LEBANON: TWO SHIA MINISTERS DISCUSS SLEIMAN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000188

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO/PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: TWO SHIA MINISTERS DISCUSS SLEIMAN'S
"LOST OPPORTUNITY"

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Shia Ministers of Administrative Reform Ibrahim
Shamseddine (independent) and Health Mohammad Khalifeh (Nabih
Berri's Amal) were mildly critical of President Sleiman
during separate meetings February 11 and 12. Both claimed
Sleiman had "lost an opportunity" to set a clear vision for
the government and to strengthen the office of the
presidency. Shamseddine and Khalifeh each highlighted
pragmatic reforms necessary for the government ministries to
function properly, but were not optimistic that any
substantive change would occur prior to the June 7
parliamentary elections.


2. (C) On their own electoral prospects, Shamseddine
confirmed his intention to run for an MP seat in Beirut,
although it would be an uphill battle. Khalifeh, on the
other hand was confident that Amal's candidates would fair
well in the south. Post-elections, Shamseddine said he would
prefer not to have a national unity government, while
Khalifeh argued that a national unity government was the only
real possibility to avoid trouble between the various
political factions, echoing a message that other opposition
politicians have been conveying recently. End summary.

SLEIMAN'S LOST OPPORTUNITY
--------------


3. (C) Shia Ministers of Administrative Reform Ibrahim
Shamseddine (independent) and of Health Mohammad Khalifeh
(Amal) both told the Ambassador and POLOFF that President
Michel Sleiman had "lost an opportunity" after the May 2008
Doha Agreement to strengthen his position and the role of the
presidency, in separate meetings February 11 and 12,
respectively. Shamseddine, named to the Council of Ministers
by March 14 but seen as independent, affirmed his belief that
"a strong state" was the most important institution for
Lebanon. Yet, he believed the state was severely weakened and
was undermined by the political factions who attempted to
place demands on Sleiman. Shamseddine said that while he
likes Sleiman personally, he criticized Sleiman for allowing
his election as a consensus choice for president to interfere
with the need to provide a "strict and clear" vision.


4. (C) Khalifeh, a close advisor to Speaker of Parliament
Nabih Berri, argued the following day that Sleiman should
have presented his own vision in the first weeks after his
election. Sleiman, in his opinion, should play a larger role
to guide Lebanon through the "transitional period" after Doha
and until the June 7 parliamentary elections, including to
push for implementation of reform. After Sleiman's election,
he said, Sleiman had a "window of opportunity" with local and
regional support behind him. However, it was clear the task
was becoming more difficult, he continued.

ACCOUNTABILITY, NOT POLITICS,
NEEDED FOR REFORM
--------------


5. (C) Shamseddine and Khalifeh, in their ministerial
positions, were also critical of the conduct of the Council
of Ministers (the cabinet). Shamseddine said that there were
at least four decrees drafted by his ministry that were still
awaiting discussion by the cabinet, including a proposal for
the establishment of an independent committee of judges to
investigate allegations of corruption. However, he was not
optimistic that any of these measures -- which he believed
were accomplishments for the ministry -- would be discussed
because of political opposition. Even if the measures were
defeated by a vote, he argued that they should at least be
discussed openly and all ministers should make their
positions known. Shamseddine told the Ambassador he wished
for a government where "rule of law and accountability
prevailed." He alleged that the current cabinet was
unhealthy and was not optimistic that any significant work

BEIRUT 00000188 002 OF 002


could be accomplished in the last 100 days before the
parliamentary elections on June 7.


6. (C) Meanwhile, Khalifeh said the government needed to
regain its identity as a "provider" for the people. Now, he
said, people view hospitals, schools or other public
institutions, as affiliates and extensions of political
parties or religious groups, instead of as part of the
government. He also complained that stagnation in the
government prevented reforms of important institutions, such
as providers of public health services, because rather than
hire "accountable" people as administrators, public
institutions were barred from hiring new employees due to
budget constraints.

ELECTORAL PROSPECTS
AND NATIONAL UNITY
--------------


7. (C) Shamseddine confirmed to the Ambassador that he
intended to run for an MP seat in the Beirut 2 electoral
district. He said that he was not seeking an alliance with
any other party or individual and preferred to remain
independent. (Note: The Beirut 2 electoral district has four
MP slots that are to be divided equally between the March 14
and March 8/Aoun blocs as part of a gentleman's agreement
struck in Doha. If the agreement holds, majority leader Saad
Hariri's March 14 coalition would take the Sunni seat and one
Armenian seat, while Hizballah's March 8 alliance would take
the Shia seat and the other Armenian slot. This would leave
no room for Shamseddine unless he allied with Hizballah,
which he has said he will not do. End note.) "Independent,"
he explained, does not mean unbiased. He repeated a common
refrain that he is closer to the ideals of March 14 than
March 8, but would not seek to be on the March 14 candidate
list. Shamseddine said he felt it was his duty to stand by
his principles and to represent the "real voices of the Shia
community."


8. (C) Khalifeh said Berri and the Amal candidates were well
positioned in the south, although some negotiations continue
with March 8 ally Michel Aoun and his Free Patriotic Movement
for certain Christian seats, especially in the mixed
Shia-Christian district of Jezzine. Khalifeh confided that
Berri would not "give up something for nothing," although
that was what he claimed Aoun sought from Berri in their
intra-opposition negotiation.


9. (C) On the issue of a future national unity government
after the parliamentary elections, Shamseddine was adamantly
opposed to the idea. He said there was a role for the
"opposition" -- whether it was March 8, March 14, or
independents -- to play, but should be distinct from the
majority. Conversely, Khalifeh described Lebanon as a "group
of undeclared federations, behaving as if they were
independent states," thus the only possible outcome should be
a national unity government to join the groups together.
However, he added that the whoever the personalities are, the
leaders must be "capable."

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Contacts in the health and pharmaceuticals
industries, as well as Khalifeh's own Director General at the
Ministry of Health, note that Khalifeh's management of the
ministry has been less than transparent. In the tradition of
his party leader Nabih Berri, he is rumored to be profiting
handsomely from his ministerial appointment. As with many
politicians in Lebanon, Khalifeh may be saying the right
things, but his motivation for real reform may not equal his
rhetoric. Shamseddine's reputation is spotless, but he has
not had much success winning approval of government reforms,
his portfolio, in the current national unity government. End
comment.

SISON