LEBANON: ARMENIAN TASHNAQ PARTY WANTS ITS OWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000185

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV LE SY IS SA
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ARMENIAN TASHNAQ PARTY WANTS ITS OWN
INDEPENDENT BLOC

REF: A. 08 BEIRUT 1781

B. 08 BEIRUT 1729

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a February 15 meeting with visiting Senate Foreign
Relations Committee staff member Perry Cammack and the
Ambassador, Armenian Tashnaq party leaders stressed that
their primary goal was the establishment of an independent
Armenian bloc in parliament, an objective which would be
facilitated by an alliance with Saad Hariri's Future Movement
and March 14. Nonetheless, they said, Hariri had not yet
shown any interest, primarily because of their demands that
Armenian candidates be chosen by Armenian parties (rather
than by Hariri),and that their bloc be allowed to vote
independently based on the needs of the Armenian community.
They highlighted that an Armenian bloc would be a "natural
center" in the politics of Lebanon, and could help achieve
consensus. They doubted Hariri would offer them an alliance
before the elections, and noted that Michel Aoun, in whose
bloc Tashnaq MPs currently sit, had thus far respected their
independence.


2. (C) The Tashnaq leaders assessed that Hizballah had not
lost support after taking up arms against their fellow
Lebanese on May 7, 2008 by casting the government's decision
to shut down the Hizballah communications network at that
time as a "pro-Israeli decision." They believed the best way
for the U.S. to help Lebanon in the coming months would be to
promote stability in the region, by facilitating a
reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Syria, pushing Israel
to withdraw from the Sheba'a Farms, and promoting
Israeli-Palestinian peace. End summary.

ARMENIAN PARLIAMENTARY BLOC?
HARIRI NOT INTERESTED
--------------


3. (C) Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member Perry
Cammack and the Ambassador, accompanied by POLOFF and
EconOff, called on Armenian Tashnaq SYG Hovig Mekhitirian,
Tashnaq MP Hagop Pakradounian, and former Tashnaq minister
Sebouh Hovnanian at their headquarters in Bourj Hammoud on
February 15. Mikhitirian stressed his community's pivotal
position in the upcoming electoral races in the Metn, Beirut,
and Zahle, and said his party hoped to be able to form an
independent Armenian bloc after the June elections. The
Tashnaq leaders explained that the best way to ensure the
formation of such a bloc would be an alliance between Tashnaq
and Future's Saad Hariri, and they expressed frustration that
Hariri had not reached out to them on such a possibility
despite their many efforts to seek a formal meeting.


4. (C) While Tashnaq's "old friend" Michel Murr, the Greek
Orthodox power broker from the Metn, had approached Hariri
repeatedly on the issue, Mekhitirian said they had heard
nothing from Hariri, who was resisting the idea of Armenian
parties (two of which are now allied with Future) choosing
their own candidates for the election, as well as the concept
of the independent bloc, which would not necessarily vote
with Future in parliament. Pakradounian complained that the
Armenians had suffered from the previous electoral
districting, under which Tashnaq candidates received as much
as 95% of the Armenian vote and a majority of the Christian
vote, yet lost because of Sunni voters casting their ballots
for Hariri's list and against Tashnaq. "The Armenian MPs do
not represent Armenians," said Pakradounian. (Note: Tashnaq
boycotted the 2005 elections in Beirut to protest this
phenomenon. The new electoral districting negotiated at Doha
in May 2008, dividing Beirut into three districts, should
improve Tashnaq's chances. End note.) Pakradounian added
that the Future Movement's Armenians are "on the payroll,"
and not given leeway to express the views of their community.
He noted that Tashnaq had tried as recently as May 2008 to
ally with the other two parties to be able to form a joint

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Armenian bloc, but Hariri would not let his allies
participate in such an alliance.

"WE ARE THE CENTRIST BLOC"
--------------


5. (C) While Mekhitirian said Tashnaq had not yet decided on
its lists, he did not believe Tashnaq would reach an alliance
with Hariri before the elections. Nonetheless, the leaders
expressed confidence that Tashnaq would increase its
representation in parliament beyond the two seats it now
holds by continuing its alliance with Free Patriotic Movement
(FPM) leader Michel Aoun. "We have no problem with Aoun,"
said Pakradounian. "We have an alliance but have kept our
independence, and he respects that." He recalled that he had
contacted Aoun on several occasions to express disagreement
on an FPM position, and Aoun had agreed to make his
statements on behalf of his party and not his bloc.


6. (C) Mekhitirian mentioned current discussions of a
potential independent or centrist list centered on support
for President Sleiman, and said he did not believe the
President would back such a list officially. "He told us he
will not interfere in the elections," added Pakradounian.
Nonetheless, Pakradounian claimed that historically, the
Lebanese parliament always had many groupings, and Tashnaq
was often at the center, a bridge that provided a basis for
stability in the parliament. "We are calm, moderate. We
believe in dialogue and equilibrium. We are the centrist
bloc," he said.


7. (C) In that vein, the leaders all expressed support for a
national unity government following the elections. They felt
strongly that the government should reflect the confessional
make-up of Lebanon, and rejected the idea of a government
that left out entire confessional groups, which would occur
should either side try to govern independently.

HIZBALLAH AFTER MAY 7
--------------


8. (C) Cammack asked the group if Hizballah had suffered any
loss of support following its use of weapons on fellow
Lebanese on May 7, 2008. Pausing for a moment to reflect,
the leaders collectively sighed and then shrugged.
Pakradounian said Hizballah escaped much criticism, because
it portrayed the event as the result of a provocation by the
GOL: the government was seen to have made a "pro-Israeli
decision" to shut down Hizballah's communications network,
which amounted to an attack on the "resistance." And in the
end, he added, the May 7 clashes led to the reconciliation at
Doha, which overtook previous events and allowed for the
election of President Sleiman, clearly a positive
development.

ADVICE ON U.S. POLICY
--------------


9. (C) When asked what U.S. policy initiatives might best
support Lebanon, Pakradounian said, "Unfortunately, the
Lebanese problems cannot be solved in Lebanon." The Tashnaq
leaders stressed the importance of reconciliation between
Saudi Arabia and Syria for ensuring that the Lebanese
elections go smoothly, given the two countries' support for
competing political forces in Lebanon. They asked for an
international push for an Israeli withdrawal from the Sheba'a
Farms, which would remove a pretext for Hizballah's weapons
and allow Hizballah's political allies to apply pressure on
it to disarm. Finally, they supported a strong drive for
Israeli-Palestinian peace, which would ease tension
regionally and potentially provide a solution to Lebanon's
difficulties with its Palestinian refugees.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Although Saad Hariri had told the Ambassador on
February 13 that he thought he would be seeing Tashnaq
"soon," FPM leader Michel Aoun told us on February 14 that

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"as far as I know, Tashnaq is still with me." End comment.

SISON