PM HARIRI URGES INCREASED MILITARY AID

S E C R E T BEIRUT 001358

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER UNSC PBTS KPAL MARR MASS IS LE
SUBJECT: PM HARIRI URGES INCREASED MILITARY AID

REF: A. BEIRUT 1334

B. BEIRUT 1351

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: The U.S. must fully support the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) to enable it to implement UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad
Hariri told the Ambassador and visiting Special Coordinator
for Regional Affairs Frederic Hof on December 18. Lebanon
would seek military equipment where available, Hariri
underscored, including China or Russia. Hariri expressed his
concern that ISRAEL would attack Lebanon to divert pressure
on it to return to the negotiation table, but he assessed
that Hizballah would not attack ISRAEL unless Iran were
confronted militarily. Hariri said that Lebanon wished to
move from a cessation of hostilities to a ceasefire with
Israel, but an armistice agreement was out of the question
without Israel's withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms, he
emphasized. End summary.

HARIRI: LAF NEEDS RESOURCES TO IMPLEMENT UNSCR 1701
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The U.S. must fully support the LAF despite some
strategic differences, Hariri insisted. During the period of
Syrian hegemony, Lebanon "outsourced" its security to Syria,
and the LAF was still being rebuilt, he argued. "How can the
LAF implement UNSCR 1701 when it's not mobile?" he queried.
The solution, he posited, was a "Marshall Plan" for the LAF.
Without that level of commitment from the U.S., he added,
"You can't ask why we have not implemented 1701." The U.S.
had extended generous support to the LAF, Hariri conceded,
but if it really wanted to help Lebanon, it would give more
so that the LAF would be a credible force as compared to
Hizballah. The Ambassador underscored the U.S. desire to
strengthen the LAF so that the LAF could help secure the
sovereignty and territory of Lebanon. Hariri said he shared
the United States' vision of a lighter, more agile LAF, but
emphasized the LAF still needed more equipment. The
Ambassador noted the importance of the planned February 2010
Joint Military Commission in developing a long-term LAF
strategy.


3. (C) Lebanon would seek equipment where available, Hariri
continued, enumerating possibilities such as purchasing radar
from Russia and upgrading the LAF's tanks via purchases from
China or Russia. Hariri revealed his desire to obtain
helicopters from Russia instead of the promised MIG-29s.
(Note: We have heard that the Russians refused this request
and are focused on the lucrative service package the MIGs
will yield after the initial gratis five-year sustainment
package expires. End note.) The Ambassador emphasized the
value of ensuring inter-operability of LAF systems,
particularly given the robust U.S.-sourced LAF inventory.

FEARS OF STALLED PEACE TALKS
--------------


4. (S) The current lack of progress on regional peace was
"giving the extremists more arguments," Hariri complained.
He, as well as the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were
confronting allegations that the peace process had
accomplished "nothing," he explained, all while Iran was
extending its influence in the region. Hariri repeatedly
asked why the U.S. opposed Palestinian reconciliation, and
Hof explained the administration's deep commitment to
achieving a solution while maintaining the Quartet
principles. Hariri expressed his concern that Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would seek to relieve
international pressure on him to return to the negotiating
table by attacking Lebanon as a diversionary tactic, and he
called for U.S. help "to control Israel." Hof discounted
Netanyahu making such a move. Hariri responded that he
believed that Hizballah would not risk another war because of
pressure from its constituents in south Lebanon. He also
claimed that Hizballah had assured him that it would not
launch any attacks in the Shebaa Farms region unless Iran
were attacked, and he wagered that the militia would not take
any action if only sanctions were placed on Iran.

NO ARMISTICE WITHOUT SHEBAA FARMS
--------------


5. (S) Lebanon would seek a ceasefire with Israel, Hariri
stated, and the anticipated return of occupied Ghajar would
be a step to regaining the Shebaa Farms. The U.S. "must
corner Israel" on the issue of moving from a cessation of
hostilities to a ceasefire with Lebanon, he urged. Taking
such a step in the context of UNSCR 1701 would "put more
pressure on Israeli thoughts of aggression," he assessed.
Although an armistice was "a long way off," three years of
relative quiet since the 2006 war had opened the way to
progress, he explained, adding that Lebanon would not accept
an armistice agreement without obtaining Shebaa Farms. When
Hof queried Hariri on Syria's attitude toward Lebanon's
obtaining Shebaa Farms directly from Israel, Hariri responded
that the Syrians had been clear with his Saudi
intermediaries: Syria stood ready to demarcate the entire
Syrian-Lebanese border with the exception of the Shebaa
Farms. Hariri added that he would do the same if he were in
Syria's position, and he pointed to negotiations initiated by
former Israeli PMs Menachem Begin and Itzhak Shamir as
evidence that the U.S. should coerce ISRAEL to return to the
negotiating table with the Syrians and Palestinians since
"Netanyahu isn't worse than Begin or Shamir." Hof
underscored that the U.S. was very active in its attempts to
restart negotiations.


6. (U) Special Coordinator for Regional Affairs Frederic Hof
has cleared this cable.

SISON