to the Lebanese army which became very strong in face of conspiracies." (Note: The May 12 visit was arranged through the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council, in coordination with the LAF, rather than through the Lebanese Embassy in Damascus. End note.) RESTORING INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY: B -------------- ¶15. (C) With 20 foreign trips in 11 months, Sleiman has sought to restore Lebanon's image on the international scene as a stable and equal member of the international community, while at the same time highlighting the role of the Lebanese presidency and Lebanon's Christian population. These first trips focused on raising Lebanon's profile among Arab countries, major capitals, and international organizations. Most characterize the trips as more ceremonial than substantive (in London Sleiman sought, and was granted, an audience with the Queen, despite the fact that his UK trip was not an official state visit). These "photo ops" helped put Lebanon back on the map, many believe. ¶16. (C) Sleiman's international trips included France (Union pour la Mediterranee),Syria, Qatar, New York (UNGA) and Washington, Saudi Arabia, Canada (Francophone Summit),Rome, the Vatican, Cairo, New York (Interfaith Dialogue),Iran, Germany, Jordan, Doha (emergency Arab League meeting on Doha),Kuwait (Arab League Economic Forum),Bahrain, UAE, France (bilat),Doha (Arab League Summit),Turkey, and the UK. His April 21-22 visit to Turkey (Ref A) was a landmark visit -- the first by a Lebanese president in over 50 years. However, the visit, occurring during the same month as the anniversary of the 1915 Armenian "genocide," upset Lebanon's Armenian population, which has traditionally been a strong supporter of the presidency. Sleiman received strong support from his international hosts, noting that during Sleiman's visits to the UK and Turkey, interlocutors appeared to have received the same talking points on the need to praise Sleiman. Sleiman's next trips will be to Russia (September), Spain (October) and Brazil (October). We understand that Sleiman does not intend to participate in UNGA this year. ¶17. (C) Abi Assi also cited Sleiman's outreach to Lebanese abroad, another theme of his inaugural address, as a major accomplishment, by encouraging them to continue investing in Lebanon and assuring them of a future right to vote, as expected in the 2013 parliamentary elections. "ACTIVATING" THE ECONOMY: B -------------- ¶18. (C) Although Sleiman highlighted the importance of improving the domestic economy in his inauguration speech, overall he has played a limited role in economic issues. The President, sometimes accompanied by Minister of Economy Mohamad Safadi, has emphasized enhanced trade and economic ties on several of his foreign trips, and has encouraged Arab BEIRUT 00000570 004 OF 007 and international investment in Lebanon. He also has been a vocal advocate for Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, whose financial strategy Sleiman credits for maintaining economic stability in Lebanon. Sleiman has attempted to play a mediating role between PM Siniora and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri during their ongoing feud over the 2009 budget. SEEKING STRONGER PRESIDENTIAL POWERS: C -------------- ¶19. (C) Sleiman's increased international support has not translated into support at home, either in terms of increasing the powers of the president, encouraging independent candidates in the race for the June 7 parliamentary elections, or in forming his own middle bloc in the next cabinet. ¶20. (C) Sleiman continues to argue for revisions to the 1989 Taif agreement, which limited presidential powers, especially vis-a-vis the prime minister. Observers agree that Sleiman has a good working relationship with PM Siniora, and that the two have been successful in projecting a unified front. One subtle indication of Sleiman's intentions is his decision to chair numerous cabinet meetings at Baabda Palace, a symbolic step (the president has no voting power) that nevertheless reflects his contention that the President -- and not the Prime Minister -- is Lebanon's leading political figure. ¶21. (C) Sleiman has intentionally remained above the political fray in the race for the June 7 parliamentary elections, refusing to heed calls (primarily by March 14) to lead an independent bloc. Nevertheless, he had hoped candidates close to the president would run, and has been frustrated with March 8 and March 14's unwillingness to cede space to his candidates. Sleiman abhors the current polarization, and believes a two-party state is difficult in a country with 18 sects, proclaiming that "independent MPs are healthier for political and democratic life." According to a recent poll, a majority of undecided voters in several key districts believe a parliamentary bloc supported by the President would be beneficial to Lebanon. One indication of Sleiman's future strength will be his ability to draw Tashnaq away from Michel Aoun (Ref B). ¶22. (C) The emergence of a strong middle bloc in parliament would allow Sleiman to argue for more representation in the post-June 7 cabinet. He would like to see a stronger middle bloc that includes all sects. Furthermore, he maintains that the new majority must include all sects in the spirit of the constitution. ¶23. (C) Most importantly for the immediate post-election period, when a new cabinet will be formed, Sleiman has advocated against the current blocking third held by the opposition as a result of the May 2008 Doha agreement. Instead, he proposes a formula whereby participation from the President's ministers would be required to obtain a blocking third. At the May 13 cabinet meeting, Sleiman for the first time exercised his presidential powers to force a vote to resolve the deadlock on administrative appointments. The opposition in turn used the blocking third for the first time. While the opposition was quick to criticize Sleiman's failure to obtain consensus before calling for the vote, Speaker Berri praised Sleiman for forcing ministers to take responsibility for the issue. ¶24. (C) Sleiman strongly believes that existing frameworks such as the 1989 Taif Agreement and the constitution, rather than the Doha agreement, are the best way to safeguard Lebanon's institutions and unity and to put an end to Lebanon's political gridlock. At the April 25 launch of Beirut as World Book Capital 2009, Sleiman declared that Lebanon's constitution should serve as "a guidebook for the Lebanese," who should preserve, abide by, and promote it. (Comment: Baabda Palace's recent decision to require that all requests for appointments with the President be made via diplomatic note through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is another sign of his efforts to promote the institution of the presidency, as well as the Ministry. End comment.) BEIRUT 00000570 005 OF 007 STANDING UP TO HIZBALLAH: D- -------------- ¶25. (C) In his inaugural speech (Ref H),Sleiman promised to pursue a national defense strategy that would incorporate Hizballah's arms, and spoke of the "resistance" in the past tense. Since then, he has lent support to the concept of the "resistance" as part of a broader strategy to defend Lebanon against Israel. However, he also speaks of liberation through "available legitimate means and the support of the international community." ¶26. (C) Sleiman was conspicuously quiet when Hizballah downed an LAF helicopter on August 28, 2008 (Ref E). He also claims to be pursuing quiet diplomacy with Egypt to resolve the issue of Hizballah cells operating there and avoid a confrontation between Egypt and Hizballah. ¶27. (C) On other issues in which Hizballah has key stakes, however, Sleiman has been less docile. He is an outspoken supporter of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the independence of the judiciary, and praised the STL's impartiality in its recent decision to release the four generals. This posture may set him on a collision course with Hizballah, which is attempting to undermine the STL's credibility and attacked the Lebanese judiciary in the wake of the STL's decision. Furthermore, Sleiman opposes a continuation of the "blocking third" in cabinet following the June 7 parliamentary elections -- which Hizballah insists be maintained -- arguing that Taif is the primary reference, not the May 2008 Doha agreement that established the blocking third as a one-time measure. ¶28. (C) Sleiman nevertheless seeks to avoid direct confrontation with Hizballah. For example, Sleiman typically expresses the desire to us that visitors to Baabda Palace making press statements refrain from provoking Hizballah, which would embarrass him on his home turf. Sleiman prefers to give diplomacy a chance, waiting until the time is ripe to take on Hizballah's arms and citing resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue as a key condition. ISRAEL-LEBANON TALKS: C -------------- ¶29. (C) As President, Sleiman has little choice but to repeat the standard refrain that Lebanon will not engage in direct peace talks with Israel. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the useful role UNIFIL plays in indirect talks between the two parties, especially on the issue of Ghajar, and recently has shifted his rhetoric on possible future talks away from an unequivocal "no" to "not at this time." He also contends that Lebanon is prepared to hold negotiations for "a just and comprehensive peace based on the provisions of the Madrid conference." ¶30. (C) Sleiman has been a consistent supporter of UNSCR 1701, another pillar of his inaugural address. He was among the first Lebanese officials to condemn the January 2009 rocket attacks into Israel, saying "I will not allow southern Lebanon to become a rocket launching pad" against Israel. According to Sleiman advisor Abi Assi, regardless of who wins the June 7 parliamentary elections, Sleiman will insist on a reference to 1701 in the next cabinet's policy statement to parliament. ¶31. (C) A familiar Sleiman mantra, especially with foreign visitors, is Lebanon's inability and unwillingness to provide permanent resettlement ("tawteen") to the 400,000 Palestinian refugees currently living in camps in Lebanon, insisting on their "right of return." Unfortunately, neither Sleiman nor other government interlocutors have looked beyond the "right of return" to consider policy alternatives. He views the security and humanitarian conditions in the camps as an international problem. Sleiman would like to see Lebanese authorities take control of the security of the camps, but does not believe the time is ripe. He did, however, help prevent the January 2009 Gaza crisis from spilling over into the camps by bringing together Palestinian leaders to urge calm. BEIRUT 00000570 006 OF 007 POST-ELECTIONS: AN AOUN CHALLENGE TO SLEIMAN? -------------- ¶32. (C) Ironically, Sleiman, a staunch defender of the constitution, was elected under what technically was a violation of the constitution, which requires that senior government officials (Sleiman was then LAF Commander) resign six months prior to their election. Although the opposition, including Aoun's bloc, agreed to his election at Doha and voted for him in parliament, suspicions remain that Aoun continues to harbor hopes of "toppling" Sleiman given the opportunity to fulfill his own presidential ambitions. ¶33. (C) The "royal" treatment Aoun received during his December 3-7, 2008 visit to Damascus (in sharp contrast to Sleiman's earlier visit) fueled speculation that Aoun was Damascus' president of choice. Currently rumors are circulating that Aoun imposed a condition on candidates wanting to run on his parliamentary lists that they back him on all issues, including, presumably, any attempts to challenge Sleiman's presidency. Aoun responded to the rumors by accusing Sleiman of being "an accomplice" in spreading allegations he planned to shorten Sleiman's tenure. ¶34. (C) Aoun will no doubt use the absence of the Constitutional Court as further ammunition. Aoun's chances of success will depend largely on the his own success at the polls. A strong showing will boost his claim to being the leader of Lebanon's Christians. Aoun himself has attempted to undermine "independent" Christian candidates -- including those considered to be close to the President -- labeling them as March 14 in disguise, in an unveiled attempt to steer votes away from candidates who would help create the emergence of a strong, centrist, pro-Sleiman bloc in parliament. ¶35. (C) Hizballah is rumored to have promised Aoun at Doha that the issue of the presidency would be revisited a year later. However, skeptics believe Hizballah prefers Sleiman over Aoun as president. Sleiman, the argument goes, has been reluctant to challenge Hizballah's arms, has a good relationship with Syria, is gaining the growing confidence of the west, and as such provides Hizballah with a useful interface with the west should it win the elections. LOOKING AHEAD -------------- ¶36. (C) As Sleiman enters his second year in office, we expect he will continue to assert himself both domestically and abroad, although much will depend on the elections and how successful independent candidates are. A strong showing by the March 14 majority and independents during the June parliamentary vote will strengthen his hand, whereas an opposition victory would significantly dash any hopes of seeing the emergence of a stronger president willing to tackle the tough issues. ¶37. (C) Either way, the U.S. should continue to encourage Sleiman by continuing to praise when appropriate and emphasize his role as a unifier within the country. While respecting his request for U.S. "silent messaging" to avoid hurting moderates on whose strength he hopes to build, we can still work behind the scenes. We should appeal to his ego, prodding him to think about his own legacy and opportunity to go down in the history books as one of Lebanon's great leaders, particularly as a potential protagonist in comprehensive Middle East peace efforts ¶38. (C) We should extend an invitation to the White House, and ensure that Baabda Palace is the first stop of senior USG visitors to Lebanon. As we have seen with the pride with which he received letters from President Obama and Secretary Clinton, a little goes a long way. Also, as noted in Ref E, an international vote of confidence for Sleiman remains key to boosting the presidency as an institution, as does tangible military, economic, and diplomatic support. ¶39. (C) Regardless of who wins, we should also push the envelope privately on Hizballah. Stressing that Lebanon BEIRUT 00000570 007 OF 007 needs a government that works and that the era of government paralysis should end, we should encourage Sleiman's efforts to abolish the blocking third for the opposition. We should warn him that, if Hizballah wins, it will use Sleiman for cover in its relationship with the west. We should make clear that continuing U.S. support, especially for the army and police, will depend on the new government's policies, and remind him that we will not deal with Hizballah. Progress on issues such as Ghajar and Sheba'a Farms, if handled correctly, can boost Sleiman's position vis-a-vis Hizballah and Syria. ¶40. (C) In terms of regional peace efforts, we must continue to stress that no deals will be made at Lebanon's expense. We also must continue to reassure Sleiman that the U.S. understands Lebanon's unique context in terms of confessional make-up and Palestinian refugees. We should underscore our continuing commitment to UNWRA to help improve conditions in Lebanon's camps and our support for the two-state solution. ¶41. (C) Overall, we give Sleiman a "B" grade for his performance his first year in office. Given the cards he was dealt, he has played his hand as well as he possibly could. While the June 7 elections will be a determining factor in whether his performance improves as he enters his second year, continuing U.S. and international support and carefully applied pressure can help steer him in the right direction. SISON