CABINET STATEMENT SIGNED, HARIRI FACES BUMPY ROAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 001271 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM KISL LE SUBJECT: CABINET STATEMENT SIGNED, HARIRI FACES BUMPY ROAD AHEAD Classified By: CDA, a.i. Thomas F. Daughton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The new Lebanese cabinet finally settled on its ministerial statement -- a policy roadmap -- on December 2, but the second-guessing about how Prime Minister Saad Hariri reached that point is already well underway. Embassy interlocutors argue that Hariri made several missteps during the government formation process, though most acknowledge that any pro-March 14 Sunni prime minister would have faced significant opposition-imposed obstacles in the path towards a cabinet. The six-month long cabinet turmoil weakened Hariri's hand as a strong prime minister with full cabinet support, they say, and his choice of certain ministers caused dissension among his coalition allies and even within his own party. Moving forward, most expect that Hariri will push for action on issues that will gain support from the opposition, leaving contentious issues -- such as Hizballah's arms -- to the National Dialogue table. The grumbling aside, Sunni contacts say Hariri has not lost the support of his confessional base. Many predict, however, that the difficulties Hariri faced in reaching the December 2 signing of the cabinet statement will not go away. END summary. NEGOTIATING MISSTEPS -------------- ¶2. (C) Lebanese politicians point to several key mistakes early in the cabinet formation process that they say weakened PM Hariri's hand from the outset. Future Movement MP Jamal Jarrah argues that Hariri, by agreeing in July to a 15-10-5 cabinet formulation and re-election of Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri absent a "package deal," sold all the majority's bargaining chips before even starting negotiations. Jarrah and other MPs have also argued that Hariri should not have stepped in so quickly as prime minister. If Hariri had first proposed the return of previous PM Fouad Siniora -- who is bitterly disliked by the opposition -- Hariri would have been able to exact concessions in exchange for taking Siniora's place, they claim. Contacts from across the political spectrum opine as well that Hariri set the bar too high with his early refusal to allow former Telecom Minister Gebran Bassil (now given the Ministry of Energy and Water) to maintain his post, weakening himself when he later had to back down. DETAILS CAUSE DISSENSION AT HOME -------------- ¶3. (C) The November selection of cabinet ministers also caused dissension within the ranks of Hariri's March 14 coalition. Kataeb leader Amine Gemayel openly considered abstaining from the government to protest receiving only one ministry, and Kataeb Minister Salim el Sayegh did not attend the first official cabinet photo session. Following Hariri's selection of Mohammad Rahhal as Minister of Environment, Future Movement committee members from the Bekaa -- Rahhal's native area -- resigned in protest at his selection. They argued that Rahhal, a member of Future for only a year after a falling-out with opposition West Bekaa Sunni politician Abdel Rahim Mrad (and a lawyer with no background in environmental issues),was a poor selection for minister. In an official meeting to inform Hariri of their resignations, the committee demanded that Hariri form a small group of West Bekaa Future members to inform him on future appointments. ¶4. (C) The ministerial statement -- signed December 2 but still pending a vote of confidence from parliament -- drew vocal criticism from March 14 Christians. Future MP Ahmed Fatfat noted publicly that even many Sunni MPs shared the Christians' concerns regarding the role of the "resistance" (i.e., Hizballah) in Lebanon. Jarrah said he agreed with Lebanese Forces (LF) and Kataeb objections about the "resistance" clause but would remain quiet in support of Hariri. When the draft statement was presented to the entire cabinet, the "resistance" language prompted four March 14 ministers to express their formal "reservations" and one March 14 independent to cast the lone vote against it. At a ceremony the evening of December 2 marking the 1989 assassination of Lebanese President Rene Mouawad, the late president's March 14-allied son gave a speech strongly criticizing the statement's handling of the issue of Hizballah's arms and accusing Hariri -- who was sitting in the front row -- of marginalizing March 14 Christians in the cabinet formation process. FACTOR OF THE JOB, NOT THE MAN -------------- ¶5. (C) Despite what they see as Hariri's mistakes, most contacts admit that the prime minister probably achieved as much in the END as he could have. Faisal Karami, son of former Prime Minister Omar Karami and part of the Tripoli opposition, argued that if Hariri, with 75% support, had faced such difficulties forming a cabinet, no other Sunni leader would have found the task easier. MP Fatfat assessed that Hariri chose not to push for a majority government because of tense regional circumstances; a national unity government was the only way to "protect the internal." LF politician Joseph Nehme regarded the final cabinet distribution as better for March 14 than the government formed after the 2008 Doha agreement. On the December 2 ministerial statement, Fatfat acknowledged that the reservations lodged by Christian ministers weakened Hariri's image as a strong leader of a unified cabinet, but he assessed that the language regarding the resistance was the strongest that would have been accepted by all parties. ¶6. (C) Former Justice Minister Bahije Tabbareh, Future MP Mohammed Qabbani and others have also blamed President Michel Sleiman throughout the past six months of cabinet formation. Lebanon's president and prime minister shared identical authorities regarding cabinet formation, Tabbareh said, and Sleiman should have worked with Hariri to name a cabinet quickly. In Tabbareh's view, Sleiman's refusal in September to accept a list without opposition approval changed the interpretation of the constitution, which calls only for the prime minister and the president to select ministerial names. Tabbareh expected that Hariri's move to allow the opposition to pick its own ministers would set a precedent for cabinet formation in the future and would weaken the ability of future prime ministers and presidents to control the process. LONG ROAD AHEAD -------------- ¶7. (C) Hariri has promised to push an economic agenda as prime minister and, although hopeful, many Lebanese expect that Beirut's usual political games will obstruct, or at a minimum slow, progress on hard issues. Druze Minister of State Wael Abou Faour glumly told polchief that the new government was "born dead." According to Karami, the extended cabinet formation process exposed a lack of confidence among Lebanon's political factions, indicating an environment in which Karami doubted that Hariri would be able to govern. Although in Karami's opinion Hariri was "serious, willing, and had a plan," he had lost all leverage during the cabinet debate. Fatfat expected that discussions on administrative appointments -- more than 50% of director general and other senior level positions currently are unfilled -- would be the first real test for the cabinet. Contacts from across the political spectrum acknowledge, however, that Hariri's open lines of communication with the opposition probably will help prevent disagreements from escalating. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) The political roller coaster of the last six months has predictably provoked disappointment and disillusionment among a number of Hariri's allies. Most of our contacts nonetheless expect Hariri to achieve some success in pushing an economic agenda through the government, but they believe he will opt to refer sensitive issues, especially Hizballah's arms, to the National Dialogue. After initially setting the bar too high -- with such things as a strong stance against Bassil's participation in the cabinet that he was later forced to recant -- Hariri now appears to have accepted opposition-imposed parameters, including a de facto blocking veto, on his premiership. Sunni contacts have pointed out Hariri's mistakes along the way and many were strongly critical of his negotiating ability, but the absence of any real challenge to his leadership in the Sunni community and a general acknowledgement of opposition intransigence in the cabinet formation process probably will prevent any long-lasting damage to Hariri's reputation among his Sunni base. Many nonetheless expect that the fractiousness revealed during the cabinet formation process will continue to dog Hariri as he starts to govern. DAUGHTON