LEBANON: JUMBLATT WEARY, BUT STILL WITH MARCH 14

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000426 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL STATE PASS TO OVP HMUSTAFA USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUMBLATT WEARY, BUT STILL WITH MARCH 14 REF: BEIRUT 416 BEIRUT 00000426 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) March 14 coalition leader Walid Jumblatt confirmed to the Ambassador April 9 that he was unhappy about "abandoning" two Christian candidates in Aley and Baabda districts, in favor of ones supported by fellow March 14 Christian leaders Samir Geagea and Amine Gemayel. Geagea and Gemayel were still in competition, he said, and Sunni leader Saad Hariri had made some missteps of his wn in districts such as Tripoli and with Shia constituencies. The key Christian district of Zahle was "a mess," Druze leader Jumblatt reported. Due to the official start of the electoral campaign season, Jumblatt said the GOL was now "inoperative" until after the elections. He predicted formation of the new government would neither be quick nor painless, as he expected heated negotiations of several key ministerial spots, including the Ministers of Telecommunications and Justice. Jumblatt came across as weary with his March 14 allies, but still in the March 14 camp. ¶2. (C) Jumblatt credited Hizballah's electoral program, released April 1, for speaking directly to the concerns of the Lebanese public, including economic and social plans. He said he relationship with opposition-allied Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri was "fine," although Hariri and Berri were not on speaking terms. Jumblatt did not expect Syria to intervene in Lebanon's electoral season through the use of assassination or other intimidation tactics, preferring not jeopardize its budding relationships with western powers and Saudi Arabia. He praised U.S. President Barack Obama's overtures to the Muslim world, but believed that a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was no longer possible. End summary and comment. ELECTORAL HORSE-TRADING WITHIN MARCH 14 -------------- ¶3. (C) March 14 coalition Druze leader Walid Jumblatt told the Ambassador, DCM, and Poloff that March 14 Christian leaders Samir Geagea (Lebanese Forces) and Amine Gemayel (Kataeb) remain in competition with each other to name candidates, despite general agreement on the March 14 candidate lists for the June 7 parliamentary elections. Meeting at his Beirut home April 9, Jumblatt said he was forced to "abandon" two of his preferred candidates for Christian seats in Aley and Baabda districts, in favor of ones chosen by Geagea and Gemayel. He said that Geagea and Gemayel view any "independent" as "undermining," similar to rhetoric coming from opposition Christian leader Michel Aoun. Jumblatt also accused Sunni majority leader Saad Hariri of "ignoring" the Shia constituencies in certain districts, which now Jumblatt was playing the role of "bridge" between the Shia and Hariri, he said. ¶4. (C) In the northern electoral district of Tripoli, Jumblatt said the list was "settled" and would include former PM Najib Mikati, current Minister of Economy and Trade Mohammad Safadi and MP Mohammad Kabbarah. Independent MP Mosbah al Adab, Jumblatt said, would not be on the list and believed this was "bad" for the image of March 14. When asked about Safadi's loyalty to March 14, Jumblatt responded that Safadi would always stay with the coalition with "certain conditions" (nfi). Furthermore, he predicted Mikati would side with a March 14 majority, but continued to hold out hope for the possibility of joining an independent bloc in support of President Michel Sleiman. ¶5. (C) In the Sunni district of Sidon, Jumblatt predicted current MP and Minister of Education Bahiya Hariri and BEIRUT 00000426 002 OF 003 Prime Minister Fouad Siniora would "easily" win. However, he anticipated majority leader Saad Hariri having problems with the Jemaah Islamiya party who sought an alliance with Hariri in Saida and other districts, but was refused. He said there was a low probability of violence between rival majority and opposition supporters in Sidon, but added violence was more likely in the predominantly Christian district Zahle. In Zahle, "everything is a mess," he said. GOL "INOPERATIVE" UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS -------------- ¶6. (C) With the campaign season now in full swing, Jumblatt said the government is completely "inoperative." Jumblatt called President Sleiman little more than "an elections administrator" assisted by Interior Minister Ziad Baroud. He said Sleiman's hands were tied when the Cabinet could not deliver him a viable budget and when Sleiman did not insist on a independent parliamentary bloc. Both parliament and the cabinet are handicapped until the elections are over, he continued. In parliament, he said, Speaker Nabih Berri would not get a quorum to vote on legislation until the electoral season ended. ¶7. (C) Post-election, Jumblatt predicted that the two main political forces -- the current majority March 14 coalition and the opposition March 8 alliance, led by Hizballah -- would remain. He cautioned not to expect the formation of a new government until weeks or possibly months after June ¶7. Jumblatt advisor Marwan Hamadeh, said the new government could be formed quicker if -- and he stressed if -- the election results gave Sleiman a freer hand through a majority that included March 14 and independents. Jumblatt anticipated a protracted battle for the parties to agree on the new Telecommunications and Justice ministers, as these would remain two of the most sensitive portfolios. (Note: In the current government, opposition-allied Gebran Bassil is the Minister of Telecommunications. Bassil also is running for a parliamentary seat in Batroun. Current Justice Minister, Ibrahim Najjar, is allied with March 14. End note.) JUMBLATT ON HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶8. (C) Jumblatt credited Hizballah's electoral platform (reftel),released April 1, for articulating the issues that the Lebanese people care about at the micro level, including economic and social issues. By contrast, March 14 kept the level of discourse at a macro level for the time being, he said, but it would become necessary to talk about serious problems, such as the economy, unemployment, and electricity after the election. He assessed that the relationship between nominal allies in the opposition -- Speaker Berri (Amal) and Michel Aoun (Free Patriotic Movement) -- was not going well. Hizballah, the dominant opposition force, would be forced to mediate between the two for the sake of holding the alliance together and to ensure Aoun's success. ¶9. (C) He told the Ambassador that his relationship with opposition-aligned Berri was "fine," although Hariri, he said, would not even talk to Berri. He did not, however, address rumors in the press that he was preparing to defect from March 14 to join the opposition. REGIONAL INFLUENCES AND CHALLENGES -------------- ¶10. (C) Syria, the "biggest troublemaker in Lebanon," Jumblatt assessed, had no interest in using assassination or other intimidation tactics to interfere in Lebanon's electoral season. He explained that Syrian government was not willing to jeopardize, in the near term, recent diplomatic moves by western powers, such as the United BEIRUT 00000426 003 OF 003 States and France, and Saudi Arabia to reach out to it. Advisor Hamadeh added that he believed the Lebanese were listening more to other Lebanese, than outside regional influences for the June 7 election. ¶11. (C) Jumblatt said he admired U.S. President Barack Obama's recent statements about Islam and his overtures to the Muslim world. He called President Obama's visit to Turkey "excellent." The Arab-Israeli problem, however, would be a "big headache." He suggested that if Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas could not take charge of Ramallah, at the least, the possibility of a two-state solution was "long dead." COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Jumblatt came across as weary with his allies, but still in the March 14 camp. His encounters with Hizballah, as portrayed in the press, are not uncharacteristic, as he maintains that his first priority is always the protection and security of his Druze constituency. However, the ongoing electoral wrangling over Christian candidates on a the March 14 ticket does not portend well for presenting a unified front, especially when most analysts predict it will be key Christian districts, such as Zahle, that will determine the ultimate electoral outcome. SISON