LEBANON: PM SINIORA: MOVEMENT ON GHAJAR CAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000485 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT OVP FOR HMUSTAFA DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IS LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA: MOVEMENT ON GHAJAR CAN STILL HELP MODERATES IN LEBANON REF: A. SECTO 00001 270050Z APR 09 ¶B. BEIRUT 466 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) PM Siniora told the Ambassador on April 27 that he believed an Israeli announcement on withdrawal from Ghajar could still have a positive impact on Lebanon's June 7 parliamentary elections. Praising the April 26 visit of Secretary Clinton to Lebanon and the clear U.S. commitment to Lebanon, Siniora also urged the U.S. to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem as the key to eradicating the roots of extremism in the Middle East. Concerned that the imminent announcement by the Special Tribunal in The Hague on the fate of the four generals currently in Lebanese custody could have a negative impact, Siniora nevertheless acknowledged the importance of the Tribunal's adherence to the rule of law. Criticizing the ineffectiveness of the national unity government, Siniora expressed pessimism that the cabinet would achieve significant results before the elections, including outstanding appointments. Clearly in campaign mode, he outlined his electoral strategy for winning a parliamentary seat in his hometown of Sidon. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with PM Siniora and his aide Rola Noureddine at his office in the Grand Serail on April 27, one day after the Secretary's visit to Lebanon (Ref A). Siniora praised the visit, stating it "confirmed the established position of the U.S. administration" vis-a-vis Lebanon. President Sleiman had telephoned him the previous evening to give him a readout. The messages all tracked with what the Secretary had told him during their meeting at the Gaza donors' conference in Sharm el-Sheikh, said Siniora. NOT TOO LATE FOR GHAJAR -------------- ¶3. (C) Siniora said he believed that it was not too late for an Israeli Defense Force withdrawal from Ghajar to have a positive impact for the moderate March 14 coalition in the upcoming elections. Even just an Israeli announcement that it intended to withdraw would help the moderates in Lebanon, he added. Siniora discounted the possibility of Hizballah criticism that any movement on the issue would be too little too late, noting that the group would spin any decision, regardless of timing or content, to its advantage. ¶4. (C) Siniora and Noureddine both stressed vehemently, however, that they believed the Israelis should not place any conditions on withdrawal, which would only play into Hizballah's hands. "Keep it clean," Siniora said. He also argued that UNIFIL Commander General Claudio Graziano should make any eventual announcement, rather than any other party. This, he said, would be the best way to capitalize on the results of indirect talks (referring to the UNIFIL-IDF-LAF tripartite meetings on Ghajar technical issues). Putting the UN at the forefront would avoid giving Hizballah additional fuel to criticize the GOL. ¶5. (C) Comment: We recommend that we move to making President Sleiman (rather than Siniora, a candidate in the upcoming elections) the point person within the GOL on Ghajar to avoid any perception that the issue is being manipulated for political purposes. Dealing with Sleiman on Ghajar could also enhance Sleiman's stature within Lebanon, and the role of the presidency in general, if these efforts are successful. End comment. ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE IS PARAMOUNT -------------- ¶6. (C) Siniora complained that there was no "clarity of BEIRUT 00000485 002 OF 003 vision" yet from the new Israeli government. The API was the only acceptable proposal on the table, he said, but more effort was needed to market the idea both in Israel and with Arab states. There had been so many negotiations over the years, leaving little doubt about what the end result would be. Siniora wondered whether there was anything left to negotiate. ¶7. (C) The real obstacle, Siniora continued, was that neither Iran nor Israel had a real interest in finding a solution. Iran is afraid of losing influence in the region and is trying to trade its nuclear file for regional power, he said. Iran is hijacking the Palestinian issue to boost its own credentials in the region. It therefoe continues to support groups like Hizballah, whch, he noted, citing its role in Egypt, is not just a problem in Lebanon. ¶8. (C) Siniora repeated his common refrain that the real issue "par excellence" was the Palestinian-Israeli problem. Acknowledging that the new U.S. administration faced several challenges, he nevertheless urged it to "spearhead" efforts to find a solution. This would pull the carpet out from Iran and other radicals in the Arab world, he said. The Ambassador stressed the continuing U.S. commitment to a comprehensive Middle East peace, including a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Siniora countered that words were not enough; the Arab world was on the "brink of radicalization"" because moderates have nothing to show. RELEASE OF FOUR GENERALS? -------------- ¶9. (C) Siniora opined that if the Special Tribunal decided to release the four generals currently detained in Lebanese prison, this would have a negative impact in Lebanon -- worse, he said, than Walid Jumblatt's criticisms of his March 14 allies (Ref B). However, Siniora noted that he had passed the message to his colleagues that the Lebanese government had decided to establish the Tribunal and therefore must accept the consequences of its decisions. Siniora agreed with the Ambassador that, either way, the decision reflected the Tribunal's respect for the rule of law and was not an indication of the generals' guilt or innocence. Ambassador noted that, if anything, a recommendation for release would show that the Tribunal's work was not politicized. The Prosecutor's investigation is continuing and goes well beyond the four generals. LAME DUCK CABINET -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador, noting that the cabinet had discussed security measures for the elections in its last (April 24) cabinet meeting, asked whether Siniora expected Cabinet progress on outstanding appointments. Siniora grimly replied that all appointments were "stuck," complaining that "this type of government" (i.e., a national unity government in which the opposition holds a blocking third) cannot accomplish anything. "I've lost hope," he said. He did not expect anything to come out of the scheduled April 28 session of the National Dialogue, but commented that it was not a bad thing to keep talking. On the stalled 2009 budget and Council of the South appropriation, Siniora merely criticized Speaker Berri's lack of credibility, adding that no one in Sidon (Siniora's district) cared about the Council of the South. (Note: Cabinet will not meet this week because of President Sleiman's trip to London. The April 28 session of the National Dialogue was adjourned without fanfare; participants agreed that the upcoming elections should be conducted in a calm and democratic atmosphere. The next Dialogue session has been scheduled for June 1. End note.) ELECTIONS, ELECTIONS, ELECTIONS -------------- ¶11. (C) Asked what the U.S. could do to help support BEIRUT 00000485 003 OF 003 moderates in Lebanon in the 39 days remaining before the elections, Siniora suggested avoiding public statements that could be used by the opposition to discredit the March 14 coalition. He also cited the need to work on the Christians by enhancing the position of the Patriarch and cultivating Armenian voters, capitalizing on the Armenian community in the United States. Agreeing with the Ambassador that Armenian Tashnaq seemed firmly wedded to the Michel Aoun and the opposition, he nevertheless argued there were still some "borderline" Armenians who could be influenced. ¶12. (C) Siniora himself had been active on the campaign trail, meeting personally with thousands of constituents in his hometown of Sidon over the weekend. He freely admitted to making up for lost time, not having lived in Sidon for years and being cooped up in the Grand Serail during Hizballah's year and half "tent city" protest outside his Beirut office. Siniora said he had not intended to run for parliament, but circumstances made it "imperative" than he throw his hat in the ring. ¶13. (C) Although the opposition was joining forces to make Sidon the "battle of the century," Siniora professed to being relaxed about his electoral prospects, comparing himself to the tortoise racing against the opposition's hare. He said he was working off the assumption that his chances were 50/50 to ensure that his supporters did not take his victory for granted. His focus was on "enlightened" Shia and Christians who had emigrated from Sidon during the 2006 and previous wars. ¶14. (C) Sidon voters were concerned primarily with their immediate needs, rather any March 14 political program, Siniora said. Rather than talking from an "ivory tower" down to voters, or lowering himself to their level and staying there, his approach was to reach down to voters and pull them up. He hoped to provide value-added by developing Sidon's institutions and private sector, all the while keeping an eye on the nation's macroeconomic situation. ¶15. (C) Siniora relayed that he had circulated a paper to cabinet during the April 24 meeting outlining his vision for economic development throughout the country. He had been soliciting funding from Gulf countries, and enumerated a number of projects he was pursuing both in Sidon and other areas. Siniora said he had received the support of prominent Sidon-based business groupings such as the Bani and Abellah Groups. Iranian money is continuing to "pour in" to Lebanon, he noted, and confirmed that March 14 members were complaining about not getting any money from the Saudis. COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) The relaxed and confident Siniora who greeted us was clearly in campaign mode, with his focus seemingly much more on winning a seat in Sidon rather than government business. His complaints about the ineffectiveness of the national unity government track with Berri's comments to the Ambassador earlier the same day (septel) that Siniora has no intention of pushing for cabinet decisions under the current government. Although Siniora gave no indications of future aspirations of becoming Prime Minister should the March 14 coalition prevail in the June 7 elections, he agreed with the Ambassador that the process of cabinet formation could be prolonged, joking that he expected to be around for quite a while as caretaker prime minister. End comment. SISON