Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT535
2009-05-14 08:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI CONFIDENT ON ELECTIONS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS SY LE 
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3761
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RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000535 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI CONFIDENT ON ELECTIONS
PROSPECTS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000535 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT OVP FOR HMUSTAFA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI CONFIDENT ON ELECTIONS PROSPECTS Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In his May 8 meeting with March 14 coalition leader Saad Hariri, visiting NEA DAS David Hale assured Hariri that the U.S. has not and will not sacrifice Lebanese sovereignty as it engages Syria. Hariri expressed confidence in the March 14 coalition's election prospects. Complaining that he has had to work tirelessly over the past few months to mediate the infighting among his Christian allies, Hariri said all of March 14 members are now focused on winning the elections. DAS Hale noted that part of the reason for his visit was to urge March 14 coalition partners to sacrifice their own interests for the greater good of the coalition. Hale also discussed Hizballah's possible strategies post-election, the appeal of opposition Christian leader Michel Aoun, the Middle East peace process, engagement with Iran, and strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces. End summary. U.S. AND SYRIAN MEETINGS -------------- ¶2. (C) On May 8, NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) David Hale, accompanied by the Ambassador, had lunch with March 14 coalition leader Saad Hariri at his residence in Qoreitem. DCM, ConOff, and Hariri advisors Hani Hammoud and Nader Hariri also attended. Hariri opened the meeting by asking about the outcome of NEA Acting A/S Jeffrey Feltman and NSC Senior Advisor Dan Shapiro's visit to Syria the day before. ¶3. (C) DAS Hale reported that Feltman and Shapiro had met with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallim, Presidential Advisor Shabaan, and Dr. Mikad. He characterized the sessions as "constructive" but broke no new ground. He underscored the administration's intent to pursue Arab-Israeli peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli track. In response to a question, Hale assured Hariri that no more high-level meetings with Syria would occur prior to the elections and that the U.S. sanctions against Syria would be renewed (the public announcement of the renewal occrred later that day). DAS Hale and the Ambassad
r emphasized that in all dealing with the Syrians, in public and in private, the U.S. has stressed that there will be no "deal" regarding Lebanese sovereignty. ELECTIONS -------------- ¶4. (C) Hariri said that if he were asked about his predictions on the elections three weeks ago, he would have lamented the infighting in March 14, with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea "wanting this and wanting that." While Hariri decried his having to "always sacrifice for the coalition," he noted that there was recently more cohesiveness in March 14 and a better appreciation of where the real battles needed to be fought. He said that Walid Jumblatt would not have any problems in the areas in which Jumblatt is contending. While Hariri at first did not offer overall election predictions, he later said that March 14 would keep its majority if certain qualifications were achieved as he expected: March 14 winning seven of the eight seats in Metn, keeping three seats in Baabda, and taking Zahle's seven seats. (Comment: Given election polls and our conversations with other political analysts, we believe these election predictions are optimistic. End comment). ¶5. (C ) DAS Hale asked about certain districts, and Hariri provided the following analysis: Zahle: Hariri said that Zahle was "okay." The only arguments in that district were over the location of where the March 14 candidates list would be announced. Hariri added that he was confident his Future Movement could deliver BEIRUT 00000535 002 OF 003 20,000 votes in Zahle (in an area where 35,000 are need to win). Jbeil: Hariri commented that President Sleiman had not been very cooperative in coming up with a March 14-leaning independent list in this Christian district. Hammoud said in his view the President's analysis was that a list of "independent" candidates in Jbeil that included persons seen as too close to March 14 would push Christian votes to Michel Aoun's list while an independent list with less partisan candidates would gather more support. Beirut One: Hariri lamented unhappiness by independent Armenian voters against March 14 over Samir Geagea's insistence on pushing a candidate for one of the Armenian seats who is allied with him but seen as very weak by the electorate. Hariri also spoke out against the Armenian Tashnaq party, allied with the opposition, which he said was in the hands of Syria and Iran because of the influence of Armenia's president. He seemed confident he would persuade Geagea to withdraw his Armenian candidate. Metn: Hariri felt the Metn was looking good. "Nobody does elections better than Murr," he said, referring to March 14's independent ally in the Metn, Michel Murr. One possible issue in the Metn, however, was irritation on the part of Armenian voters who are also upset about the weak Armenian candidate that Geagea is pushing in Beirut. Hammoud speculated that these independent voters, who normally would be loyal to Michel Murr, might not vote for him out of spite over the squabble in Beirut. ¶6. (C) Hariri said his Future Movement had reached an agreement with Sunni Islamist party Jamaa Islamiya, which will not pursue having candidates in Sidon or anywhere besides Tripoli. The party would keep its candidates there in order to draw away voters from other Islamist parties. HIZBALLAH'S MOVES POST ELECTION -------------- ¶7. (C) In response to DAS Hale's question, Hariri said that if Hizballah lost the elections, Hizballah would become much more flexible when it came to political negotiations and that it would rely more on the president to mediate political disagreements. If Hizballah won the elections, however, Hariri portended the next phase of "Tehran's takeover of Lebanon." The missiles Iran now smuggles to Hizballah secretly over the border would start coming "through Beirut's Rafiq Hariri International Airport," he said. DAS Hale speculated that if the Hizballah-led opposition won, Hizballah might not seek more powerful government portfolios as the number of Hizballah parliamentarians would not increase. Hizballah would refrain from demanding more for itself (as opposed to March 8 allies),and select a well-known Sunni politician to serve as Prime Minister, as a means of encouraging international legitimacy for a new Hizballah-dominated Lebanese government. The problem, then, would be dealing with insidious Hizballah influence. Hariri agreed. ¶8. (C) Both Saad and Nader Hariri said the European governments were already signaling full acceptance of a possible Hizballah-led government. Hariri added that because of the close U.S. and British relationship, the public perception was that the British/Hizballah meetings were with U.S. acquiescence. DAS Hale responded that the U.S. opposed these contacts, in part for that very reason of the public message. APPEAL OF AOUN -------------- ¶9. (C) Responding to a question as to why Michel Aoun, who is allied with Hizballah, has appeal among the Christian electorate, Hariri and his advisors gave two reasons. The BEIRUT 00000535 003 OF 003 first was that in the mind of Aoun supporters, it was a smart strategic move to align with the rising Shiite power, not only in Lebanon but in the region, in order to protect the Christian minority in Lebanon. According to Hariri's assessment, Aoun views the U.S. as a declining power and a fair-weather friend, and Iran as a rising power. Hammoud retold a quote from Aoun when Hariri met him in Paris: "The Americans will let you down, like they did to me." The second reason for Aoun's appeal was that he was an alternative to March 14 Christian leaders Geagea and Amine Gemayel. Nader Hariri said Aoun gets many votes from the anti-Geagea segment, who recalls Lebanese Forces civil war baggage. MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND IRAN -------------- ¶10. (C) DAS Hale discussed Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell's efforts to bring peace to the region. DAS Hale said that Special Envoy Mitchell would like to visit Lebanon eventually, and discuss how to bring Lebanon into comprehensive peace talks. ¶11. (C) After much mulling over U.S. engagement, and Hale's replies on U.S. thinking, Hariri said at the end of lunch that if he had to engage Syria or Iran, he would not have done it any differently than the way the U.S. is approaching Syria. He advised that during this election season if there were any assassinations or other disturbances orchestrated by Syria or Iran then there must be a response. He described the Syrians and Iranians as thugs who only understand the language of force. "MARSHALL PLAN" FOR LEBANESE ARMED FORCES -------------- ¶12. (C) Hariri said that if March 14 wins the election it would work to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and that he wanted to develop a new Marshall Plan for the army. He said he understood the political difficulties of the U.S. government directly supplying LAF with advanced weapons, but urged that Washington work with Russia and regional allies to have them supply Lebanon with non-U.S. advanced weapons. ¶13. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this cable. SISON

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