LEBANON: NASRALLAH SPEECHES COULD HELP MARCH 14

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000562

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: NASRALLAH SPEECHES COULD HELP MARCH 14
GEAGEA SAYS

REF: A. BEIRUT 00547

B. BEIRUT 00537

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) March 14 Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, in a May
19 meeting with the Ambassador, was optimistic about March
14's chances in upcoming parliamentary elections. He noted
that coalition leaders had agreed upon lists in all but one
district, Beirut 1. Discussing Hizballah Secretary General
Nasrallah's recent speech praising the violent events of May
2008, Geagea assessed that the opposition would lose some
Christian support because of Nasrallah's remarks, which he
called "horrendous." On a positive note, however, such
inflammatory Hizballah statements would help push March 14
unity, Geagea said. He expressed concern about violence in
the run-up to elections and after, and also remarked that
cabinet formation would be trying. According to Geagea,
President Sleiman could do more to help March 14 candidates,
especially in Kserwan and Jbeil. End summary.

ONE DISTRICT LEFT
--------------


2. (C) Meeting with the Ambassador May 19, eighteen days
before the June 7 parliamentary elections, March 14 Lebanese
Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea, accompanied by his advisor
Elie Khoury, said candidate lists in all but one district,
Beirut 1, were settled. May 18 Geagea had given March 14
Sunni leader Saad Hariri a "balanced, practical, pragmatic"
offer on the district and was waiting for a response from
Hariri. The deal could be done "within days," Geagea
assessed. (Note: Hariri told the Ambassador May 14 that
Geagea agreed to remove his Armenian candidate from Beirut 1,
about whom many have complained, if Hariri replaced his Greek
Orthodox candidate in Akkar with an LF candidate. Hariri
adamantly refused this arrangement --Ref A. End note.)


3. (C) Geagea expressed concern that Hariri had adopted a
delay tactic on the issue of Beirut 1 in order to pressure
Geagea to accept the removal of the LF Armenian candidate
from the Beirut 1 list without compensating him elsewhere.
Hariri and Geagea met frequently, Geagea said, and spoke on
the phone nearly every day. In Geagea's opinion, however,
Hariri was "greedy." Being transparent and open with the
Sunni leader would have left Geagea without a single
candidate, he opined. Geagea told the Ambassador that no
March 14 unified coalition event would be held until the
candidate list for Beirut 1 was complete.


4. (C) Geagea commented that the March 14 list for Zahle,
after "huge efforts," was a success. When queried by the
Ambassador about how firm March 14 lists were, Geagea
insisted that once a list was formed, it could not be broken
(although, according to Hariri, Geagea is trying to rearrange
the already-settled list in Akkar as part of his Beirut 1
deal -- Ref A.)

SPEECHES PAINT OPPOSITION
AS DESPERATE AND DANGEROUS
--------------


5. (C) Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's May 15
and 18 speeches praised the May 2008 Hizballah takeover of
Beirut and promised Hizballah would take "precautions" during
upcoming Israeli border exercises. Nasrallah had been full
of "furious words," Geagea said. Nasrallah's statements
about "erasing the mistakes" that March 14 had committed over
the past four years were evidence, according to Geagea, that
the opposition insisted on taking control of the country,
"one way or another." Nasrallah's tone was more fiery than
that of Hizballah MPs in their recent speeches, Geagea noted;
he feared the group supported the substance of Nasrallah's
comments and was prepared to fight to power. (Note:
Reactions to Nasrallah's speeches reported septel. End note.)

BEIRUT 00000562 002 OF 003




6. (C) Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun had also lost
support as a result of Nasrallah's speech, in Geagea's
opinion. Nasrallah's speech had raised fears in Christian
communities, some of which were overrun by Hizballah fighters
in May 2008. Christian concerns, as a result of these
speeches, would affect elections, Geagea said. Aoun's
statements and gestures proved he was "losing and nervous,"
Geagea assessed. Although Aoun did not have the means for
violence in the case of an unfavorable electoral outcome for
the opposition, his allies did, Geagea opined.

BUT RHETORIC MAY HELP
MARCH 14 COHESION
--------------


7. (C) Discussing the possibility that both the March 14 and
March 8 coalitions could splinter following the elections,
Geagea argued that Hizballah, especially with Nasrallah's
recent fiery words, would provide March 14 leaders with
strong motivation to maintain unity; they would stay unified
against such "horrendous" rhetoric, he assessed. Khoury
offered hope that Nasrallah would give another similar speech
closer to elections. (Note: Khoury may have his wish, as
Nasrallah, who has sharply picked up the frequency of his
speehes, is scheduled to speak again on May 22 and 25. End
note.) Geagea said he had told Hariri that "Nasrallah may
help us win despite ourselves."

MARCH 14 SHOULD
STAY STEADY
--------------


8. (C) Because the opposition would be unable to win the
elections through violence, Geagea assessed March 14's best
tactic would be to remain steady in the face of any violence,
verbal or otherwise. Geagea expressed concern about violence
in the run-up to elections and the days following the vote,
especially if the opposition lost on June 7. Hariri did not
share Geagea's concerns, Geagea said; Hariri described recent
incidents of violence as "bubbles," not indications of more
serious trouble to come. Geagea noted that several districts
where Hariri was active, including West Bekaa and Beirut,
were potential hot spots.


9. (C)Geagea expressed confidence that March 14 would winon
June 7. The race would be close, he offered,but March 14
would maintain its majority. Expatriate voters would be
mostly insignificant, except for the expatriate Armenian vote
in Beirut 1 and Metn. In Beirut 1, March 14 enjoyed about a
1000-vote lead, Geagea said, but a significant expatriate
Lebanese-Armenian turnout could tip the balance for March 8.
Geagea told the Ambassador that he had commissioned two polls
in the Metn that had concluded exact opposite results. He
thought expatriate Lebanese-Armenian voters could have an
impact in Metn also. Despite these mixed signals, Geagea
said the March 14 LF, Kataeb, and Murr political machines
were working together well in the district.


10. (C) On campaign finances, Geagea was satisfied. He told
the Ambassador that things were a "bit better" among March 14
leaders as far as funding was concerned. (Note: Hariri and
Druze leader Jumblatt traveled May 9-10 to Saudi Arabia and
confirmed to the Ambassador that they had received funding --
Refs A and B. End note) For his part, Geagea said he had
his own campaign resources.

SLEIMAN SHOULD COORDINATE
--------------


11. (C) President Sleiman could do much to help March 14's
chances in Jbeil and Kserwan, Geagea said. According to
Geagea, Sleiman should give more support to National Bloc
Kserwan candidate Carlos Edde and should push his former aide
Nazem Khoury to cooperate with Fares Souaid in Jbeil.
Stronger cooperation between the President and March 14 also
would strengthen the President's preferred candidates in
Jbeil, Geagea emphasized, but Sleiman wanted March 14 support
for his candidates without providing his own support to March

BEIRUT 00000562 003 OF 003


14 candidates. Sleiman assumed that March 14 would vote for
his candidates because of the coalition's dislike of Aoun
alone; this was not a safe assumption, Geagea argued.


12. (C) Geagea had been waiting to no avail for a signal from
the President about a meeting. Sleiman tried to
"outmaneuver" him, Geagea said, by meeting with Hariri, who
was "soft," instead of with Geagea. Geagea assessed that the
President "wanted a bigger share" but should realize that a
president at the same time cannot be a party leader.
Sleiman's deputies would be "useless" in the next parliament,
according Geagea. Just as Interior Minister Ziad Baroud is
hamstrung as the President's appointee in cabinet, the MPs
affiliated with Sleiman would be unable to vote with either
March 14 or the opposition in the next parliament.


13. (C) Maronite Patriarch Sfeir was "doing good work,"
Geagea said. The Patriarch had been vocal recently and
Geagea noted that for "each team" Aoun proposed, Sfeir had
"an antidote."

COMMENT:
LONG ROAD AHEAD
--------------


14. (C) Eighteen days before elections, Geagea came across as
optimistic and motivated, if somewhat critical of Hariri.
His nominal March 14 ally Amine Gemayel complained to the DCM
on May 19 that Geagea was disrupting March 14 agreement on
lists for Beirut 1 and another heavily Christian district,
Kserwan. Fielding phone calls about the Kserwan issue as he
spoke, Gemayel said Geagea is not being "pragmatic",
insisting on candidates from his LF party over others who
would bring March 14 more votes. The pro-March 14 forces
were supposed to announce their lists for Kserwen the same
day, but instead had to announce a postponement. End comment.

SISON