LEBANON: RELATIONS WITH SYRIA: COSMETIC CHANGES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000155 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER/GERMAIN NSC FOR MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: RELATIONS WITH SYRIA: COSMETIC CHANGES THUS FAR? REF: A. USUN 83 ¶B. BEIRUT 148 ¶C. BEIRUT 129 ¶D. BEIRUT 124 ¶E. BEIRUT 46 ¶F. 08 BEIRUT 1542 ¶G. 08 BEIRUT 1449 ¶H. 08 BEIRUT 1201 ¶I. 08 BEIRUT 1173 BEIRUT 00000155 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Six months after the August 13-14 summit in Damascus between President Michel Sleiman and Syrian President Bashar Asad (Ref H),there has been little substantive progress, from the Lebanese point of view, on any of the key bilateral issues: exchange of Ambassadors, border security cooperation, and Lebanese detainees in Syria. Syria is saying many of the right things, some Lebanese interlocutors believe, but many in Lebanon view this primarily as Syria's attempt to ingratiate itself with the international community, rather than demonstrating a sincere commitment to improving relations with Lebanon. ¶2. (C) Meanwhile, the steady stream of senior GOL official visits to Syria has not yet been reciprocated, leaving the Lebanese with the perception that Lebanon is still under Syrian tutelage. Furthermore, with the fourth anniversary of the February 14, 2005 assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri approaching, many Lebanese hope that the March 1 start date for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Ref A) will put an end once and for all to Syrian influence in Lebanon, although they are concerned that Asad continues to challenge the authority of the Tribunal. Finally, while it has been over a year since the last assassination of a March 14 figure, we are beginning once again to hear mounting anecdotal concerns about security threats against March 14 leaders. End summary. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: A ONE-WAY STREET -------------- ¶3. (C) Following the August 13-14, 2008 summit in Damascus, Lebanon and Syria formally established diplomatic relations on October 15. Syria fulfilled its pledge to open an embassy in Lebanon before the end of 2008, in what we see as the only tangible progress in the bilateral relationship. However, it has failed thus far to nominate an ambassador, leaving a First Secretary in charge of the mission, and waited until the last possible moment to grant agrement to Michel Khoury, Lebanon's current Ambassador to Cyprus and Ambassador-designate to Damascus. Speaking on LBC television on February 5, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt called the August summit a "quarter victory," referring to the opening of Syria's embassy in Beirut, which he labeled "a nest of spies next to my house." ¶4. (C) Meanwhile, there has been no further discussion regarding the fate of the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council, the umbrella organization covering numerous foreign, economic, and security relations between the two countries (Ref F). Although generally perceived by March 14 contacts as a mechanism for extending Syria's influence over Lebanon, they say now is not the time to challenge its authority, preferring not to upset the apple cart. Council Secretary General Nasri Khoury, however, continues to play a central role in the bilateral relationship, acting as liaison between the two countries and participating in GOL officials' meetings with Syrian counterparts in Damascus. ¶5. (C) The steady stream of GOL visitors to Damascus since August, most recently Defense Minister Elias Murr (Ref C) have not yet been reciprocated. Opposition leaders who have traveled to Syria include Youth and Sports Minister Talal BEIRUT 00000155 002.3 OF 004 Arslan (August 26),Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh (October 15),Agriculture Minister Elias Skaff (November 3),former PM Karame (September 10),and Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun (December 3-7). ¶6. (C) On the March 14 side, Information Minister Tarek Mitri and Culture Minister Tamam Salam attended November 16 conferences of Arab Information and Culture Ministers, respectively. Two of Sleiman's hand-picked ministers, Interior Minister Ziyad Baroud (November 10) and Defense Minister Elias Murr (January 28),traveled to Damascus to discuss border and security cooperation, as did Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Jean Kahwagi on November 29 and LAF Intelligence (G-2) head BG Edmond Fadl shortly before that. BORDER TALKS: ALL TALK, NO ACTION -------------- ¶7. (C) Despite receiving assurances from their Syrian counterparts that Syria intends to embark on a new era of relations with Lebanon, the delegations returned largely empty-handed. Baroud's visit followed Syrian troop deployments on the northern Lebanese border during extremist violence in Tripoli in October; the Syrians, who claimed the deployment was to prevent extremists from entering Syria and to crack down on smuggling, failed to notify the GOL of their actions, instead communicating through LAF Commander Kahwagi (Ref G). Baroud reportedly secured a commitment to reactivate the bilateral security committee. However, while the GOL has followed up by nominating representatives to the committee, we have seen no evidence of further bilateral cooperation. (Note: Smuggling, especially of fuel, has reportedly halted since September, but this is attributed to lower fuel prices rather than increased border controls. End note.) ¶8. (C) Defense Minister Murr claimed he was treated with "perfect" protocol during his visit, for this first time on equal terms with his counterpart rather than a Syrian "minion" (Ref C). On the Palestinian bases (Qousaya and Hilwe) straddling the Lebanese-Syrian border, Murr said President Asad refused to acknowledge that weapons were coming from Syria, but claimed the two countries would set up a joint team tasked with finding a solution to the situation of people living in the camps. Murr further claimed that both sides agreed to establish security checkpoints on both sides of the border, and hoped that changes would become visible on the ground quickly. We will continue to monitor this closely; however, we find it difficult to see how Lebanon's already stretched security forces will be able to staff the 82 checkpoints Murr claims he will establish in the next six months. NO PROGRESS ON DETAINEES -------------- ¶9. (C) Although Sleiman cited Lebanese detainees in Syria as one of his key priorities for the August 13-14 summit, there has been no progress on this issue. In an August 20 television interview, March 14 Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar said there were 745 detainees, divided into two categories: convicted criminals and victims of enforced disappearances." On September 7, the Syians responded with a list of names of 115 convicted Lebanese held in Syrian jails, with no reference to "enforced disappearances." ¶10. (C) According to the Lebanese NGO Support of Lebanese in Detention and Exile (SOLIDE),by end 2008 Syria still had not granted approval for Lebanese judges to visit the detainees, although it agreed in principle. Reflecting Lebanese frustration with the lack of progress on this issue was the recent formation of yet another advocate group in Lebanon, with a more pro-March 14 bent than the pro-Aoun SOLIDE (Ref E). Even Aoun, who hoped to bring hope detainees to bolster his own support domestically, failed to make headway. ALL EYES ON SPECIAL TRIBUNAL BEIRUT 00000155 003.2 OF 004 -------------- ¶11. (C) With the fourth anniversary of the February 14, 2005 assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri approaching, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) scheduled to begin on March 1, many March 14 leaders hold high hopes that the Tribunal will promote constructive change in Lebanon by implicating the Syrian regime and changing regional dynamics. However, they view Syrian President Asad's recent interview with al-Manar, in which he reiterated that Syrian citizens are subject only to Syrian jurisdiction, and that there must be an agreement on rights and obligations between the STL and Syria before Syria will cooperate with the Tribunal, as a challenge to the STL's authority. Jumblatt told his tv interviewer that President Asad "would not allow the (STL) to try even a sergeant in his regime." ¶12. (C) Meanwhile, some conspiracy theorists in Lebanon suggest the current row over wiretapping is an effort to hinder the GOL's ability to share evidence with the STL by arguing that the evidence was obtained illegally. Following a February 5 meeting of the parliamentary Media and Telecommunications Committee, Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar (March 14) confirmed that the STL had asked him to talk to Telecommunications Minister Gebran Bassil (Aoun) to facilitate information-sharing with the Tribunal. Former Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh (March 14) complained that the Ministry was "withholding" data related to "certain attacks." Jumblatt echoed this complaint, specifically accusing the Ministry of withholding data needed by UNIIIC to investigate the Hariri assassination and related crimes. "The side that controls the Ministry of Communications is hostile and affiliated with the Syrian regime," he told his television interviewer. MOUNTING SECURITY THREATS -------------- ¶13. (C) Most worrisome of all, an increasing number of March 14 leaders have confided to us in recent weeks that they are receiving warnings about their personal security. Both Walid Jumblatt and Samir Geagea (in addition to Saad Hariri) are staying close to home, as are March 14 MP Boutros Harb and independent Greek Orthodox MP Michel Murr, who only leaves his house under cover of darkness (Ref B). Independent (but close to March 14) MP Mansour Ilbon told us Harb has warned him to take precautions as well. Akkar MP Hadi Hobeich warned during a February 5 parliamentary session that two Tripoli MPs were under threat, and we also have heard separately that March 14 Tripoli MPs have received warnings of a Fatah al-Islam attack against them. EVIDENCE OF CONTINUED INTERNAL MEDDLING -------------- ¶14. (C) March 14 contacts cite Syrian opposition to a centrist parliamentary bloc as one reason President Sleiman is reluctant to openly support independent candidates. To the surprise of his March 14 colleagues, Defense Minister Elias Murr openly supported opposition (Aoun) Telecommunications Minister Gebran Bassil in the wiretapping affair, only days after he held an "unscheduled" tete-a-tete with President Asad, although he reportedly opposed Bassil during internal discussions. General Aoun contends he is not receiving external financing (Ref D),but many in March 14 believe he received Syrian assurances of support during his December visit, where, according to press reports, he received "royal treatment." COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Six months later, we view the changes in the Lebanese-Syrian relationship as cosmetic, thus far. While Syria continues to say many of the right things -- for the benefit of its international audience -- we see little evidence of progress on the ground in Lebanon. We expect both sides will be looking to the start-up of the STL as a BEIRUT 00000155 004.2 OF 004 clue to where the relationship is going. With its allies in the opposition apparently sitting comfortably with respect to the June 7 parliamentary elections, Syria has no incentive either to stir things up in Lebanon or cede ground to the March 14 government. March 14, pinning its hopes on the Tribunal, already is planning numerous local activities to celebrate the March 1 launch, while we view Asad's comments as a warning that Syria will not be easily pressured. SISON