Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT427
2009-04-13 13:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: TRIPOLI: HARIRI'S CANDIDATE LIST NEARLY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR LE SY 
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DE RUEHLB #0427/01 1031322
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131322Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4667
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3660
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3860
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000427 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: TRIPOLI: HARIRI'S CANDIDATE LIST NEARLY
COMPLETE, BUT RAISES QUESTIONS

REF: A. BEIRUT 401

B. BEIRUT 154

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000427 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: TRIPOLI: HARIRI'S CANDIDATE LIST NEARLY COMPLETE, BUT RAISES QUESTIONS REF: A. BEIRUT 401 ¶B. BEIRUT 154 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) March 14 coalition-allied Tripoli MPs Moustafa Allouch and Mosbah al Ahdab, in separate meetings, told the Ambassador that Saad Hariri's candidate list for the district was nearly complete. Allouch, with good grace and laughter, called himself "a victim," but said he was not upset to be dropped from the list if it was for the good of March 14. Ahdab, meanwhile, said he was confident of his ability to retain his MP slot, whether on Hariri's list or not. Both Allouch and Ahdab affirmed that the ultimate composition of the list would fair well if it included representatives known and respected by Tripolitans. Ahdab, however, assessed that Hariri was losing his influence in Tripoli and in the north. The electoral outcome was difficult to predict, but Allouch said a repeat of the status quo was the most realistic scenario, although he did not discount the possibility that the opposition March 8 alliance could make gains. ¶2. (C) Tripoli's status as a historical gateway to Syria and the Sunni heart of Lebanon put it at the crossroads of larger regional attempts at reconciliation and detente. Local issues such as high unemployment and poverty could push rival sectarian communities towards violence, although the situation was calm, Allouch and Ahdab said. To demonstrate continued U.S. assistance to Tripolitans, the Ambassador announced the selection of Tripoli NGO, Maakum, as a recipient of one of the first U.S. Embassy Small Grants. We assess the electoral outcome in Tripoli will be a barometer of Saad Hariri's ability to unify the March 14 coalition. End summary and comment. HARIRI: MAKING THE RIGHT OVERTURES TO TRIPOLITANS? -------------- ¶3. (C) Current Future Movement MP Moustafa Allouch, a practicing surgeon, told the Ambassador and POLOFF April 6 that he was not "hurt" by Sunni majority leader Saad Hariri's decision to drop Allouch as a candidate on his elec
toral list for the June 7 parliamentary elections. (Note: Candidate registration closed on April 7. End note.) Allouch, a member of Hariri's Future Movement since 1998 and an MP since 2005, said he was willing to step aside if that was best for "the party and the good of the March 14 coalition." He said he and Hariri share many of the same beliefs, although Hariri was not as "firm" with others, as Allouch believed he should be. Confirming what Hariri told the Ambassador April 3 (ref A),Allouch said the Future/March 14 candidate list for Tripoli was decided and not a big problem. ¶4. (C) Allouch predicted a three-way electoral alliance between Hariri, current Minister of Economy and Trade Mohammad Safadi, and former PM Najib Mikati would lead to low voter turnout (20 to 25 percent) in Tripoli, which should be interpreted as a sign of confidence, he said. However, if the alliance broke down before the election, he predicted a much higher turnout, closQ to 45 percent. ¶5. (C) On April 8, however, independent but March 14-allied Tripoli MP Mosbah al Ahdab told the Ambassador that he believed Saad Hariri was "being used" by his so-called allies, and was actually losing his influence in Tripoli and in the north. Ahdab, a maverick in March 14 but who claims to maintain good relations with Hariri, said his candidacy in Tripoli was assured, whether on or off of Hariri's list. Ahdab called Hariri's decision to drop Allouch from the list a "big mistake." BEIRUT 00000427 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Ahdab also suggested Safadi (another independent) and Mikati (independent, but pro-Syrian) are in competition with each other, and bringing Samir Saadeh, an outsider from Batroun, to the candidate list in Tripoli for the Maronite seat was a miscalculation. Others rumored to be on Hariri's Tripoli list, such as businessman Robert Fadl (Greek Catholic) and current Tripoli (Sunni) MPs Mohammad Kabbara and Samir Jisr, are "not really" Hariri's people, Ahdab accused. ¶7. (C) Both Allouch and Ahdab defended the character of Tripolitans and said that politically, those who represent Tripoli need to have a relationship with the people of Tripoli. Ahdab said he had no idea who was Hariri's advisor for the north, but claimed Hariri was struggling there because he had neither a strong presence nor a strong electoral machine. THE CRYSTAL BALL: ELECTORAL OUTCOME PREDICTIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) When asked about predictions for the outcome of the parliamentary elections, Allouch said that in the best case scenario, March 14 would win a majority with less than 50 percent of the 128 parliamentary seats, the opposition March 8/Aoun alliance would remain in the minority with less than 40 percent, and the remainder would be independents. The more realistic scenario, he said, was a repeat of the status quo. However, the recent political statements of March 14 Druze leader Walid Jumblatt were "dangerous" for the coalition, he said. (Note: Jumblatt's recent statements suggested internal friction among March 14's leaders. Local media portrayed the statements as hints to Jumblatt's possible defection from the coalition, which he denies -- septel. End note.) ¶9. (C) Allouch said it was possible that Hizballah's March 8 alliance could win a majority. Should that occur, he said he would not be surprised if members of March 14 decided to join a national unity government, although Allouch opposed this idea. ¶10. (C) For his part, Ahdab was confident about his own success. He also said that if March 14 won a majority, he would not accept not being offered a cabinet position. (Note: During the July 2008 government formation, negotiations between Hariri and Ahdab broke down, and Ahdab was not offered a ministerial spot. Ahdab took the slight personally and relations between the two continue to be rocky. End note.) TRIPOLI CAUGHT AT THE CROSSROADS -------------- ¶11. (C) Historically, Tripoli is a social and economic gateway for Lebanon to its regional neighbors, notably Syria and Saudi Arabia. Both continue to play a role in Lebanon's politics, as Hariri is viewed as the "Saudi's choice" for Sunni leader, and Syria has close ties to several of Tripoli's political and business elite, including Mikati and former PM Omar Karami. Ahdab characterized the results of recent overtures of reconciliation and detente between Tripoli's different sectarian communities (Sunni, Alawite, Christian, etc.) as symbolic of Lebanon's ability to maintain sovereign, mutually beneficial relations with other regional players, especially Syria. ¶12. (C) Meanwhile, High unemployment and poverty are the immediate local concerns that could spark proxy clashes between Tripoli's rival communities, such as Sunni Bab el Tabbaneh and Alawite Jabal Mohssen (ref B),Allouch said. The security situation in Tripoli was currently calm, he continued, but could play a role in the elections if new clashes erupt. He assessed that neither the Lebanese Armed BEIRUT 00000427 003 OF 003 Forces (LAF) (the military) nor the Internal Security Forces (ISF) (the police) would have the appetite to intervene to stop such violence. He assessed that neither the LAF nor ISF were ready to accept casualties of their own members nor of the civilian population. U.S. EXPANDS ASSISTANCE TO TRIPOLI -------------- ¶13. (SBU) During the April 6 visit to Tripoli, the Ambassador announced the selection of local NGO Maakum as a recipient of a USD 51,000 Embassy Small Grant for vocational training of youth. Maakum, registered as an official NGO in 2005, focuses many of its programs on disadvantaged youth, including vocational training, education, and support services. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) We assess Saad Hariri's efforts to finalize his candidate list in Tripoli to be in its final stages. However, as Ahdab noted, several of the likely contenders on the list are not necessarily committed to Future Movement or March 14. Several contacts and local press are mystified by the Hariri's plan to take Samir Saadeh on his Tripoli list and do not support the idea. While deals on electoral alliances are being cut in each electoral district, results in Tripoli will be a key barometer of the appeal of March 14's message and Hariri's ability to unify his coalition. SISON

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