LEBANON: AOUN SETTING THE STAGE TO CHALLENGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000124 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR I/O PDAS WARLICK P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN SETTING THE STAGE TO CHALLENGE ELECTION RESULTS? REF: 08 BEIRUT 1682 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a January 28 meeting with the Ambassador, Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun complained that Sunni Future Movement leader Saad Hariri planned to pay to fly in expatriate Christian voters to vote against Aoun in the June parliamentary elections. Aoun dismissed the idea that an independent or centrist political bloc could be a positive force in Lebanese politics. He believed an electoral arrangement between himself and the Murr family might be possible for the elections, particularly given his historical links to Defense Minister Elias Murr. He described his progress in developing electoral lists in concert with his coalition partners, including Hizballah. ¶2. (C) Aoun criticized March 14 for not doing enough to prevent the permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and outlined once again the thinking behind his national defense strategy. He described the Arab Peace initiative as "suspended, not dead." He was unsure why Syria had not yet appointed an ambassador to Lebanon. He described coordination between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was excellent. End summary. COUNTERING HARIRI'S PLOY -------------- ¶3. (C) On January 28, the Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief and EconOff, called on FPM leader Michel Aoun at his home in Rabieh. Aoun voiced concerns about security during the upcoming parliamentary elections on June 7. He assessed that there would not be enough civil service and security personnel to carry out the elections in one day, and wondered why the majority had pushed so hard for one-day elections without the resources to carry them out. He professed to be more worried, however, about reports that Future Movement leader Saad Hariri was planning to use his significant resources to fly in not only fellow Sunnis, but also Christians, to vote against Aoun and his allies in the elections. He lamented that he did not have funds to fly in his own expatriate supporters, and said that despite rumors to the contrary, he was receiving no outside funding from Iran for such tactics. He complained that the majority had purposely pushed off the decision to allow Lebanese expatriates to vote in their countries of residence until it was too late to put the systems in place to support overseas voting. ¶4. (C) Aoun highlighted the ambitious legislative agenda he had introduced to parliament as one way he might counter Hariri's tactics. Of the five laws he has submitted, so far only one had been passed, granting the payment of arrears to government employees and increasing salaries in certain government sectors. Four others, on pension plans for the elderly, social security, restrictions on foreign ownership of property, and lowering the gas excise tax, await a vote, and Aoun said he would personally lead the parliamentary debate on these topics. He hoped his attempt to secure improvements on these issues of social importance would attract support, and by getting the word out on the FPM website and on television, perhaps convince some overseas voters to stay home rather than accept Hariri's offer to fly to Lebanon and vote against him. INDEPENDENTS: "I AM NOT SURE WHAT THEY ARE" -------------- ¶5. (C) Aoun rejected the idea of "independent" or "centrist" candidates creating a viable political bloc in Lebanon. He called the concept of "centrist" indefinable, and said that in the current political atmosphere, politicians needed to choose a clear path. He pointed out that some "independents" BEIRUT 00000124 002 OF 004 were funded by March 14, and claimed that by calling themselves independents, candidates were trying to destroy political forces, rather than working with them as a positive force for change. He noted that he had many disagreements with Hizballah, but assessed that his 2006 memorandum of understanding with it had led to its restraint in the recent Gaza conflict. ¶6. (C) Pol/Econ Chief asked Aoun how he would define President Michel Sleiman in the context of Aoun's rejection of "centrists." Aoun replied that Sleiman had been elected as a consensus candidate, and was forced to govern as such. This means, said Aoun, that Sleiman does not have much room for maneuver and will work "only within the legal limits of his position." ARRANGEMENT WITH MURR? -------------- ¶7. (C) Aoun said that despite a "rather negative" relationship with independent Christian leader Michel Murr, he believed he might be able to come to some sort of limited agreement with the Murr family on parliamentary seats in the heavily Christian Metn district. He based this belief on a special bond he said he had formed with Murr's son Elias, the current Defense Minister, when, according to Aoun, he "saved Elias from being executed by Samir Geagea." (Note: Elias Murr was reportedly with Lebanese Forces leader Elie Hobeika in 1986, when LF rival Geagea sent fighters against Hobeika for participating in tripartite talks in Damascus with the Amal militia and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. Aoun sent troops in to assist Hobeika and Murr. End note.) As a result, said Aoun, "we cannot be enemies." While he stressed any accord would be very limited in scope, Aoun believed he could come to an agreement with Elias Murr. ¶8. (C) Aoun said he was working with Hizballah and his March 8 partners in determining candidate lists. Although he said he and Hizballah do not overlap in many districts in Lebanon, he noted hat they had made some decisions on who would chose candidates in the areas where their candidates might conflict, such as Baabda. He said his lists across Lebanon, which will be predominantly Christian, would likely include a total of three Shia, one Sunni, and one Druze, who, if elected, might not sit in his parliamentary group once parliament convened, but would support his initiatives on the national level. TAWTEEN -------------- ¶9. (C) Aoun criticized the March 14 majority for not doing enough to prevent the permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (tawteen). He said March 14 's proposal to require parliamentary unanimity (vice the usual two-thirds majority) to amend the constitutional preamble prohibiting tawteen would do nothing to prevent the permanent resettlement of the Palestinians, unless the GOL engaged with the international actors who will determine the fate of Palestinians' right of return to Israel. He claimed that although Lebanon is a country of massive emigration, the countries that host Lebanese across the world have physical space and sufficient population to absorb them, while Lebanon cannot absorb 400,000 Palestinians. (Comment: Aoun appears to have changed tack following the majority's clear position against tawteen; whereas before he accused March 14 of supporting tawteen, he now argues it is not doing enough to prevent external forces from imposing permanent resettlement on Lebanon. End comment.) ¶10. (C) Aoun touched briefly on the recent regional debate over whether the Arab Peace Initiative could still move forward or should be scrapped. He noted that the initiative had been suspended since its initial presentation, because the Israelis had not officially responded to the offer, though they had indeed leaned toward rejecting it. He pointed to President Sleiman's defense of the initiative in the face of Arab voices calling for its withdrawal, and said that though the initiative might look dead, "in politics, any BEIRUT 00000124 003 OF 004 death can be resuscitated." NATIONAL DIALOGUE: DEFENSE STRATEGIES -------------- ¶10. (C) Aoun noted that since he had presented his national defense strategy at the National Dialogue session in November (reftel),Samir Geagea and Boutros Harb had presented alternative visions of the strategy. He said his strategy starts from a very different principle from the others': while they base their strategies on the idea of demobilization of Hizballah into a national army (the LAF), his starts with the idea of the national resistance. He stressed once again that any external threat to Lebanon, because of the country's size and geography, would require guerrilla tactics in order to defeat it, something the LAF is not prepared to use. He reiterated his vision that the LAF should be used to counter internal threats. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador asked Aoun how he viewed the level of coordination between the LAF and UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon. Aoun responded that coordination was excellent, and that UNIFIL served as "moral authority" to the LAF in its operations south of the Litani River. He said Hizballah had told him it fully accepts the UNIFIL presence. WHERE IS THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR? -------------- ¶12. (C) Noting that Defense Minister Elias Murr was in Syria on an official visit, Aoun had no information on why the Syrian government has not yet appointed an ambassador to Lebanon. He said his impression during his December visit to Syria was that relations between the two countries were back on track, and he was perplexed as to why the Syrian ambassador had not yet arrived. He assessed that the Syrians often speak using "the language of silence," though he said he was not aware of what the Syrians might be wanting or expecting before making the appointment. He believed President Sleiman might be in a better position to know, and acknowledged that Syria's acceptance of Lebanon's ambassadorial appointment to Damascus, Michel Khoury, was a good sign. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Already we see signs that Aoun is setting the stage to challenge the electoral results should they not go in his favor. (Note: To this day, he challenges 11 seats from the 2005 elections. End note.) His "concerns" about security and the majority's financing and facilitation of expatriates' return to Lebanon to vote belie the fact that the opposition has its own much better financed and organized electoral machine, not to mention media. Furthermore, we doubt Aoun's claim that he himself does not benefit from external financing. ¶14. (C) We will continue to watch the Murr/Aoun/Tashnaq relationship closely. While independent MP Michel Murr (whom the Ambassador will see on February 2),continues to assert that he will not/not ally with Aoun, there is rampant speculation that his son Elias is still undecided. At a dinner we attended hosted by Saad's advisor Ghattas Khoury, and also attended by Druze MPs Walid Jumblatt, Marwan Hamadeh, Wael Abu Four, and National Liberal Party chief Dory Chamoun, the March 14 contacts suggested that Elias' January 28 trip to Damascus, during which, to no one's surprise, he had an unscheduled meeting with Syrian President Bashar Asad, would impact Elias' decision. ¶15. (C) Finally, we have heard from several sources that the opposition, like March 14, also is facing internal squabbling over candidate selection, Aoun's assertions to the contrary notwithstanding. In Christian districts like Jezzine, for example, we have been told that Aoun is not happy with Hizballah's insistence on calling the shots. The much more disciplined opposition, however, is less likely to air its BEIRUT 00000124 004 OF 004 dirty laundry publicly in order to present a unified front, a lesson the majority could learn from. End comment. SISON