ISF POLICE STATION OPENED IN NAHR AL-BARID CAMP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001201 SIPDIS DEPT FOR INL/AAE ALSO FOR PRM/ANE AND NEA/ELA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2014 TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV PTER KPAL LE SUBJECT: ISF POLICE STATION OPENED IN NAHR AL-BARID CAMP Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Lebanese government intends to begin policing inside Palestinian refugee camps for the first time since 1969, starting with the Nahr al-Barid camp, thanks to a USG pledge to fund the construction of a police station and train the Internal Security Forces (ISF) in community policing. ISF Director General Rifi informed us recently that the ISF has already established a limited presence in the camp; he requested USG assistance to provide temporary housing and office space for the unit. After consulting with the other stakeholders, we have concluded that despite numerous challenges, there is general acceptance of the ISF presence in the camp. The challenges include a continuing lack of dialogue among the stakeholders on the role of the ISF in the camp; the lack of a plan for transfer of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) policing authorities to the ISF; and a lack of training in community policing for the ISF officers currently assigned to the camp. The placement of the ISF in the camp remains a high-risk endeavor, but USG technical assistance can help smooth the way. End Summary. TRANSITION OF SECURITY FROM LAF TO ISF BEGINS -------------- ¶2. (C) Director General of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) General Ashraf Rifi advised incoming INL Director on October 7 that the ISF has established a platoon-strength presence within the new camp at Nahr al-Barid. (Note: The new camp is adjacent to the "old," i.e. original, Nahr al-Barid camp, which was destroyed in May 2007 fighting between Lebanese forces and Palestinian extremists. End note.) Rifi urgently requested USG assistance to provide two trailers for office space and housing. The ISF will exercise security control within the camp and control of the external checkpoints will transition from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to the ISF sometime in the future. General Sami Nabhan (head of ISF operations) echoed Rifi on October 15, adding that the ten-member ISF contingent had used several trailers in Nahr al-Barid but needed more to accommodate current needs and future growth. According to Nabhan, the ISF has deployed at the request of the LAF. The next step in transferring the LAF's role to the ISF, Nabhan explained, is for the ISF and the LAF jointly to man one or two checkpoints, although Nabhan did not expect that to occur in this calendar year. The ISF intends to employ a community policing approach, he added, though none of the ten-officer ISF contingent currently in the camp has completed ongoing INL-sponsored training on community policing. UNRWA SKEPTICAL OF ISF ACCEPTANCE IN CAMPS -------------- ¶4. (C) UNRWA Lebanon Director Salvatore Lombardo was skeptical of the security transition, assessing that many issues with the divided Palestinian community needed to be worked out before an ISF presence within the new camp would be accepted. Lombardo said on October 19 that with work on the old camp stalled by a lawsuit (ref A),some of the 18 factions within the camp are firmly opposed to the ISF presence. (Note: The GOL decided on October 23 that reconstruction in the old camp could resume. End note.) Lombardo recommended that the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) and the Palestine Liberation Organization promote the gradual acceptance of the ISF and the community policing concept. Lombardo judged that there is currently no relationship between the ISF and the Palestinian community in the camp. ¶5. (C) Two Palestinian representatives from the Follow-up Committee for the Reconstruction of the Nahr al-Barid Camp told INL Director in the same meeting that most of the factions in the camp accept the ISF presence, but have numerous questions about the scope of its authority and planned activities. They noted concern that the ISF would begin to enforce building permit violations and professional licenses, both of which fall under the ISF mandate but have not been enforced in the camps. They complained that since Palestinians cannot own land or hold professional licenses in Lebanon, enforcement of these provisions of Lebanese law by the ISF could cause problems. Thus, they suggested, the ISF BEIRUT 00001201 002 OF 003 should address only security issues and leave all other social and economic issues to be resolved by the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee. The two Palestinians also inquired about the mechanism to be used to implement the community policing concept. GOL-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE NOT VERY FRIENDLY -------------- ¶6. (C) Ziad el-Sayagh, senior advisor to the LPDC's Ambassador Makkawi, asked in the UNWRA meeting that the Palestinian groups prepare a list of concerns to be taken under consideration by the LPDC, stressing that Lebanese sovereignty will be exercised in all of Lebanon, including the camps. The Palestinians may govern themselves, but security will be handled by the ISF, he asserted. When asked if the LPDC had engaged in outreach to the Palestinian residents in the camp about the ISF deployment, el-Sayagh replied tersely, "They have been notified." ¶7. (C) The Palestinian representatives replied that they wished to avoid problems with the ISF deployment, but they noted that the camps in Lebanon are related and communicate with one another. Although there are no arms in Nahr al-Barid, they pointed out, any problems in the camp will be reflected in the other camps, where there are weapons. The Palestinians said that satisfaction of their demands for basic civil rights in Lebanon -- such as the right to work, own property, or obtain health care -- were the key to the deployment of GOL security forces within the refugee camps. (Note: Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri has told us separately that giving civil rights to Palestinian refugees will be one of his early priorities after forming a government (ref B). End note.) Alastair Harris, an advisor to the GOL on security and refugee camp issues, asserted in a meeting with INL on October 22 that the GOL dialogue process with the Palestinians was a failure, with much mistrust among all sides. SITUATION IN THE CAMP CALM BUT ROLES UNCLEAR -------------- ¶8. (C) UNRWA Deputy Project Manager in Tripoli Mohammed Abdel Al told us on October 29 that there have been no problems with the ISF presence in Nahr al-Barid to date and that Popular Committee members have paid courtesy calls on the ISF contingent in the camp. The Palestinian community has a poor relationship with the LAF and loathes the onerous security restrictions at the checkpoints circling the camp, Abdel Al reported. The LAF soldiers do not understand the Palestinian people, he declared, and the community expects the ISF, whose officers are local hires and viewed as more flexible, to be a better alternative. Even though the ISF needs to explain its role and establish a positive relationship through town hall meetings, focus groups and other outreach, he said, there is currently no dialogue. If the ISF presence failed in Nahr al-Barid, there will be problems in all the other camps, he added. When asked if the UNRWA would be willing to facilitate such community dialogue and outreach, Abdel Al demurred, saying he didn't wQt the UNRWA to be seen as working with the police. That is a job for the LPDC, he asserted, which should come to the camp to interface with the Popular Committee instead of working from Beirut. Abdel Al advised delaying work on the police station in the camp until the dialogue process is well underway. While the Palestinians are aware that the USG is funding construction of the police station and conducting training in community policing, he advised the U.S. keep a low profile and avoid becoming directly involved in the dialogue process. ¶9. (C) At the camp itself, we found the ISF contingent working from three concrete containers on a small field adjacent to the site of the planned police station. Conditions are primitive, with a field kitchen outdoors. The unarmed ten-officer contingent at the camp has no duties other than to set up the police outpost, so policing within the camp continues to be performed by the LAF. Local ISF commander Brigadier General Mohammed Alameddine said that he needs two more concrete containers for offices and sleeping quarters so more than the current three officers could stay overnight. He also wants a generator since electricity in the camp is only available 10 hours a day. Once these items BEIRUT 00001201 003 OF 003 are installed, he promised to increase the contingent to 30 officers. Alameddine was unsure what role the ISF will play in the camp but expected that over time the ISF will take over security duties from the LAF. In contrast, the senior LAF official we met in the camp, Major Haytham Salam, said the ISF will handle building permits and the LAF will continue to do policing for the foreseeable future. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Provision of some basic logistical support to the limited ISF contingent at Nahr al-Barid under our existing INL program could provide us some valuable insights on how relations among the ISF, Palestinians and the LAF are developing. We can also help the GOL minimize the risk of missteps by offering to provide technical assistance in promoting dialogue between the ISF and the community. Our INL program can quickly provide basic training for the ISF officers assigned to the camp to help them build good community relations. Longer-term, if the ISF is to succeed in taking over policing at Nahr al-Barid, they and the LAF need to develop a plan for the gradual transfer of security responsibilities. In the coming weeks, we will engage with all parties to help minimize the chance for missteps. SISON