LAF OFFICERS DESCRIBE CHALLENGES IN SOUTH LEBANON

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 001176 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019 TAGS: PREL MARR PTER MOPS KPKO MCAP UNSC IS LE SUBJECT: LAF OFFICERS DESCRIBE CHALLENGES IN SOUTH LEBANON REF: A. BEIRUT 1153 ¶B. BEIRUT 819 ¶C. BEIRUT 995 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A formal strategy paper would be a critical tool to maintain Congressional support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),DASD Colin Kahl explained to LAF commander General Jean Kahwagi on October 22. Kahwagi portrayed the October 12 Tayr Felsayh incident as perplexing, but reported no evidence of an explosion. The Ambassador and DASD Kahl stressed a growing U.S. perception that the LAF needed to take a more active stance in preventing events such as the July 14 Khirbet Selim explosion rather than simply investigating such incidents. Kahwagi replied that the LAF needed increased capacity in order to strip away Hizballah,s "alibi" of being the only capable security force in Lebanon, but the true solution was a regional political one. Kahwagi praised the Tripartite mechanism among the LAF, UNIFIL, and the IDF, describing the dynamic as very positive. In a separate meeting, BG Abdulruhman Chehaitly, Lebanese representative to the Tripartite, reported that coordination with UNIFIL had improved, although he expressed concern that a new UNIFIL force commander might overreact to security incidents and alienate local residents. End Summary. TOWARD AN LAF STRATEGY -------------- ¶2. (C) A formal LAF strategy paper with a 10- to 15-year horizon and tied to performance milestones would be a critical tool to maintain U.S. support, visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Kahl explained to LAF commander General Jean Kahwagi. USG support for the LAF is a "critical pillar" of U.S. regional policy and depends upon transforming the LAF to meet Lebanese security needs and enforce UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, Kahl pointed out. Kahwagi replied that the Joint Military Conference (JMC) scheduled for February 2010 in Washington would be an ideal venue for him to share the "many ideas" he had on developing the LAF. Kahl offered to send a delegation to Lebanon prior to the JMC to assist the LAF in this process. LAF RESPONSE TO TAYR FELSAYH INCIDENT -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador noted continuing U.S. concern over incidents such as Khirbet Selim, the September 11 rocket launches, and Tayr Felsayh. Kahwagi portrayed the October 12 Tayr Felsayh incident as perplexing (ref A),but he insisted that troops present at the scene reported no evidence of an explosion. Responding to allegations of a delayed LAF response to the incident, he explained that no troops were in the area of the small village, so patrols needed time to reach the scene. No arms cache was found in the garage, Kahwagi insisted, although he allowed that perhaps a rocket or some type of munition ignited in the building even though "nothing was found, not even a trace on the walls." ¶4. (C) The LAF was unaware that evidence was moved from Tayr Felsayh to nearby Deir Qanoun an-Nahar until UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) commander General Claudio Graziano shared the Israeli surveillance video, Kahwagi claimed. He explained that since over 20 hours had passed between the incident at Tayr Felsayh and the LAF's arrival at the second location on October 13, Hizballah could have disposed of more evidence. The previous Hizballah arms cache explosion in Khirbet Selim on July 15 (ref B) was a violation of UNSCR 1701, Kahwagi admitted, but he claimed that the LAF alone could not prevent such incidents. The Ambassador and DASD Kahl emphasized the need for the LAF to prevent such incidents rather than merely investigate them. Kahwagi downplayed the incidents, saying the citizens of the south did not want another war or an escalation. REGIONAL SOLUTION NEEDED FOR HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶5. (C) DASD Kahl warned of a potential negative perception forming in Washington of LAF performance and implementation of UNSCR 1701 because of the LAF's apparently close relationship with Hizballah. Kahwagi disputed the use of the term "close," noting that the GOL considered Hizballah a legitimate "resistance force" to Israel, so he had no option but to work with it along the southern border. The Ambassador noted that a delegation of four Hizballah MPs and Hizballah's security chief, Wafiq Safa, had called on General Kahwagi shortly before the arrival of the U.S. delegation. Kahwagi underscored that Hizballah was not a traditional militia, but rather a part of society, with supporters or members in nearly every Shia home. Hizballah is an old problem, he insisted, one bigger than the LAF's capacity and requiring a regional and international solution. ¶6. (C) When asked about the LAF's strategy toward Hizballah, Kahwagi asserted that the LAF needed increased capacity in order to strip away Hizballah,s "alibi" of being the only capable security force in Lebanon. The true solution, he repeated, was a political one given the regional and international nature of Hizballah,s support. Kahwagi dismissed the option of fighting Hizballah, which he described as "a fact of life." BORDER CONTROL A STRUGGLE -------------- ¶7. (C) Kahwagi stressed the enormity of securing the borders from arms smuggling, a task that "goes back to increased LAF capability." The LAF recently sent a battalion-sized unit to perform border security work, Kahwagi revealed, although he emphasized that the LAF could only work with its limited assets, which were "stretched to the maximum." U.S. assistance in raising the LAF,s capabilities was critical, he insisted. TRIPARTITE BUILDS TRUST WITH IDF -------------- ¶8. (C) Kahwagi praised the Tripartite mechanism among the LAF, UNIFIL, and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF),noting that the LAF participants represented not only the LAF, but the GOL as a whole. While the dynamic had been tense six months before, he explained, current dynamics and communication via UNIFIL were very positive. In a separate meeting, the LAF representative to the Tripartite, BG Abdulruhman Chehaitly, echoed Kahwagi's optimism and told Kahl that since the mid-July Khirbet Selim incident, coordination with UNIFIL had improved thanks to increased joint patrols. Chehaitly also noted the progressive demarcation of the Blue Line, which had reached nearly one-third of the projected 149 points even though the press ignored this success story. The Tripartite mechanism also built trust between the LAF and the IDF, he added. Chehaitly concluded that the LAF had gained support in the south, noting that for the first time in nearly 30 years southerners "believed there is government in Lebanon." EXAMINING UNIFIL'S ROLE -------------- ¶9. (C) Chehaitly expressed concern that a new force commander replacing MG Graziano might overreact to security incidents and alienate local residents. One way to integrate the relationship, he assessed, was to develop more civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) units (ref C). He bemoaned the fact that UNIFIL battalions -- not the GOL or the LAF -- were spearheading healthcare and educational projects in the south. "We must be able to provide for our own society," Chehaitly asserted, appealing to us for basic military supplies. He intimated that UNIFIL could quickly provide the LAF basic items such as barbed wire by circumventing UNIFIL rules against donating directly to the LAF since assistance from donor countries arrives slowly. ¶10. (C) The LAF must one day assume UNIFIL's role in the south, Chehaitly explained. In order to do so, the LAF must improve training, obtain more reliable equipment, and focus on CIMIC training. The LAF suffers from equipment shortages, but it is also stretched thin due to expanding mission requirements, Chehaitly pointed out. He bemoaned that the poor quality of the Internal Security Forces necessitates deployment of LAF soldiers to handle routine police work. Counter-terrorism remains the LAF's prime mission, he said, but because of the challenges from Palestinian refugee camps and Lebanon,s diverse terrain, the LAF can only address that mission if it has mobile quick-reaction forces. Chehaitly also provided positive feedback on the concept of a formal LAF strategy paper outlining a 10-15 year timeline and performance milestones and welcomed the idea of working closely with the U.S. side to define this strategy. ¶11. (U) DASD Kahl has cleared this cable. SISON