LEBANON: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

UNCLAS BEIRUT 000024 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/ELA, S/CT RHONDA SHORE, NCTC: RUEILB, NCTC WASHINGTON DC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PTER LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM REF: 08 STATE 120019 ¶1. Since 2005 there have been numerous assassinations and assassination attempts of prominent Lebanese figures, including former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The attacks targeted Lebanese political and military figures and journalists, many of whom were critical of Syrian interference in Lebanon. All of these attacks remain unsolved. The UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) was appointed to investigate the Hariri assassination, and subsequently has also been involved in investigating some 20 other attacks. UNIIIC,s mandate was extended through February 2009 and is scheduled to transition to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in The Hague on March 1, 2009. ¶2. Terrorist violence continued in 2008. On January 15, a US Embassy fully armored vehicle was hit by a road side vehicle bomb north of Beirut, injuring two embassy body guards and killing three Lebanese bystanders, along with injuring 20 others, including one non-official American. On January 25, a car bomb in the Hazmieh suburb of Beirut killed an Internal Security Force (ISF) Intelligence officer, his driver and four others. A road side bomb detonated on August 13 in Tripoli, killing 12 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers, six civilians and wounding more than fifty. On September 29, a road side car bomb in Tripoli detonated, killing four LAF soldiers and two civilians. There was speculation both Tripoli bombings were the work of militant Islamic group, Fatah al-Islam (FAI). A car bomb attack killed Sheikh Saleh al-Aridi, a senior member of the Lebanese Democratic Party led by Druze leader Talal Arslan. While previous assassinations and assassination attempts targeted anti-Syrian figures, the Aridi assassination was the first to target a pro-Syrian politician. None of the attacks have been solved. ¶3. The end of former President Emile Lahoud's term in November 2007 and subsequent vacuum in the presidency left Lebanon in a state of political turmoil. The political deadlock lasted until May 2008, when the government,s decision to dismantle Hizballah-controlled fiber optic communication systems and remove the chief of airport security sparked armed clashes between Hizballah and other groups in Beirut and other areas. The clashes ended a few days later with the help of Arab League intervention which led to the Qatari-brokered Doha Agreement of May 21. The agreement ended the months-long political impasse and paved the way for the May 25 election of consensus candidate, and former LAF Commander, Michel Sleiman as president. A national unity government was officially formed on July 11, including three cabinet ministers appointed by the President, 16 ministers appointed by the majority March 14 coalition, and 11 ministers appointed by the March 8 opposition (including one minister from Hizballah),as agreed in Doha. ¶4. The new government selected General Jean Kahwagi as the new LAF Commander in September 2008. Kahwagi is a respected battle hardened commander with command experience in Nahr al-Barid fighting Fatah aI-Islam terrorists in an urban setting. The U.S. government has an active, expanding program of assistance with the LAF, including both training and equipment. By confronting and defeating FAI in the Nahr el-Barid camp, the government and the LAF took a strong step in combating terrorist activities. The battle against FAI marked the first time in 40 years that the LAF fought a major conflict, and it was the first time the army entered a Palestinian refugee camp to eliminate an Islamic militant terrorist group. ¶5. While the Lebanese government has made progress, there are concerns about its ability to combat terrorism, especially in Lebanon,s 12 Palestinian refugee camps. A porous border with Syria, weak internal camp security by Palestinian authorities, and Lebanese security authorities, reticence to enter the camps all contributed to a concern that there would be another confrontation against an armed group in one of the camps. The most widely predicted venue for such a clash is in Lebanon,s most populous refugee camp, Ain al Hilweh near the southern city of Sidon. The camp is well known for intra-Palestinian violence and is a safe haven for fugitives. As of December 2008, the Lebanese authorities were reportedly making efforts to capture Abdel al-Rahman Awad, believed to be the successor of FAI leader Shaker al-Abssi. (Abssi is a fugitive, and there is speculation that he is in Syria or that he has been killed by Syrian security authorities.) ¶6. Ain al Hilweh internal security relies largely on Palestinian group Fatah forces. Cooperation among the Palestinians and the government led to the establishment in 2005 of a Palestinian-Lebanese Dialogue Committee. The committee works towards establishing cooperative security arrangements and reducing the poor conditions in the camps that create a fertile environment for extremist ideology. ¶7. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559 called for respect for the sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, the end of foreign interference in Lebanon, and the disarming and disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. Hizballah, which the U.S. has designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, is a political party represented in Lebanon's cabinet and parliament. Political leaders have agreed that the role of Hizballah,s arms should be determined through "national dialogue" rather than by force. President Sleiman launched a new round of the National Dialogue talks in September. (The last National Dialogue, begun in 2006, never resumed after the start of the 2006 war.) The 14 participants in the dialogue represent the major political parties which participated in the negotiation of the May 2008 Doha Agreement. After the third round of talks in December, participants agreed to form a committee to evaluate participants, proposals for a "National Defense Strategy," which is intended to include how to deal with Hizballah's weapons. ¶8. Border security remains problematic. It is quite likely that smuggling of weapons into from Syria to Hizballah-controlled territory in Lebanon continues. Reports from the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the LAF said there was no conclusive evidence of arms smuggling to Hizballah in the area of southern Lebanon patrolled by UNIFIL (south of the Litani river). This is despite Hizballah officials' comments to the press that the organization is now more heavily armed than before the 2006 war with Israel. ¶9. Even with LAF troop deployments after the 2006 war, the government of Lebanon still does not exercise control over areas in the Hizballah-dominated areas in southern Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and parts of the Bekaa Valley. ¶10. UNSCR 1701 called upon Lebanon to secure its borders at all entry points to prevent entry of arms, weapons of mass destruction or related material without its consent. In May 2007, the UN Secretary General dispatched a border security team to Lebanon (the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team or LIBAT) to assess the monitoring of Lebanon,s border with Syria. In July 2008, a second assessment team (LIBAT II),responsible for assessing the implementation of the recommendations of LIBAT I, was sent to Lebanon. ¶11. The overall assessment of LIBAT II was that the borders are as penetrable and unsecure as they were in 2007 and concluded that the rate of implementation of LIBAT I,s recommendations was insufficient. Lebanon achieved "disconnected islands" of progress without a decisive impact on overall border security, the report said. At the border crossing points and particularly along the eastern border with Syria, little progress was observed stemming the tide of smuggling and human trafficking. Some positive steps like the installation of security equipment such as scanners and computerization of passport control were mentioned. ¶12. Drug smuggling across Lebanese borders remained problematic in 2008. ISF authorities said they saw no relationship between terror groups in Lebanon and narcotics cultivation or trafficking. ¶13. Two international conventions supported by the USG remained pending approval: The International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing was sent back to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee for further study in 2008, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which the Foreign Ministry has not submitted for Cabinet approval because of a dispute with the Finance Ministry over some wording. ¶14. Lebanese officials played an active leadership role in 2008 in the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA/FATF) and the US-MENA Private Sector Dialogue. Lebanon's Financial Intelligence Unit is the Special Investigation Commission (SIC),an independent legal entity empowered to investigate suspicious financial transactions. It investigated 186 cases involving allegations of money laundering, terrorism, and terrorist financing activities from January to mid-December 2008. The SIC refers requests for designation or asset freeze regarding Hizballah and groups affiliated with Hizballah to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but does not require banks to freeze these assets, because the GOL does not consider Hizballah a terrorist organization ¶15. Lebanese authorities maintained that the amnesty for Lebanese individuals involved in acts of violence during the 1975-90 civil war prevented the government from prosecuting terrorist cases of concern to the United States. These cases included individuals involved in the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, during which a U.S. Navy diver was murdered; the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983; and the abduction, torture, and murder of U.S. hostages in Lebanon from 1984 to 1991. A Hizballah official suspected in several bombings against U.S. citizens, Imad Mughniyeh, was killed in Damascus, Syria in February 2008. No one has taken responsibly for his death. Mohammad Ali Hamadi, who spent 18 years in a German prison for his role in the TWA hijacking, was released in December 2005 and was believed to be in Lebanon. The United States continued its efforts to bring him to trial before a U.S. court and has formally requested his extradition, although the U.S. does not currently have an extradition treaty with Lebanon. GRANT