LEBANON: GAZA CONFLICT EXPOSES CHALLENGES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000170 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO PDAS WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS KPAL IR, LE, SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: GAZA CONFLICT EXPOSES CHALLENGES FOR HIZBALLAH REF: BEIRUT 161 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Hizballah successfully used the Gaza conflict to reinforce its own standing by talking tough against Israel but not drawing Lebanon into a second, and probably unpopular, war (reftel). However, the conflict exposed several challenges Hizballah faces, as it seeks to consolidate its strength in Lebanon. These include the contradiction of its allegedly pro-Palestinian and pan-Arab credentials against accusations of being an Iranian proxy, its claims to being a liberation movement against its own domestic agenda, and its credibility as a "resistance" against its quest for political legitimacy. End summary. IRANIAN vs ARAB CREDENTIALS -------------- ¶2. (C) Despite Hizballah's success in using the Gaza conflict to boost its own "resistance" credentials, the conflict also exposed several challenges Hizballah faces. First, Hizballah's strong verbal attacks against Egypt aroused Arab suspicions that Hizballah is pursuing an Iranian agenda, rather than a pro-Arab one. Hizballah's criticism of Egypt's refusal to open the Rafah border crossing resonated with some Lebanese, who heeded the call to protest outside the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut. Hizballah international relations officer Nawaf Moussawi criticized Egypt's preference for negotiations with Israel, repeating the Hizballah claim-to-fame that only the "resistance" has been successful in liberating territories. ¶3. (C) Critics responded by accusing Hizballah of being an Iranian lackey intent on sowing inter-Arab conflict instead of attacking Israel, with Egyptian press going so far as to call Nasrallah an Iranian agent. Hizballah again sided against Egypt and other moderate Arab states in pushing President Sleiman to attend the January 16 Doha meeting, viewed by many as an Iran/Qatari-sponsored initiative. Seeking political legitimacy in Lebanon, Hizballah will be at pains to convince the Lebanese that it is not an Iranian puppet. PALESTINIAN LIBERATION vs DOMESTIC AGENDA -------------- �A; ¶4. (C) While Hizballah unabashedly used the Gaza conflict to shore up its own "resistance" credentials, many in Lebanon do note believe it independently would have risked its weapons for the sole purpose of liberating Gaza. Amal Ghorayeb, a Hizballah expert and political science professor at Lebanese American University, noted that although defense of HAMAS was central to Hizballah's ideology, this should not be interpreted as a willingness to open a second front against Israel. Likewise, Yasser Elwy, an Egyptian diplomat in Lebanon, discounted the notion that a certain number of casualties in Gaza would mobilize Hizballah; rather, he said, "The more casualties there are, the more victorious HAMAS will appear at the end of the fighting." ¶5. (C) Indeed, Hizballah's strong statements in support of Hamas and the Palestinians in Gaza were not matched with action, leading some critics of Hizballah to ridicule Hizballah's "empty threats" and question its commitment to the Palestinian cause. Had the conflict continued, pressure on Hizballah to act probably would have increased, making it difficult to resist accusations that it was protecting Israeli's back while Palestinians perished in Gaza. Instead, despite the crippling blow to Hamas, Hizballah played the propaganda battle as it did in 2006, congratulating the group on its "Divine Victory." "RESISTANCE" vs POLITICAL LEGITIMACY BEIRUT 00000170 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶6. (C) Hizballah, potentially poised to win the June 7 parliamentary elections and fending off efforts to discuss its arms in the ongoing National Dialogue, and with its May 2008 aggression still on the minds of many Lebanese, also had to balance its quest for domestic legitimacy against what probably would have been an unpopular second conflict with Israel. At a time when Hizballah seem focused on Lebanon -- rather than the region -- the Gaza conflict was an ill-timed and unwelcome distraction. As one analyst put it, this is an "awkward time for military adventurism." UNSCOL Chief of Staff Jack Christofides opined that Hizballah would only undertake such an adventure to score a military victory or boost its own standing. He assessed that Hizballah's standing in the Arab world was at its peak and that the group did not believe it could win a military victory. Similarly Paul Salem, director of Carnegie Institute in Beirut, said Hizballah was in a "wait and see" mode pending domestic and regional developments. ¶7. (C) Observers viewed a safer course for Hizballah: use Gaza to sweep into power in Lebanon rather than launch a war it could not win. Hizballah knows that another military offensive could increase pressure domestically for it to disarm. By refraining from intervening in Gaza, it succeeded in drawing attention away from its arms, leaving the January 26 National Dialogue session to focus instead on Palestinian arms outside the camps. Having proven its military dominance in May, then succeeded at Doha in obtaining a blocking third for the opposition in cabinet and a new president unwilling to take on Hizballah's arms, and with the Gaza crisis reinforcing the legitimacy of the "resistance" in Lebanon, Hizballah appears to be continuing its efforts to consolidate its grip in Lebanon domestically as the best way to influence the regional balance of power. SISON