Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT140
2009-02-03 18:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: MARONITE CHRISTIAN MP HARB ASSAILS UNITY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE 
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WAHDC PRIORITY 4142
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3427
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RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000140 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO/PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARONITE CHRISTIAN MP HARB ASSAILS UNITY
GOVERNMENT IF MARCH 8 TAKES CONTROL

REF: A. BEIRUT 108

B. BEIRUT 124

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000140 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO/PDAS WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARONITE CHRISTIAN MP HARB ASSAILS UNITY GOVERNMENT IF MARCH 8 TAKES CONTROL REF: A. BEIRUT 108 ¶B. BEIRUT 124 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a February 2 meeting with the Ambassador, Maronite Christian MP Boutros Harb acknowledged security threats against him serious enough to warrant a self-imposed confinement at home. He cautioned that Free Patriotic Movement leader (FPM) Michel Aoun "courts emotion" as a populist candidate, and was trying to use relations with Syria to increase his majority with March 8 Hizballah allies, but is worried over independent candidate lists developing in the June 7 parliamentary elections. ¶2. (C) Harb professed a need for "sacrifice and cooperation" among March 14 members, and confirmed that the leaders agreed to publicly declare their common platform on March 14. He worried, however, that elections could not be completed in one day as planned. If March 8 won the election, Harb believed a national unity government was impossible without a national unity "program," and opined that the current Lebanese government is a "constitutional heresy," unresponsive to people's needs. ¶3. (C) Calling Telecommunications Minister and Michel Aoun's son-in-law Gebran Bassil "dangerous," Harb believed Bassil was involved in the recent wiretapping scandal. On the National Defense Strategy, Harb discussed his proposal for disarming Hizballah, adding that arms in the hands of Palestinians must stop also. Harb cautioned Hamas in Lebanon was not strong enough to cause trouble, but it was not "at ease" either. He hoped the Obama administration would act strongly to bring peace between the Palestinians and Israelis, but was worried about the February 10 Israeli elections. End summary. HARB'S SAFETY ALREADY A CONCERN -------------- ¶4. (C) On February 2, the Ambassador, accompanied by PolMilOff, called on Maronite Christian MP Boutrous Harb at his residence. Harb admitted his personal security was threatened, and his self-imposed home confinement with departures only at night were measures taken to ensure his security. He said
his supporters understood the situation, and were making visits at his home. Harb cautioned that the elimination of particular March 14 candidates in districts such as his own of Batroun can "change the situation significantly," as they are difficult to replace. MICHEL AOUN: CRAZY, SCARED OR BOTH? -------------- ¶5. (C) Harb referred to Aoun as "crazy" in his kowtowing to Syria, and pronounced Aoun was courting voter "emotions" with promises to increase spending on social security, wage increases, and decreasing taxes on oil (Ref B). His tactics are careless and would "bankrupt" the country, he complained. Harb concurred with the Ambassador that Aoun is threatened by a potential independent bloc of candidates that could pull Christian voters away from March 8, and added that Aoun was using relations with Syria to increase his stature with Hizballah. ¶6. (C) He insisted the wiretapping issue involving Aoun's son-in-law and Telecommunications Minister Gebran Bassil, was an example of how "dangerous" Aoun was. (Note: This week, MP Walid Jumblatt accused Bassil of having knowledge of illegal wiretapping and withholding of information from security forces. Jumblatt alleged that a Surete Generale colonel with a "long history of wiretapping," and who was seeking information given by Bassil's ministry to the UN International Independent Investigation Committee (UNIIIC) on the assassination of former PM Hariri was protected by BEIRUT 00000140 002 OF 003 Bassil. The accusations were discussed at a February 2 meeting of security officials, the PM, and Ministers of Interior, Defense, and Justice. The issue was resolved without boiling over into an incident similar to the May 2008 Hizballah uprising in Beirut, when the GOL tried to sever Hizballah telecommunication lines. End Note.) INDEPENDENTS: TO BE OR NOT TO BE -------------- ¶7. (C) Harb assessed that President Sleiman would not involve himself with an independent list of candidates, which Harb believed could involve eight to ten seats. (Note: In an earlier meeting with Defense Minister Elias Murr (Ref A),the Ambassador heard a similar assessment of the number of deputies that might run in a independent grouping.) Harb was unsure whether independent candidates would actually run, however, the possibility was a serious concern for Aoun. Harb praised Sleiman as "good" and "wise," a person suited for the current times, but in the long run the country needed someone to "stand up" and allow Christians to feel "strength" in a leader. ELECTIONS: MARCH 14 NEEDS UNITY AND MORE TIME -------------- - ¶8. (C) Harb "hoped" a one day election could work, but he stated that Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General Kahwagi told him, "We cannot do it all in one day." Harb suggested a two-day period starting with southern districts and the Bekaa and then the rest of the country on a second day. (Note: Only Parliament can set the conditions for voting day periods. The one day period was set last November. End Note.) Harb emphasized that for March 14 to win in districts such as his own, Batroun, sacrifices must be made to accommodate the most electable candidates. ¶9. (C) He said Kataeb and Lebanese Forces (LF) leaders continue to squabble with each other, but we "will manage," he concluded. Harb was confident of his own victory in Batroun as one of the two Maronite candidates, and confirmed March 14 rather than February 14 for the party to publicly announce its common platform. Party members believed the later date was better suited to making the opposition less effective in contesting them. ¶10. (C) Harb said pessimistically that should March 8 win there would be "no unity government." He professed that unity government is a waste for Lebanon without a "unity program." The current government was a "constitutional heresy," he declared, citing the lack of a full 10 member Higher Judicial Council as one example of the current government's failures. Without a majority-led government, politics in Lebanon was like a "wrestling room," he remarked, and he wasn't convinced that Jumblatt wanted a unity government at all. He accused Aoun and Hizballah allies as proponents of unity government, using intimidation to paralyze the country to get their way. He added that to believe in the Taif Agreement, one must support the idea of a majority-led government. ISRAELIS VOTE: NETANYAHU WORRISOME AS PM -------------- ¶11. (C) Harb did not believe Iranian elections in Iran would lead to a change of leadership. On Israel, Harb worried that the Likud Party's Benjamin Netanyahu would become prime minister. He called Netanyahu "careless" and someone who would jeopardize any potential progress in peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Harb commented Israelis did not have enough faith in Tzipi Livni. Harb believed Ehud Barack would be a better PM for Israel, if it wanted to move forward to peaceful relations in the region. DISARMING PALESTINIANS AND HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶12. (C) Reflecting on the Gaza fighting, Harb surmised that BEIRUT 00000140 003 OF 003 Hamas in Lebanon was not strong enough in the Palestinian camps to cause trouble. He believed it important to disarm Palestinians, both in and outside the camps, especially if the country wanted someday to disarm Hizballah. Harb said there cannot be a double standard vis-a-vis Hizballah disarmament. Additionally, he noted, with Palestinians disarmed, Hizballah could not use their weapons as a legitimizing claim to their own militia. He implored the Syrians to stop protecting Palestinian bases on their border. (Note: The Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command, a group many suspect was behind the January 8 and 14 rocket firings into Israel, has three bases in Lebanon, two straddle the Syrian border and one in the Chouf. End Note.) ¶13. (C) Discussing his own multi-point proposal for a national defense strategy, Harb justified his position to take measures to "protect Hizballah leaders and cadres" if they did eventually disarm. He believed protection was warranted for them from Israeli retribution. He stressed, however, the best way to diminish Hizballah legitimacy was to bring peace to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. PRESIDENT OBAMA PLEASE TAKE NOTE -------------- 14 (C) Harb urged President Obama to show support for Lebanon and a regional peace process. He said without peace between Palestinians and Israel, Obama's efforts to convince Muslims the U.S. wants improved relations with the Middle East would not succeed. Harb declared that Lebanon alone could not solve the issues around disarming militias, UNSCR 1701, Syria, and Israel. Involvement by the U.S. administration was critical, he emphasized. COMMENT -------------- 15.(C) Locked down in his own home, Harb seemed resigned to his situation but was still confident about March 14's prospects in the elections. While not disavowing the lingering disputes between the Kataeb and Lebanese Forces parties, Harb believed it would all come together by June. Despite Harb's outreach to the opposition in the past, most notably recently in 2007 when he had aspirations of being the "consensus" presidential candidate, Harb sounded very March 14 during this meeting. He is not the only candidate receiving threats; Walid Jumblatt, Samir Geagea and, as always, Saad Hariri, are also taking precautions. End comment. SISON

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