LEBANON: SENATOR KERRY ENGAGES PRESIDENT SLEIMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000198 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO/PDAS WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: SENATOR KERRY ENGAGES PRESIDENT SLEIMAN OVER POLICY WITH SYRIA Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1. 4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a February 18 meeting with visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator John Kerry, President Michel Sleiman called upon Kerry to "take care of the Lebanese people," to support Arab reconciliation, and to press Israel to accept the Arab Initiative for Palestinian-Israeli peace. Sleiman emphasized that, in Lebanon, UNSCR 1701 was effective in containing violence during the Gaza crisis, although arms smuggling was a difficult problem to solve. ¶2. (C) Cautioning that Syria can be a "spoiler" in the region, and that it plays the role of both "hero and victim", Sleiman agreed with U.S. efforts for more dialogue with the Syrians. Sleiman professed a need to dismantle Syrian-supported Palestinian military bases such as Qoussaya, but said it must be done through negotiation with Syria, and not by force. On upcoming parliamentary elections, Sleiman noted the many election observers indicating interest in coming to Lebanon, and stated simply the "elections will be fine." End summary. PRIORITY ONE: PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI PEACE -------------- ¶3. (C) Senator John Kerry, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, and the Ambassador, accompanied by committee staff members Perry Cammack and Frank Lowenstein and PolOff, called on President Sleiman at Baabda Palace on February 18. Remarking on his policy priorities, Sleiman said to have overall peace in the region, Arab countries must first reconcile and work on common interests, otherwise "others interfere." He encouraged Kerry to press for a Palestinian-Israeli peace plan, and to use the Arab Initiative to support the effort. UNSCR 1701: IT WORKS BUT NOT PERFECTLY -------------- ¶4. (C) Sleiman responded to Kerry's concern on enforcement of UNSCR 1701 by saying that had 1701 not been in place and respected, the rocket attacks of January 8 and 14 from south Lebanon by unknown persons could have opened up a wider conflagration between Lebanon and Israel. Dodging questions about Hizballah being more armed than ever, Sleiman simply replied, "maybe, maybe." He responded to further questions on Syrian and Iranian arms smuggling by noting the difficulty of interdicting the flow. Even the "strong hand of Israel" cannot stop weapons smuggling into a small space like Gaza, he argued. SYRIA: "HERO AND VICTIM" WANTS A ROLE IN THE REGION -------------- ¶5. (C) Kerry, stating the "clock is ticking," addressed the U.S. Administration's willingness to get "deeply involved" in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. He asked Sleiman what role Syria might play. An "important role," Sleiman responded, saying Syria has many cards at hand and that any U.S., Arab or local initiatives needed Syrian backing to succeed. Kerry pressed Sleiman on what the Syrians might want, be it Golan or something else. Sleiman reiterated Syria wanted "a role". He observed that Syria had, like Lebanon, many confessions and was a more moderate society than many others. While the Syrians had many problems with the U.S. and Europe, he said, it was better for the West's policies in the region to include Syria than to have Syria in an Iranian camp. Sleiman added that good relations does not require giving in to every demand, but declared a U.S. policy of engagement with Syria "good." BEIRUT 00000198 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Sleiman observed that Syria did well playing the "hero" with Arab nations and a "victim" to others. Responding "nonsense" to Kerry's suggestion that Syrian deployments on the border some months ago were intended as a signal of some sort, Sleiman said Syria did not need to make a signal, it could come into Lebanon at will. Sleiman did acknowledge a problem with Fatah al-Islam as well as with other extremists in Palestinian bases near the border. It's a major problem between Lebanon and Syrian, Sleiman agreed, but said the issue would not be solved by force. There was "no reason" yet to attempt to dismantle them via military means, he declared. Dismantling them would require dialogue and pressure from Syria. He concluded, a Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) attack on the bases could cause other Palestinian camps in Lebanon to "explode." WHAT CAN THE U.S. DO FOR LEBANON? -------------- ¶7. (C) Sleiman spoke little about the upcoming June 7 parliamentary elections, remarking "we have many observers," and "we'll be fine." Sleiman thanked Kerry for U.S. military assistance, noting how crucial it was during the fight in Nahr al-Barid in 2006. He acknowledged that despite the change in U.S. administrations, he was confident U.S. support for Lebanon will continue. Kerry agreed, emphasizing commitment to Lebanon and that nothing will come at "the expense of Lebanon" vis-a-vis U.S. policies in the region. Kerry stressed the U.S. will have "real standards" for the Syrians to meet, and non-interference in Lebanese affairs will be one. Sleiman expressed gratitude, closing the meeting by commenting to Kerry "Take care of the Lebanese people." PRESS INTERACTION -------------- ¶8. (U) Senator Kerry met with press following his meeting with Sleiman. He noted that "...we remain steadfastly, firmly committed to the sovereignty and the independence of the democratic process in Lebanon. ...nothing, I can assure you, will occur that will come at the expense of our relationship with Lebanon and our support for a diverse, pluralistic, a democratic government. ...Syria (needs) to change its behavior. ...We want Syria to respect the political independence of Lebanon. We want Syria to help in the process of resolving issues with Hizballah and with the Palestinians. We want Syria to help us with (UNSCR) 1701 and the disarmament of Hizballah..." ¶9. (U) Kerry then engaged in a short informal conversation with local journalists. He heard a number of comments expressing serious concerns about prospects for instability and assassinations, and whether elections would take place on time. ¶10. (SBU) Senator Kerry did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. SISON