LEBANON: WHAT IS IMPACT OF THE DISAGREEMENTS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000288

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO/PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY, KAHL, DALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WHAT IS IMPACT OF THE DISAGREEMENTS IN
THE OPPOSITION?

REF: BEIRUT 00233

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) There has been speculation in the media and among
political observers about disagreements within the March
8/Aoun opposition coalition as its members prepare candidate
lists for the June 7 parliamentary elections. There have
been claims of disagreements between Christian opposition
leaders Suleiman Franjieh and Michel Aoun, Shia partners
Hizballah and Amal, and Aoun and Amal. For their part,
opposition leaders have accused March 14 and the
international community of seeking to sow discord, or the
appearance of discord, within opposition ranks. This cable
seeks to explore possible fracture points in the opposition
and any potential impact on elections.


2. (C) In addition to the formation of electoral lists, there
have been apparent disagreements on one-day voting and the
mechanisms of forming a government post-election. Long-term
fractures could appear because of Syrian and Iranian
influence in the opposition and also individual leaders'
likely emphasis on self-preservation at the expense of the
electoral alliance. Despite these disagreements, our
assessment is that the opposition alliance -- with Hizballah,
Amal, and the Free Patriotic Movement at its core -- will
remain intact for the election. End summary.

ELECTORAL LISTS
CAUSE SPARKS
--------------


3. (C) Contacts assess that while disagreements are likely
among opposition leaders as they begin forming electoral
lists, coalition discipline will ensure that most of the
debate will occur, in general, away from the spotlight. One
disagreement, an open secret, revolves around who gets to
name the Christian representatives in southern districts,
Christian leader and Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) head MP
Michel Aoun or his opposition ally Speaker of ParliamentNabih Berri. Berri historically has selected canddates for
Christian seats in areas where his Amal party dominates, but
Aoun is insisting on naming Christian candidates in order to
prove to his Christian supporters that he (and only he)
represents their interests.


4. (C) Discussing how Aoun and Berri will reach an agreement,
FPM member Alain Aoun (Christian) told us the opposition
would conduct opinion polls in districts where candidates
were disputed. Whoever's candidates proved more popular,
they would represent the opposition. Berri's advisor Ali
Hamdan (Shia),however, complained that Aoun was
"overstepping his reach," by pushing for candidates in areas
Amal considered its strongholds. Pro-Syrian Ad-Diyar paper
reported February 25 that Aoun met with Hizballah SYG
Nasrallah to settle "complications" related to parliamentary
seats, a sign that Hizballah might have to settle the various
disputes among its allies in the opposition.


5. (C) Three districts that have or probably will spark
disputes among opposition members -- Jezzine, Zgharta, and
Aley -- are highlighted below. Disputes in these areas,
however, are not expected to cause the opposition as a whole
to crumble.

JEZZINE
--------------


6. (C) Contacts have cited Jezzine as a district where there
is a dispute between Berri and Aoun. It is thought that
Berri hopes to keep the right to name the two Christian seats
in Jezzine -- held by Amal-allied incumbents -- as they
provide a small level of cross-confessional validity to his
mainly Shia Amal movement. Aoun is seeking the right to name

BEIRUT 00000288 002 OF 003


the seats as a way to bolster his position as the Christian
figurehead in the opposition and refute claims that he is a
"tool" in the hands of his Shia allies. Some contacts even
have speculated that Aoun may run a separate list against
Berri in Jezzine, but we would find that highly surprising.


7. (C) Hizballah might side with Aoun as a means of gathering
more Christian supporters to the opposition coalition.
Hizballah has been quiet publicly quiet on details of
electoral lists

ZGHARTA
--------------


8. (C) There are reports that Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh
(Christian) and Aoun differed on who should be on the list in
heavily Christian Zgharta. Aoun favors Sayez Karam, who was
in exile with Aoun in France. Franjieh, however, supports
another candidate. Contacts have told PolStaff that, given
overwhelming support for Franjieh in Zgharta, Aoun will back
down.

ALEY
--------------


9. (C) In Aley, opposition disagreement has centered on Druze
leader Talal Arslan. Arslan told Emboffs in March that he
had supported a compromise deal with March 14 Druze leader
Walid Jumblatt involving Aley and Baabda. Arslan hoped to
keep his seat in Aley by agreeing that his opposition allies
would not challenge Jumblatt's candidate in Baabda. Arslan
said he was "strongly rebuked" by Aoun and Hizballah for his
proposal. The voter confessional breakdown in Baabda
requires Arslan to obtain buy-in from Aoun and Hizballah for
his plan.

DIVERGING ON
ONE-DAY ELECTIONS
--------------


10. (C) Besides electoral list formations, opposition members
also have differed over the mechanics of elections,
specifically on whether elections should be held on one day
(parliamentary elections had historically been spread over
four successive Sundays). Aoun publicly questioned the
ability of Lebanese security services to hold elections
without incident on only one day and expressed his support
for elections instead to take place over two days.


11. (C) Although Labor Minister Mohammed Fneish (Hizballah)
acknowledged in late February that Aoun's concerns about
security for one-day elections were justified, Hizballah
publicly supported elections in one day. Christian Marada
Forces head Suleiman Franjieh has publicized his preference
for one-day elections as well.


12. (C) Aoun's separating from Hizballah on this issue could
help him among Christians nervous about his alliance with the
Shia party. Hizballah's acknowledgment of Aoun's concerns
validates his somewhat "independent" stature. Moreover, by
leaving the final decision to the GOL on security
capabilities, Aoun leaves a way for one-day elections to
occur without incurring a "loss."

AOUN QUIET ON NATIONAL
UNITY GOVERNMENT
--------------


13. (C) Hizballah and Amal have been vocal in calling for the
formation of a national unity government following elections,
but Aoun thus far has been less outspoken on the issue. Aoun
publicly supported the formation of a national unity
government after elections, but said he would not force March
14 to accept the arrangement. Aoun's lack of enthusiasm on
the topic probably stems from his unwillingness to cede
ministerial seats to March 14 Christians in a national unity
government, particularly if the opposition wins elections.


BEIRUT 00000288 003 OF 003



14. (C) Berri and Hizballah, on the other hand, maintain a
monopoly over Lebanese Shia and would not have to cede any
Shia seats to March 14 in a national unity government should
the opposition win. March 14 leaders Samir Geagea and Walid
Jumblatt have admitted to us that the few Shia in the March
14 camp are not seen as representative of the Shia sect as a
whole.

AOUN-BERRI
CLASH DESTINED?
--------------


15. (C) According to independent pollster Jawad Adra, Aoun is
"destined" to clash with Berri. In fact, Adra posited that a
clash with Berri was in Aoun's interest. Aoun, by succeeding
as a leader without the support of Sunni Future Party leader
Saad Hariri, demonstrated Christian triumph over the Sunnis.
By flaming fears of Sunni extremism and Palestinian
resettlement (tawteen),Aoun has brought Christians even
closer to him.


16. (C) By clashing with Berri, Aoun would prove himself
again as the protector of Christians -- this time over Shia
domination -- without actually endangering his alliance with
the stronger Shia ally, Hizballah. Aoun's strength is
valuable to Hizballah, as it re-emphasizes the opposition's
claim of cross-confessional representation. Hizballah may
assess that given its dominance among Lebanon's Shia, Aoun
brings a more important aspect to the alliance than its
weaker Shia ally, Berri.


17. (C) Aoun's outspokenness against Berri about judicial
appointments in recent days could indicate Aoun is beginning
to exert his independence from the Speaker. After the weekly
FPM meeting March 9, Aoun strongly criticized Berri for his
acquiescence on the appointments, which Aoun said were highly
politicized. Aoun accused Berri of knowing about the
appointments ahead of time and agreeing to the selections,
despite his allies' opposition to the names.

LONG-TERM SPLIT
OVER SYRIA-IRAN POSSIBLE
--------------


18. (C) While there may be some more signs of daylight
between Aoun and Berri before elections, the two likely will
remain allied for the election and after, whether as allies
in the majority or in the opposition. Longer term, some
observers tell us they see the seeds of disagreement between
Hizballah and Amal if the countries identified with
supporting them, Iran and Syria respectively, drift apart
over, say, Syrian rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
One issue to watch for signs of such a disagreement: the
selection of the next Speaker of Parliament, the senior GOL
position designated for Shia. The current speaker, Amal's
Nabih Berri, wants to become speaker again.


19. (C) Actors in the opposition -- and also in March 14 --
likely will remain allied with each other for the short-term
interest of winning elections. Potential independent Maronite
candidate in Beirut I district, Massoud Ashar, explained the
phenomena by separating electoral alliances from political
alliances. He noted that, although he was an independent
candidate and disagreed with Aoun's alliance with Hizballah,
he would likely ally with Aoun in June 2009 elections for
tactical electoral reasons. Ashar, however, did not plan to
remain in Aoun's camp over the long term.


20. (C) Many candidates, similar to Ashar, place short-term
personal victory over ideology. MP Nicholas Fattoush, who
ran in 2005 on March 14's list, told POLOFF he is deciding
which list to join in 2009 based on where his chances of
winning are the strongest.

SISON