THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON AS POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 001130 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2019 TAGS: KJUS UNSC PTER PREL SOCI PINR LE SY SUBJECT: THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON AS POLITICAL FOOTBALL REF: A. BEIRUT 500 ¶B. BEIRUT 972 ¶C. BEIRUT 1044 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is still a political football, with opposition-aligned figures striving to discredit it and the majority pledging its support for the STL's mission of bringing to justice those responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. In spite of the ongoing debate in Lebanon over the STL's neutrality, the tribunal's Beirut field office continues interviewing witnesses, including those aligned with Hizballah. End summary. ¶2. (C) With the STL's convocation in the Netherlands on March 1, 2009, the process of bringing those responsible for Rafik Hariri's murder to justice shifted outside of Lebanon. The impact of the STL process nonetheless remains a key factor in the calculations of Lebanese political players. The accusing finger, previously pointed at Syria, shifted toward Hizballah with the May 23 publication of an article in Der Spiegel, which alleged that a Hizballah special unit carried out the assassination. The article claimed that STL investigators relied on cellular telephone records, along with other techniques, to reach this conclusion. The public airing of this accusation forced a re-framing of the debate over the STL inside Lebanon. OPPOSITION SEEKS TO DISCREDIT STL -------------- ¶3. (C) The opposition's key strategy to confronting the STL has been to discredit it. In its first official act on April 29, the STL ordered the release of four former Lebanese generals -- held for nearly four years on suspicion of planning and/or implementing the assassination at Syria's behest -- after it determined that sufficient evidence did not exist to prosecute them. The opposition attempted to use the release to its advantage in the June 7 elections by claiming that the unjust incarceration of the generals by the court showed that it is biased and politicized (ref A). ¶4. (C) This charge was rolled out again on August 30 when one of the former detainees, former General Security chief General Jamil al-Sayyed, used the fourth anniversary of his arrest to excoriate the STL and its supporters. Throughout the summer, opposition-aligned voices in the media had called for an investigation of Lebanese prosecutor general Saeed Mirza, whom they accused of being responsible for the imprisonment of the generals. The same refrain was joined by the Syrian government on September 8 when it filed a letter with the UN Security Council accusing Detlev Mehlis, the head of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (the STL's predecessor),of improperly targeting Syria through his investigation. ¶5. (C) Members of the parliamentary majority, as well as Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, believe that one of Hizballah's primary goals now is to derail the STL's investigation. Hizballah is "still afraid" of the STL, Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri told the Ambassador on October ¶2. The group is "pre-positioning" itself for the outcome of the tribunal, accusing the STL of being politicized in order to diminish the impact should the STL accuse Hizballah of involvement in Hariri,s assassination. Jumblatt, who has said that justice is in the hands of the STL, has publicly reiterated his claim that the Der Spiegel article was a fabrication planted to encourage sectarian tension in Lebanon. Jumblatt's former allies in the majority ascribe his public statements to his conviction that an STL charge aimed at Hizballah would result in Sunni-Shia sectarian strife (ref B). Meanwhile, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) Michael Williams has predicted that the current "orchestrated assault" on the STL will only get more intense as time goes on. STL CONTINUES WORK OUTSIDE THE LIMELIGHT -------------- ¶6. (C) Although Hariri and his allies rally around the STL, they also emphasize that bringing charges is the responsibility of the tribunal and that they will accept any conclusion. Given the lack of high-profile investigations on the ground, many in Lebanon wonder when the STL will take action. Hariri himself, despite his pledge to find his father's killers, does not expect a resolution anytime soon. In discussing eventual STL indictments, Hariri predicted a "Milosevic-like" scenario entailing a long delay before those indicted were brought to trial in an October 2 conversation with the Ambassador. The Prime Minister-designate indicated he would take a "non-confessional" position if the STL indicted Hizballah, emphasizing that he wanted STL prosecution and not a civil war. He did not sense, however, that the STL investigation was nearing the stage of issuing indictments. ¶7. (C) The STL's Beirut field office is increasing the pace of its interviews with witnesses, Valerio Aquila, the head of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in Beirut, told polchief and Legatt on October 13. The OTP, which began work on July 1, houses around 20 permanent staff from both the OTP and the STL Registrar's office, in addition to a similar number of TDYers. Although the OTP can summon witnesses directly itself, Valerio praised the "good cooperation" that his team has experienced with the Lebanese general prosecutor's office, headed by Mirza. When the OTP contacts the general prosecutor to request a witness interview, he said, the prosecutor's office passes that request to the judicial police to be served, either in writing or verbally. ¶8. (C) Aquila, who confided that he has thus far faced no difficulties in interviewing witnesses affiliated with Hizballah, expressed hope that the level of GOL cooperation will remain high in the future. Nevertheless, Aquila underscored that the GOL has "lost its (legal) competence" in all issues related to the STL's mandate, and the tribunal is now working independently under a hybrid of general procedures inspired by international law while drawing from Lebanese criminal law to fill in legal gaps. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) March 14-aligned contacts continue to speculate that Hizballah will try to stymie the STL from within the government. From our conversation with OTP Chief Aquila, it would appear that the STL's work, supported by the Lebanese judiciary and law enforcement, has not to date been subject to political pressure. Nonetheless, the Special Tribunal will continue to be subject to intense scrutiny within Lebanese media and political circles. SISON