LEBANESE RELIGIOUS LEADERS PESSIMISTIC ON PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001043 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINS KDEM SCUL KISL LE VT SUBJECT: LEBANESE RELIGIOUS LEADERS PESSIMISTIC ON PROGRESS Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a mid-September round of calls by the Ambassador, Lebanese religious leaders expressed pessimism about political progress and ruled out deconfessionalization of Lebanon's political system. Sunni Mufti Qabbani accused Hizballah of undermining the state, and his Shia counterpart Mufti Qabalan dismissed talk of Sunni-Shia reconciliation. While the religious leaders criticized foreign interference in Lebanese affairs, they were equally dubious of the protracted government formation process. While tensions exist between the Sunni and Shia communities, both sides recognize the dangers of overt appeals to sectarianism. End summary. REGIONAL POLARIZATION REFLECTED LOCALLY -------------- ¶2. (C) Sunni Mufti Sheikh Mohammad Rashid Qabbani accused Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah of declaring that the group will rule Lebanon no matter the election results. During a September 9 meeting with the Ambassador at Dar al-Fatwa in Aisha Bekkar, Qabbani insisted the opposition's primary goal was "to take over this country" and complained that Lebanese policy should prevail in Lebanon, not Iranian policy. Even when PM-designate Saad Hariri manages to form a government, said Qabbani, Iranian influence in Lebanon will thwart the government's ability to serve Lebanon's people effectively. According to Qabbani, recent rhetoric on reconciliation was simply an effort by political leaders to use Ramadan to further their own interests. "You cannot solve problems by gathering around an iftar banquet," Qabbani quipped, a sentiment that was echoed to the Ambassador on September 14 by Shia Mufti Sheikh Abdel Amir Qabalan, if for different reasons. "All these iftars are useless," complained Qabalan, who also described Qabbani as the "Mufti of the American Republic." ¶3. (C) Some religious leaders voiced their fear that a stalled government formation process could lead to clashes between sects, especially Sunnis and Shia. These fears were reinforced when the press reported an assassination attempt against Qabbani that was allegedly to take place on September 20, the first day of Eid al-Fitr. Qabbani subsequently denied the reports, saying the rumors were spread with the aim of obstructing constitutional efforts in Lebanon, spreading panic, and undermining stability and security. Lebanese daily an-Nahar reported this week, though, that security concerns have been a top priority for both religious and political leaders due to fears that certain groups will capitalize on the delay in cabinet formation "to exchange regional messages and turn Lebanon into a battlefield for sectarian strife." LEBANON INSEPARABLY BOUND TO REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS -------------- ¶4. (C) Religious leaders also weighed in on the role of foreign actors. While refraining from pointing the finger directly at Iran, Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir told the Ambassador on September 11 that Lebanon's QvyNQ{*D#CQantly interfering in its domestic affairs. Armenian Orthodox Catholicos Aram I was more measured in his comments when he observed, "You cannot speak of Lebanon in isolation. It is very much connected to what is happening in the Middle East." Qabalan, for his part, took a patently darker view of the influence of outside actors upon Lebanon, whom he blamed for Lebanon's woes. He admitted his own concern over the protracted government formation process, noting that there could be no meaningful progress in Lebanon until the cabinet was formed because "a country without a government is like sheep without a shepherd." ¶5. (C) Most religious leaders counseled against seeking outside help to solve Lebanon's internal problems. Sfeir BEIRUT 00001043 002 OF 003 rejected the possibility that a second Doha summit would solve the current government formation crisis. Aram I, who said that the "tranquilizers" of outside interference never yield a lasting solution, was of a similar mind. Qabalan also agreed that outside help would do little to resolve the current Lebanese predicament. "We hope to have a mainly Lebanese solution, although we thank anyone who is willing to extend the hand of help," he said. CHRISTIAN POLITICAL DIVISIONS REFLECTED WITHIN THE COMMUNITY -------------- ¶6. (C) Lebanon's Christian religious leaders were equally dubious about the future possibility of reconciliation between disparate factions. Maronite Patriarch Sfeir complained, "How can a government govern with both a majority and an opposition? It's as though there is a cart with a horse before it and a horse behind it." Sfeir was skeptical of the Vatican's ability to bring about Christian reconciliation in Lebanon. "I don't know if (Pope Benedict XVI) has the power to change the situation," he said. "Lebanon is the smallest child in the family." Aram I dismissed out of hand the Vatican's ability to effect a reconciliation within Lebanon's divided Christian community. "The Vatican cannot do anything, and a new patriarch is not the solution either," he calculated, referring to speculation that replacing the aging and polarizing Sfeir might help foster Christian unity. ALL AGREE THAT THE STATE MUST PROVIDE SECURITY -------------- ¶7. (C) Lebanese sovereignty cannot be achieved or maintained without security, Lebanon's religious leaders agreed, including Qabalan, who acknowledged the government's responsibility to provide security. Greek Orthodox Archbishop Elias Audi surmised that the Lebanese do not possess the ability to govern themselves without the necessary governmental institutions and security apparatus to back them. "As long as Hizballah is stronger than the state, we will not be in a happy position and the state will not function," Audi observed. Qabbani agreed with Audi, insisting, "For a country to rule it must be in control of its own land, and its arms must be in the hands of the state." Sfeir also pointed to Hizballah as the primary impediment to a sovereign Lebanon. "There is no country in the world where there is an official army and a second army, yet it is the reality here." DECONFESSIONALIZATION A PIPE DREAM? -------------- ¶8. (C) Both Muslim and Christian leaders were wary of criticizing Lebanon's sectarian system despite increasing popular support for deconfessionalization. "It can't be done," Qabbani insisted, adding, "It's not that someone is not Sunni or Shia or Christian. It's that someone has a sense of nationalism." Qabbani asserted that there is no tension between Lebanon's religious sects and that deconfessionalization is neither practical nor necessary. "It is the way of the opposition to try and deconfessionalize," he argued. "Any confession that is in power will claim to support deconfessionalization, but its own objective will be, in the end, confessionalism." Qabalan, in contrast, held the Sunnis accountable for Lebanon's inability to implement deconfessionalization noting that it "requires unanimity" and that "there is a big Lebanese party that is not in a hurry to achieve this goal." ¶9. (C) Lebanon's Christian leaders were somewhat more measured in their views. Sfeir described the Lebanese as "very attached to their religion," while Aram I considered that "Lebanon is a country of communities, but it cannot be a melting pot like the U.S." The institutionalization of BEIRUT 00001043 003 OF 003 sectarianism is the problem, he maintained, describing coexistence as "precarious" and requiring measured dialog. Audi was particularly frank when asked for his thoughts on the recent decision by the interior ministry to remove religious affiliation from national identification cards. "Even if you take a person's religion off of his ID card, you still can figure out his confession from his dialect, his name, or his village," he argued. For deconfessionalization to work, he explained, "You have to educate people from birth to see the other person as a brother." COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) The remarks of Qabbani and Qabalan exemplify the underlying tensions between the Sunnis and the Shia. While it currently seems unlikely that these tensions will translate into street violence reminiscent of the May 2008 clashes, political speech with sectarian overtones often sparks physical conflict in Lebanon. As Hizballah's Nasrallah warned in a September 18 speech, sectarian speech is a "two-edged sword" that causes all to suffer. SISON