Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT118
2009-01-28 18:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: UNIFIL URGES COMMITMENT TO ENHANCED

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE IS 
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P 281824Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4093
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3403
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RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000118 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO/PDAS WARLICK
PM FOR ACTING A/S RUGGIERO
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE IS
SUBJECT: LEBANON: UNIFIL URGES COMMITMENT TO ENHANCED
TROOP, FUNDING LEVELS

REF: A. BEIRUT 66

B. BEIRUT 39

C. BEIRUT 28

D. BEIRUT 7

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
---------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000118 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA ALSO FOR IO/PDAS WARLICK PM FOR ACTING A/S RUGGIERO P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER NSC FOR MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE IS SUBJECT: LEBANON: UNIFIL URGES COMMITMENT TO ENHANCED TROOP, FUNDING LEVELS REF: A. BEIRUT 66 ¶B. BEIRUT 39 ¶C. BEIRUT 28 ¶D. BEIRUT 7 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Commander General Claudio Graziano hosted an ambassadorial-level briefing for all UNIFIL contributing countries January 27 to update UNIFIL's bilateral partners on UNIFIL capabilities, a timeline of recent events, and lessons learned in the aftermath of the recent Gaza conflict. Graziano's primary message was that UNIFIL, as a Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) mission, could not sustain the type of "massive deployment" that occurred during the Gaza crisis for longer than one month in the event of another crisis situation. As a result, Graziano urged contributing countries to sustain their troop and funding levels, at a minimum, if they could not be augmented. He specifically asked for an additional frigate for the Maritime Task Force and four maneuver units to saturate the area south of the Litani to improve UNIFIL's capacity to contain a future crisis. UNIFIL officers also reported that UNIFIL was considering how to address a perception of lack of credibility among the local population in the south. On a positive note, Graziano reported that UNIFIL-Lebanese Armed Forces cooperation and coordination worked well, and in fact, had improved. ¶2. (C) The UNIFIL political division reported that during the January 16 tripartite meeting UNIFIL reminded each party of its responsibilities under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. However, Lebanon argued its credibility was undermined by Israeli retaliatory fire, while Israel argued its actions were in self-defense. There was no substantive progress to REPORT on Ghajar, Graziano said, although he hoped to meet with Israel's Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Aaron Abramovich to clarify Israel's position. The Blue Line Pilot Strategy, on the other hand, was progressing and 6 km of the 16 km project were already marked. UNMACC reported that it would be forced to reduce the number of Battle Area Clearance (BAC
) teams from 33 to 20 due to lack of sufficient funding, it still had not received Israeli strike data, and 12 percent of the 48 million square meters of contaminated area had not yet undergone evaluation or clearing munitions of any kind. End summary. GRAZIANO URGES CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES TO SUSTAIN TROOP, FUNDING LEVELS TO IMPROVE CREDIBILITY -------------- ¶3. (C) UNIFIL Commander Claudio Graziano convened ambassadors January 27 for a presentation at UNIFIL House in Beirut to provide an update on UNIFIL's activities and capabilities in the aftermath of the December/January Gaza conflict. The presentation covered the time period between UNIFIL's discovery of rockets in Naqoura (south Lebanon) on December 25 (Ref D),the start of Israeli attacks on Gaza December 27, and subsequent rocket attacks from Lebanon to Israel January 8 and 14 (Refs A-C). Graziano informed the gathering that the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) investigation into the rocket attacks was proceeding, but to date no persons or groups were charged with launching the rocket attacks. ¶4. (C) Graziano said the current structure of UNIFIL was that of a Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) mission, which only supports approximately 3300 deployable soldiers in a "normal situation." During the Gaza crisis, however, UNIFIL undertook a "massive deployment," utilizing the maximum number of assets available for deployment at one time. UNIFIL's Maritime Task Force (MTF) was also placed on high alert during the crisis, despite having limited maritime assets, such as fully-equipped frigates capable of BEIRUT 00000118 002 OF 003 surveillance. Press reported January 28 that France would withdraw its two warships serving with UNIFIL off of Lebanon's coast. From the Gaza experience, UNIFIL learned that this type of "crisis-level" deployment would only be sustainable for approximately one month in any future crisis, Graziano said. As a result, he urged troop contributing countries and donors to enhance commitments to UNIFIL's troop and funding levels. Graziano specifically asked for a frigate for the Maritime Task Force and four maneuver units to saturate the area south of the Litani to improve UNIFIL's capacity to contain a future crisis. (Note: The U.S. is a donor, not a troop contributing country, to UNIFIL. End note.) ¶5. (C) UNIFIL officers also reported that recent surveys of the local population in south Lebanon showed satisfaction with UNIFIL's and the LAF's ability to provide security. However, the surveys also showed a perception that UNIFIL and the LAF could not provide adequate protection from groups attempting to launch rockets or from Israeli retaliation, thus showing a perceived lack of credibility. UNIFIL officers assured the group that this was "only a perception," but it was critical for UNIFIL to address the concerns. The best way to combat the perception would be for UNIFIL to increase its number of deployable troops; contain Israeli retaliatory fire; and address persistent violations of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 by both sides, the officers said. Graziano noted continuing reports of possible smuggling of weapons from camps in the Bekaa, which are outside of UNIFIL's area of operations. In addition, he noted that 21 Israeli overflights occurred January 25. TRIPARTITE DISCUSSION ON ROCKET INCIDENTS -------------- ¶6. (C) The most recent tripartite discussion between UNIFIL, the LAF and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) occurred on January 16, following rocket attacks from Lebanon to Israel on January 8 and 14. UNIFIL representatives to the meeting framed the discussion by saying: - The firing of rockets from Lebanon was "hostile activity" and a flagrant violation of UNSCR 1701; - Israel's decision to launch retaliatory fire after the January 8 and January 14 attacks without prior warning to UNIFIL was in direct contravention to the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) Agreement; and - Lebanon was responsible for ensuring no provocative actions contrary to the CoH Agreement occurred and held primary responsibility for the area between the line of withdrawal and the Litani River. ¶7. (C) In response, the LAF stressed its efforts to prevent rocket attacks, but claimed that retaliatory fire by the IDF played into the hands of those trying to provoke a conflict, UNIFIL reported. For its part, the IDF recognized the LAF's cooperation and coordination efforts with UNIFIL, but maintained retaliatory fire was "necessary and justified for self-defense" in both instances. UNIFIL argued that the rockets launched on January 14 never reached Israeli territory, therefore retaliation fire contravened the CoH Agreement. (Note: Graziano noted to the ambassadors that pan-Arab television network Al-Jazeera reported this fact prior to Israeli acknowledgment. End note.) UPDATE ON GHAJAR & BLUE LINE PILOT STRATEGY -------------- ¶8. (C) Graziano informed the ambassadors that there was no substantive progress on the issue of Ghajar. The November 22, 2008 expiration date for UNIFIL's withdrawal proposal had passed without a formal answer from either Lebanon or Israel, nor had Israel responded to Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad BEIRUT 00000118 003 OF 003 Siniora's alternate proposal. (Note: Earlier the same day, Ambassador met with President Sleiman, who echoed Graziano's assessment. End note.) Graziano continued that he hoped the Ghajar issue could be resolved, ideally prior to or during the electoral season because it would be a boost for both the Israeli and Lebanese governments. (Note: Israeli elections are scheduled for February 10, while Lebanon's parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 7. End note.) Ghajar, he said, is Lebanese territory and unlike Shebaa Farms, is not in Qspute. He said he expected to meet with Israel's Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Aaron Abramovich "soon" to brief him and address what appeared to be "confusion" about Ghajar, he said. Graziano said he would seek to clarify the Israeli position and REPORT back to Lebanon. ¶9. (C) However, UNIFIL's Blue Line Pilot Strategy was progressing well, UNIFIL political officers reported. The parties had agreed to extend the pilot project to 16 km of the Blue Line, and to date, 6 km was completed with either barrel or flag markers. Discussions continued, they said, on the remaining coordinates, but UNIFIL had secured agreement from both sides to unilaterally mark contentious points on a case-by-case basis. Whenever measurements were taken for specific coordinates, "almost always" both Israel and Lebanon were within the margin of error agreed to by both sides, they reported. UNMACC WAITING FOR STRIKE DATA -------------- ¶10. (C) TeKimiti Gilbert, Chief of Staff for the UN Mine Action Coordination Center (UNMACC),explained that UNMACC had reverted back to the UN structure, while its LAF partners were now embedded with the Lebanese Mine Action Center, which has its headquarters in Nabatieh (south Lebanon). UNMACC would face a reduction from 33 to 20 Battle Area Clearance (BAC) teams beginning in March, if additional funding was not secured, he reported. The estimated total contaminated area in the south, he said, included 48 million square meters; 12 percent of which UNMACC had not evaluated or begun any type of munitions clearing to date, he said. UNMACC was still waiting for strike data from Israel from the July 2006 war, he said. Both Graziano and the UNMACC director agreed that unidentified cluster munitions posed the greatest risks to civilians and demining teams. To date, 154,345 unexploded cluster munitions were found; while 16,115 unexploded artillery shells, mortar rounds, grenades and other unexploded ordnance were found. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The January 27 UNIFIL briefing was likely a preview of sections of the next UNSCR 1701 report, due in March. UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) Michael Williams recently told the Ambassador he would be making a tour of the European capitals in the coming days. We expect that one of the messages he will carry will be for troop contributing countries to sustain, if not increase, their troop commitments to UNIFIL, while seeking similar commitments from donors. End note. SISON

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