LEBANON: SENATOR KERRY ENGAGES PRESIDENT SLEIMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000198

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO/PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SENATOR KERRY ENGAGES PRESIDENT SLEIMAN
OVER POLICY WITH SYRIA

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.
4
(b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In a February 18 meeting with visiting Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Senator John Kerry, President
Michel Sleiman called upon Kerry to "take care of the
Lebanese people," to support Arab reconciliation, and to
press Israel to accept the Arab Initiative for
Palestinian-Israeli peace. Sleiman emphasized that, in
Lebanon, UNSCR 1701 was effective in containing violence
during the Gaza crisis, although arms smuggling was a
difficult problem to solve.


2. (C) Cautioning that Syria can be a "spoiler" in the
region, and that it plays the role of both "hero and victim",
Sleiman agreed with U.S. efforts for more dialogue with the
Syrians. Sleiman professed a need to dismantle
Syrian-supported Palestinian military bases such as Qoussaya,
but said it must be done through negotiation with Syria, and
not by force. On upcoming parliamentary elections, Sleiman
noted the many election observers indicating interest in
coming to Lebanon, and stated simply the "elections will be
fine." End summary.

PRIORITY ONE:
PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI PEACE
--------------


3. (C) Senator John Kerry, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman, and the Ambassador, accompanied by committee staff
members Perry Cammack and Frank Lowenstein and PolOff, called
on President Sleiman at Baabda Palace on February 18.
Remarking on his policy priorities, Sleiman said to have
overall peace in the region, Arab countries must first
reconcile and work on common interests, otherwise "others
interfere." He encouraged Kerry to press for a
Palestinian-Israeli peace plan, and to use the Arab
Initiative to support the effort.

UNSCR 1701: IT WORKS
BUT NOT PERFECTLY
--------------


4. (C) Sleiman responded to Kerry's concern on enforcement
of UNSCR 1701 by saying that had 1701 not been in place and
respected, the rocket attacks of January 8 and 14 from south
Lebanon by unknown persons could have opened up a wider
conflagration between Lebanon and Israel. Dodging questions
about Hizballah being more armed than ever, Sleiman simply
replied, "maybe, maybe." He responded to further questions
on Syrian and Iranian arms smuggling by noting the difficulty
of interdicting the flow. Even the "strong hand of Israel"
cannot stop weapons smuggling into a small space like Gaza,
he argued.

SYRIA: "HERO AND VICTIM"
WANTS A ROLE IN THE REGION
--------------


5. (C) Kerry, stating the "clock is ticking," addressed the
U.S. Administration's willingness to get "deeply involved" in
the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. He asked Sleiman what
role Syria might play. An "important role," Sleiman
responded, saying Syria has many cards at hand and that any
U.S., Arab or local initiatives needed Syrian backing to
succeed. Kerry pressed Sleiman on what the Syrians might
want, be it Golan or something else. Sleiman reiterated
Syria wanted "a role". He observed that Syria had, like
Lebanon, many confessions and was a more moderate society
than many others. While the Syrians had many problems with
the U.S. and Europe, he said, it was better for the West's
policies in the region to include Syria than to have Syria in
an Iranian camp. Sleiman added that good relations does not
require giving in to every demand, but declared a U.S. policy
of engagement with Syria "good."

BEIRUT 00000198 002 OF 002




6. (C) Sleiman observed that Syria did well playing the
"hero" with Arab nations and a "victim" to others.
Responding "nonsense" to Kerry's suggestion that Syrian
deployments on the border some months ago were intended as a
signal of some sort, Sleiman said Syria did not need to make
a signal, it could come into Lebanon at will. Sleiman did
acknowledge a problem with Fatah al-Islam as well as with
other extremists in Palestinian bases near the border. It's
a major problem between Lebanon and Syrian, Sleiman agreed,
but said the issue would not be solved by force. There was
"no reason" yet to attempt to dismantle them via military
means, he declared. Dismantling them would require dialogue
and pressure from Syria. He concluded, a Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) attack on the bases could cause other
Palestinian camps in Lebanon to "explode."

WHAT CAN THE U.S. DO FOR LEBANON?
--------------


7. (C) Sleiman spoke little about the upcoming June 7
parliamentary elections, remarking "we have many observers,"
and "we'll be fine." Sleiman thanked Kerry for U.S. military
assistance, noting how crucial it was during the fight in
Nahr al-Barid in 2006. He acknowledged that despite the
change in U.S. administrations, he was confident U.S. support
for Lebanon will continue. Kerry agreed, emphasizing
commitment to Lebanon and that nothing will come at "the
expense of Lebanon" vis-a-vis U.S. policies in the region.
Kerry stressed the U.S. will have "real standards" for the
Syrians to meet, and non-interference in Lebanese affairs
will be one. Sleiman expressed gratitude, closing the
meeting by commenting to Kerry "Take care of the Lebanese
people."

PRESS INTERACTION
--------------


8. (U) Senator Kerry met with press following his meeting
with Sleiman. He noted that "...we remain steadfastly,
firmly committed to the sovereignty and the independence of
the democratic process in Lebanon. ...nothing, I can assure
you, will occur that will come at the expense of our
relationship with Lebanon and our support for a diverse,
pluralistic, a democratic government. ...Syria (needs) to
change its behavior. ...We want Syria to respect the
political independence of Lebanon. We want Syria to help in
the process of resolving issues with Hizballah and with the
Palestinians. We want Syria to help us with (UNSCR) 1701 and
the disarmament of Hizballah..."


9. (U) Kerry then engaged in a short informal conversation
with local journalists. He heard a number of comments
expressing serious concerns about prospects for instability
and assassinations, and whether elections would take place on
time.


10. (SBU) Senator Kerry did not have an opportunity to clear
this cable.

SISON