LEBANON: GEMAYEL PROPOSES TO NEA ACTING A/S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000270 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR A A/S WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR MCDERMOTT, SHAPIRO E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC MARR MOPS IS LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEMAYEL PROPOSES TO NEA ACTING A/S FELTMAN INDIRECT TALKS WITH ISRAEL Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On March 6, former President Amine Gemayel described to visiting NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman and NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Dan Shapiro the influence Iran and Syria, through its proxy Hizballah, wield in Lebanon. A A/S Feltman assured Gemayel of enduring U.S. support for Lebanon and said he would relay this message during his visit the following day to Damascus. Gemayel proposed the GOL, under UN auspices, pursue indirect negotiations with ISRAEL to return to the 1949 Armistice Agreement that established an armistice line between ISRAEL and Lebanon. He argued that Hizballah would have to support such a process to demonstrate its desire to "liberate" Sheba'a Farms. Also in attendance, MP and former Social Affairs minister Nayla Mouawad said March 14 has gained in popularity among the Christians prior to the June 7 parliamentary elections. Gemayel noted that the March 14 Christian leaders were making progress in determining which candidates to run in each district. Gemayel expressed his concern that Hizballah, through the Lebanese Armed Forces, would obstruct people from reaching polling stations on election day. End summary. SYRIA, IRAN VERY INFLUENTIAL IN LEBANON -------------- ¶2. (C) Visiting NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman, NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Dan Shapiro, and the Ambassador met with former President Amine Gemayel at his Sin el Fil residence on March ¶6. March 14 Secretariat SYG Fares Suaid and three Kataeb members attended the meeting. National Liberal Party leader Dory Chamoun and March 14 MP and former Social Affairs minister Nayla Mouawad joined the luncheon following the meeting. ¶3. (C) A A/S Feltman stressed that President Obama's and Secretary Clinton's support for Lebanon's independence, sovereignty, and stability, most notably for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, was genuine and "still very strong." He explained that he planned to deliver the message to Syria the following day that U.S. policy on Lebanon was not changing, and also to explore what engagement with Syria might mean. ¶4. (C) Gemayel expressed his gratitude for past U.S. support for Lebanon, crediting the U.S. with the Syrian withdrawal in ¶2005. However, he noted that Syria was still very influential in Lebanon because the Syrians remained "nostalgic" for Lebanon and wished to recapture the country "one way or another." ¶5. (C) Iran is equally disruptive in Lebanon, Gemayel added, accusing it of supplying Hizballah with sophisticated weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles, and having "spiritual, religious, and financial control" over the organization. "We have reached a stage where Hizballah is the army and the LAF (Lebanese Armed Forces) is just an appendix," Gemayel warned. PURSUING INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL -------------- ¶6. (C) Gemayel, caveating that Lebanon was not ready for full negotiations with Israel, proposed that the GOL, under UN auspices, pursue indirect negotiations with ISRAEL to return to the 1949 Armistice Agreement that established an armistice line between ISRAEL and Lebanon. According to Gemayel, such a proposal was a good starting point, and could lead to discussions on resolving Sheba'a Farms. The U.S. should pledge its full support for this proposal, and encourage PM Fouad Siniora's participation, who, Gemayel said, continued to oppose talks with Israel. BEIRUT 00000270 002 OF 003 ¶7. (C) A A/S Feltman acknowledged the USG's desire to see Lebanon on some sort of a track with Israel. He inquired whether ISRAEL would accept this starting point, given that Hizballah possesses an enormous arsenal in southern Lebanon. Gemayel responded that ISRAEL might accept the idea because it is an opportunity for ISRAEL to negotiate with another Arab neighbor and it provides an avenue to eventually deal with Hizballah's arms. Suaid chimed in to say that all sides, including ISRAEL and Hizballah, accepted UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which, in Article 9, calls for UN SYG support in securing agreements between the two countries. ¶8. (C) A A/S Feltman countered that the Israelis had tried to oppose any reference to the Armistice Agreement in UNSCR 1701 precisely because no one was taking seriously Hizballah's possession of arms, and because of troop limitations in the agreement that are no longer relevant. He further laid out a scenario in which Hizballah continued to smuggle arms and Israel subsequently continued its overflights, therein prompting Hizballah to denounce ISRAEL for violating the armistice, and disrupting the entire process. ¶9. (C) Gemayel agreed that March 14 and the GOL would need to convince Hizballah to allw the GOL to pursue a diplomatic approach by callng its bluff on its desire to resolve Sheba'a. He did not elaborate on how such indirect talks would proceed, but suggested that the Turks, Jordanians, French, and Italians could participate, led by the UN. Gemayel clarified that he suggested the Armistice Agreement for its focus on secure borders, not for its troop limitation clauses or other details, which would need to be reworked. MARCH 14 MAKING PROGRESS AHEAD OF ELECTIONS -------------- ¶10. (C) Mouawad described how March 14 has gained in popularity, especially among the Christians, and attributed this increase in part to Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun's December 2008 visit to Syria, which cost him some of his non-core supporters. Suaid noted with pleasure that people were inquiring about March 14's platform, and that the coalition would roll out its program at its next convention on March 14. ¶11. (C) Suaid shared his colleagues' assessment that relations between Gemayel's Kataeb party and Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces (LF) had improved. Gemayel interjected that his party had been meeting frequently with LF and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party representatives to find compromises over the limited number of seats and plethora of candidates. He was worried that some individuals may feel excluded and not throw their needed weight behind the March 14 coalition. ¶12. (C) Declaring that independent MP Michel Murr is allied with him in the Metn district "for the time being!", Gemayel cautioned that the Armenian Tashnaq party was directed by Iran, and Murr would not succeed in drawing the party away from the opposition. U.S. SUPPORT BEFORE AND AFTER ELECTIONS -------------- ¶13. (C) A A/S Feltman and the Ambassador relayed U.S. support for Lebanon ahead of the elections, including a May shipment of equipment for the LAF, new USAID funding for small projects, and official visits. Gemayel said he hoped that the Special Tribunal would issue indictments before the elections. He added that resolution on "something strong" from the Syrians, such as border delineation or progress on Lebanese detainees in Syria, prior to the elections would boost the majority's standing. ¶14. (C) Inquiring about LAF Commander Kahwagi's recent trip to the U.S., Gemayel suggested that Hizballah, via the LAF, could interfere with the elections, for example, by BEIRUT 00000270 003 OF 003 controlling access to polling stations through its presence at military checkpoints. A A/S Feltman responded that the U.S. administration was pleased with Kahwagi's priorities, and would reevaluate its assistance to the LAF after the elections. ¶15. (U) NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey D. Feltman and NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa have cleared this message. SISON