Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT471
2009-04-24 14:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: UNSCOL WILLIAMS DOWNBEAT ON GHAJAR, MARCH

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER UNSC LE IS EG 
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INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
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RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000471 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC LE IS EG
SUBJECT: LEBANON: UNSCOL WILLIAMS DOWNBEAT ON GHAJAR, MARCH
14 CHANCES

REF: A. BEIRUT 466

B. BEIRUT 463

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000471 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC LE IS EG SUBJECT: LEBANON: UNSCOL WILLIAMS DOWNBEAT ON GHAJAR, MARCH 14 CHANCES REF: A. BEIRUT 466 ¶B. BEIRUT 463 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) Michael Williams, meeting with the Ambassador and DCM on April 23, expressed dismay at what he saw as a missed opportunity for progress on Ghajar. Williams assessed that new governments on both sides of the border would be less committed to the issue in the future. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was fully off the reservation and major steps within the March 14 coalition would be necessary to repair unity, he said. On the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL),Williams noted that STL Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare had reportedly asked for a 48-hour delay before deciding on an extension to the April 27 deadline to submit his recommendation on the continued detention of the four generals. Regarding the ongoing spat between Egypt and Hizballah, Williams assessed that the impact would be long-lasting, despite a drop in media attention. End Summary. PROGRESS ON GHAJAR UNLIKELY -------------- ¶2. (C) UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) Michael Williams told the Ambassador and DCM April 23 that Israel was tying its current policy review to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's upcoming trip to Washington. Williams, accompanied by UNSCOL Special Assistant Salvatore Pedulla, noted the timeline made any progress on Ghajar before Lebanon's June 7 elections unlikely. He confirmed that the 2,000 residents in northern Ghajar and the approximately 1,200 residents in southern Ghajar enjoyed full Israeli citizenship. Williams told the Ambassador and DCM that he was seeking meetings with Israeli leaders, but had not yet received confirmation. ¶3. (C) Williams said UNIFIL Commander General Claudio Graziano's April 21 trip to Israel focused mostly on technical issues. In Israel, Graziano met with Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director of International Issues Evi Manor and Ambassador David Vertzer, who covers Ghajar issues at the MFA. According to Williams, Graziano
assessed that technical discussions had advanced as far as possible; a policy decision was now necessary. Israeli concerns regarding security in Ghajar in the case of an Israeli withdrawal were unrealistic, Williams noted. The Israelis withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, and for six years no security apparatus was present in Ghajar; now UNIFIL would provide security, he said. ¶4. (C) UNSCOL advisor Rami Shehadeh told PolEconoff separately that "the Israelis" (unclear whether IDF or MFA), in meetings with Graziano, had expressed willingness to give some positive signs on Ghajar before Lebanon's June 7 elections, but did not intend to withdraw from the area. In Shehadeh's opinion, anything short of full withdrawal would be unpalatable to the Lebanese population. ¶5. (C) Williams and Special Assistant Pedulla expressed dismay at what they viewed as a lost opportunity on Ghajar. It would be difficult for Israel to withdraw now when the makeup of the next Lebanese government was uncertain, they said. New governments on both sides of the border would likely be less committed to the issue, Williams opined. A UNSC Presidential Statement encouraging Israel to leave Ghajar was a possibility, if it included a timeframe for withdrawal. Graziano had assessed a two-year timeframe might be feasible. ¶6. (C) Additionally, Williams expressed skepticism about the shape of UNIFIL forces in the future. Continued participation of European countries was not guaranteed, BEIRUT 00000471 002 OF 003 Williams said, as demands for peacekeeping troops increase around the world, especially in Afghanistan. The French will assess their troop contribution at the end of the year, he noted, and would likely withdraw one battalion. French cutbacks to troop committments in Lebanon could have a ripple effect on other European countries. JUMBLATT MAKING NO AMENDS -------------- ¶7. (C) Williams said that Druze leader Walid Jumblatt continued his criticism of his March 14 allies at an April 22 dinner, hosted by March 14 MP Mosbah Adab, that Williams had attended. (Note: Adab has been dropped from the March 14 electoral list in Tripoli for the 2009 elections. End note.) Although Jumblatt had attempted to clarify the statements he made against his March 14 allies in a video leaked over the weekend of April 18 (Ref B),Williams argued the situation had only been made worse. According to Williams, Jumblatt was questioning the meaning of the March 14 alliance -- formed in the aftermath of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri -- now that its founding pillars of resistance against Syrian occupation and support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) were mostly accomplished. ¶8. (C) Williams believed that in Jumblatt's view, March 14 had failed to articulate a political program and to realize the value of consensus. Williams assessed that Jumblatt's new position -- one foot in March 14 and one foot out -- was "pretty irrevocable." He also argued that Jumblatt's leak had been premeditated. The only way to ease the tension was a summit between Jumblatt and Hariri, Williams opined. (Note: Hariri told the Ambassador that he met April 23 with several people from Jumblatt's camp. A meeting between the two leaders is scheduled for April 27; septel. End Note.) For his part, Adab was "very upset" about his exclusion from the March 14 list in Tripoli, Williams said. ¶9. (C) Unsurprisingly, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, both of whom Williams met earlier April 23, provided drastically different assessments of Jumblatt's outbursts. Siniora, whom Williams said seemed very tired, both physically and "policy-wise," called Jumblatt a "blackmailer." Berri, on the other hand, praised Jumblatt's moderation and his consistent efforts to bridge the divide between March 14 and the opposition. WHAT NEXT FOR MARCH 14? -------------- ¶10. (C) Williams noted that a Hizballah member with whom he had met earlier the week of April 20 had been "very upbeat" on elections. This was a change from a few months ago, Williams noted. He argued that unless March 14's "heads were knocked together," the coalition would likely lose the upcoming elections. Berri assessed the race would be close, with three or four seats deciding the difference. Williams expressed particular concern about Jumblatt's re-positioning. He noted that, with the more unifying Christian leader (Michel Aoun) on the opposition side, March 14 was becoming a much less confessionally-diverse bloc. With weaker Christians and an absent Druze, March 14 would become a solid Sunni bloc. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶11. (C) According to Williams, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare had reportedly asked for a 48-hour delay before deciding if he would need to extend the April 27 deadline for his recommendation on the continued detention of the four generals held in connection with the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri-- Ref B. (Note: Press reported today that Bellemare will announce his recommendation of continued detention April 27. End Note.) Williams noted Pre-Trial Judge Daniel Fransen, upon receiving Bellemare's request, could insist on seeing the generals BEIRUT 00000471 003 OF 003 face-to-face before rendering his decision. This would happen either in the Hague or by video conference. ¶12. (C) Williams said the alleged April 18 arrest in the UAE of former Syrian intelligence officer Mohammed Zohair al-Siddiq presented a "confused picture." Although Williams assessed Siddiq's transfer to Syrian authorities was not ideal, he opined that Siddiq had been discredited as a witness for the STL. MUBARAK STILL OUTRAGED -------------- ¶13. (C) Although the scathing statements between Egypt and Hizballah had died down in local press, Williams noted Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was "unlikely to forget" that Hizballah had operated a cell in the country. Berri told Williams earlier April 23 that a long trial for the Hizballah suspects -- to keep the situation out of the spotlight -- was best. Berri also assessed that the improving ties between Saudi Arabia and Syria would have a calming effect. Williams told us that he would see Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa April 25; Moussa would see President Michel Sleiman, Siniora, and Berri as well. SISON

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