Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT1058
2009-09-25 14:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

GEMAYEL PREDICTS NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE A

Tags:  PGOV KDEM LE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 001058 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2019
TAGS: PGOV KDEM LE
SUBJECT: GEMAYEL PREDICTS NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE A
"COMPROMISED COMPROMISE"

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons
1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 001058 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM LE SUBJECT: GEMAYEL PREDICTS NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE A "COMPROMISED COMPROMISE" Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Lebanon's government formation crisis is the result of external interference but should not be solved through additional meddling, Kataeb party leader and former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel told the Ambassador. Although he discounted most formulas currently under discussion for government formation, Gemayel relayed that he had had told Saad Hariri, "Maybe a leaders' cabinet is a way out." He worried that the March 8 opposition was winning the battle for the sympathies of voters, especially in the divided Christian community. Gemayel revealed that he and other March 14 leaders -- absent Druze leader Walid Jumblatt -- have convened twice in the last ten days to develop a strategy to counter the opposition and respond to potential civil disturbances. He underscored that public statements of the USG's strong support for "an independent and sovereign Lebanon" are needed after cabinet consultations finish September 30. End summary. PESSIMISM ABOUT NEW ROUND OF CABINET TALKS -------------- ¶2. (C) A dour Amine Gemayel placed the blame for Lebanon's government formation crisis squarely on the shoulders of regional actors during a meeting with the Ambassador September 24. He decried an external resolution to the crisis, which he said would "come at the expense of Lebanon." Fearing that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's trip to the opening of King Abdullah University for Science and Technology indicated a Saudi desire "to get rid of this problem," the former president opined, "Syria is willing to get control of our government regardless of who or how." Gemayel, who has recently passed to us reports that his MP son Sami's life has been threatened, alleged that Hizballah was "ready for another May 7th...ready for the use of terrorism...ready for a new political assassination." ¶3. (C) Gemayel ran through various proposed alternatives (e.g., a technocratic cabinet, a cabinet composed of party leaders) to the 15-10-5 cabinet formula that framed the first round of discussions. Although he discounted most options, he related that he had had told Hariri, "Maybe a (political) leaders' cabinet is a way out," based on his assessment of the success of this model in 1958. However, he was not optimistic it would work. The system, Gemayel lamented, �
A;would only lead to another ineffective government, and he predicted that whatever resulted from Hariri's current effort would be a "compromised compromise." Gemayel nonetheless underscored that public statements of the USG's strong support for "an independent and sovereign Lebanon" would be needed after cabinet consultations finish September 30. ¶4. (C) Gemayel conceded that the March 8 opposition was winning the battle for the sympathies of voters, especially in the divided Christian community. He criticized Hariri for not understanding the Christian dynamic and warned that Hariri's failed first draft cabinet was extremely damaging to the March 14th Christians, specifically to the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb factions. By giving Michel Aoun's bloc the important ministries, Gemayel said, "Saad encouraged the Christians to (go to) Aoun." He seemed particularly offended that his son Sami, a newly-elected MP, was put up for the tourism ministry, scoffing, "We are not responsible for cabarets...and crowning Miss Lebanon, Miss Universe..." (Note: Sami Gemayel had previously told us that he would refuse to join the cabinet if given the tourism ministry, and Kataeb has floated in and out of the March 14 secretariat recently in an attempt to garner two instead of one cabinet positions. End note.) PREPARATIONS FOR A CRISIS CELL -------------- ¶5. (C) Gemayel revealed that he and other March 14 leaders -- absent Druze leader Walid Jumblatt -- had convened twice in the last ten days to develop a strategy to counter the opposition. (Note: Gemayel was adamant that Jumblatt's withdrawal from March 14 was irreversible and that he could not rejoin the coalition. End note.) We separately obtained from March 14 Secretary General Fares Suaid the draft strategy based upon the conclusions of the first two meetings. Following are some of the suggested tactics, in order of their suggested deployment: - Organizing a media campaign to mobilize Lebanese and Arab public opinion behind March 14. - Sending delegations of March 14 figures to Arab and Western capitals to drum up support. - Debating with President Sleiman the role of the Lebanese Armed Forces in maintaining internal security. - Launching a media campaign based on the concepts of loyalty and reliance on the constitution. - Energizing the Christian base by coordinating with the Maronite patriarch, decrying Hizballah's arms as being illegitimate, and pushing the president to assume his role in protecting the constitution. - Energizing the March 14 base with a media campaign based on "our right to life." - Integrate (independent) Shia figures into March 14th. - Encouraging Sunni leaders to call for calm and urging Shia leaders to recognize the danger of escalation. The strategy also mentions suggested reactions to potential street disturbances generated by the opposition: - Attracting public support by condemning illegal arms and sectarianism and protesting Iranian and Syrian meddling. - Prayer vigils and peace protests. - Appeals directly to the Iranian and Syrian people to halt the "aggression" against Lebanon. - Calling on the Arab League to send troops to Lebanon. - Calling on the UN Security Council to protect Lebanon from external aggression. COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) There is an emerging admission among March 14 leaders that Hariri's tactical mistakes in cabinet negotiations, in addition to opposition obstinance, led to the collapse of the first round of talks. Growing evidence indicates that Hariri is now consulting more closely with his allies and seeking common ground with his opponents as he enters the second round. SISON

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